Peter Gold

The UK Overseas Territories: a decade of progress and prosperity?

This article analyses the relationship between the UK and its Overseas Territories since the publication of the 1999 White Paper Partnership for Progress and Prosperity. The article considers the efforts by the UK government to improve links with the territories via a new partnership based on mutual obligations and responsibilities. It focuses on the two most important aspects of the White Paper – governance and economic growth and sustainability. Much has been achieved, but fundamental structural problems in the relationship remain unattended. The article concludes by recommending how the relationship can be improved over the coming years.

Identity Formation in Gibraltar: Geopolitical, Historical and Cultural Factors

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Immigration into the European Union via the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla: A reflection of regional economic disparities

As the only EU territories in North Africa, the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla are unique points of entry for immigrants into the EU. The Euro‐Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) or Barcelona Process is designed to reduce disparities between Europe and the countries of the South and East Mediterranean and thereby tackle the immigration problem in the medium to long term. In addition there are short‐term measures outside the EMP that are being taken. But the EMP, although an ambitious and major commitment by the EU towards non‐European Mediterranean countries, is unlikely to result in sufficient economic growth to have a significant effect on the immigration issue. Nor has the Partnership made much progress through the third chapter of the Barcelona Declaration in tackling the immigration concerns of countries from both sides of the Mediterranean. In the foreseeable future the enclaves will therefore continue to attract would‐be immigrants into the EU from across Africa.

The Tripartite Forum of Dialogue: Is this the Solution to the ‘Problem’ of Gibraltar?

Following the abortive attempt by Britain and Spain to negotiate the joint sovereignty of Gibraltar in 2001–02, the incoming Spanish Government in 2004 proposed the establishment of a Forum of Dialogue, in which for the first time Gibraltar would take part as an independent third party. This Forum was designed to achieve cooperation across a number of issues, including the use of the airport, frontier traffic flows, pensions for former Spanish workers in Gibraltar and telecommunications, and by September 2006 proposed solutions were reached on all of them. The paper explores the Forum process and its achievements, but concludes that, given the fundamental differences in the ultimate objectives of the Forum participants and in particular Spains sensitivity to Gibraltars status, the agreements may only prove to be a means of managing the Gibraltar ‘problem’ rather than resolving it. Finally, the article considers whether the Forum model offers any lessons for other disputes in the region where sovereignty is contested.

Department stores in Spain: why El Corte Ingle´s succeeded where Galerías Preciados failed

Explores and compares the strategic development of Spain’s two most important retail organisations, El Corte Ingles and Galerias Preciados. Both department stores were established in the 1930s, but while the former has gone from strength to strength, Galerias Preciados changed hands several times before going into receivership in 1994, when it was bought up by El Corte Ingles. A comparative case study approach which focuses on outlet growth, diversification, financial control and continuity is used to identify the factors which appear to account for the contrasting fates of the organisations. Concludes that careful planning, vertical integration and continuity of ownership and positioning within the context of the macro‐environment contributed to El Corte Ingles’ success and longevity.

Sovereignty Negotiations and Gibraltar's Military Facilities: How Two “Red-Line” Issues Became Three

The Brussels Agreement signed between Britain and Spain in 1984 aimed to resolve all aspects of the dispute over Gibraltar, including sovereignty, which dated back to the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713. Desultory progress was made in negotiations until 2001, when the British Government decided to attempt to negotiate a joint sovereignty agreement. From the outset two non-negotiable (‘red-line’) issues on Britains part were established: the agreement must be permanent, and it must be subject to a referendum in Gibraltar. As the negotiations progressed, a third ‘red-line’ issue emerged: Britain insisted on retaining control of Gibraltars military facilities. The article explores how this third issue emerged and the possible reasons why it did so following 9/11.

Sport as a Political Tool: The Case of Spain and Gibraltar

For almost 300 years Spain and Britain have been in dispute over the sovereignty of Gibraltar, seven sqare kilometres of territory which were captured by an Anglo-Dutch naval force in 1704 and handed to Britain “in perpetuity”by theTreaty of Utrecht signed in 1713. Spain madenumerous attempts to regain the “Rock” by milit‘ary means in the 18th and 19th centuries. More recently “the re-establishment of the territorial integrity of SpaiiP (which is its main justification for the claim) has been sought by recourse to the United Nations since the 1960s, by blockade between 1969 and 1985, and by negotiation since 1984 under a process known as the Brussels Agreement. This guarantees discussion on all differences between BritainandSpain over Gibraltar, including theissueofsovereignty, but until recently has proved relatively fruitless. Talks at Foreign Minister level that restarted in November 2001 after a four-year interval have given Spain some hope that the British Government is prepared to resolve the problem, even though the Gibraltarians themselves remain implacably opposed to any transfer of sovereignty or to Spanish involvement in their affairs. On the sovereignty issue, at least, the people of Gibraltar have been given the power of veto through the guarantee of a referendum.

Gibraltar at the United Nations: Caught Between a Treaty, the Charter and the “Fundamentalism” of the Special Committee

On account of Spains long-standing claim to the sovereignty of the British Overseas Territory of Gibraltar, “the Rock” remains one of sixteen non-self-governing territories on the United Nations list awaiting decolonization. This article examines the principles of self-determination and territorial integrity adopted by the United Nations in consideration of the issue of decolonization as they have been applied to Gibraltar, together with the consequences for the parties concerned. With the fiftieth anniversary of the first United Nations Resolution on decolonization on the horizon and the recent adoption by Gibraltar of what is considered to be a non-colonial constitution, the article suggests that it is timely for the United Nations to consider taking a more flexible approach to Gibraltars status that would put to one side Spains claim but allow Gibraltar to be removed from the UN list.

Parsley Island and the intervention of the United States

On 11 July 2002 a dozen Moroccan armed police occupied Parsley Island, a rocky outcrop off the north Moroccan coast. Five days later Spanish armed forces intervened to ‘liberate’ the island and repatriated the Moroccans. On 20 July, following the intervention of US Secretary of State Colin Powell, the State Department drew up an agreement acceptable to both sides and Spain withdrew. This article examines why Morocco occupied the island, why Spain used force in reply and why the US became involved. As with many territorial disputes, the occupation and the responses to it were symptomatic of more deep-seated grievances between the disputants, while the involvement of the Bush administration was inspired by its own self-interest in the aftermath of 9/11.