Peter J. Sher
National Chi Nan University
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Publication
Featured researches published by Peter J. Sher.
Applied Economics | 2010
Ming-Liang Yeh; Hsiao-Ping Chu; Peter J. Sher; Yi-Chia Chiu
This article tests whether there is an optimal level of research and development (R&D) intensity at which point a firm is able to maximize its performance. An advanced panel threshold regression model is employed to investigate the panel threshold effect of R&D intensity on firm performance among publicly traded Taiwan information technology and electronic firms. The results confirm that a single-threshold effect does exist and show an inverted-U correlation between R&D intensity and firm performance. This article demonstrates that it is possible to identify the definitive level beyond which a further increase in R&D expenditure does not yield proportional rewards. Some important policy implications emerge from the findings.
Applied Economics Letters | 2008
Hsiao-Ping Chu; Peter J. Sher; Ming-Liang Yeh
In this study, the newly-developed Panel SURADF tests advanced by Breuer et al. (2001) are used to investigate whether the growth rate of electronics firms is independent of their size, as postulated by Gibrats (1931) Law of Proportionate Effects. Time-series data for the total assets of 48 electronic firms in Taiwan during the 1995–2004 period are used. Whereas other panel-based unit root tests are joint tests of a unit root for all members of a panel and are incapable of determining the mix of I(0) and I(1) series in a panel setting, the Panel SURADF tests investigate a separate unit root null hypothesis for each individual panel member and are, therefore, able to identify how many and which series in the panel are stationary processes. The empirical results from several panel-based unit root tests indicate that the total assets of all firms studied here are nonstationary, implying that Gibrats Law holds for all 48 firms; however, Breuer et al.s (2001) Panel SURADF tests unequivocally indicate that Gibrats Law is only valid for 27 of those firms.
Innovation-management Policy & Practice | 2012
Beryl Lihua Kuo; Peter J. Sher; Chien-Hsin Lin; Hsin-Yu Shih
Joint ventures and technology licensing can involve contracting and royalty-based payments. Payment behavior is not a simple consequence; it may be a strategic impetus to exchange knowledge. Extending the transaction cost economics, this study examines the effects of non-contractible variables on the strategic preference for payment modes. We test hypotheses using information from a survey of 104 Taiwanese firms and partial least square (PLS) analysis to examine the payment behavior in a technology licensing contract. Considering knowledge tacitness, the licensed technology incurring high transraction costs reduces the source intention to build long-term relationship with the recipient, and thus a fee-based payment is preferred. When shifting the focus of technology or knowledge per se to the heterogeneity of technology recipients, relationship exchange embedded in recipient dependence and learning potential becomes critical in a technology licensing contract, and increase the likelihood of royalty-based payment.
Innovation-management Policy & Practice | 2011
Peter J. Sher; Hsin-Yu Shih; Beryl L. Kuo
Abstract The transfer and commercialization of university technology requires interactive marketing. While a growing number of studies have examined academic entrepreneurship, the relationship between university technology and firm decisions regarding commercialization remains poorly understood. This study employs the firm perspective to holistically outline the characteristics and relationships related to the commercialization of university technology in Taiwan. Using 83 firms involved in acquiring university technology through licensing, joint research or contract research, this study identifies negative relationships between the likelihood of commercialization and guanxi and variable royalties, respectively, suggesting that acquired technology can be considered a short-term, transaction-specific investment in securing further guanxi, and that variable royalties compensate faculty/inventors but recompense recipients for additional transaction costs incurred. The results highlight the need to closely examine the nature of technology, relationship development, and royalties behind commercialization, and recommends further research to develop academic entrepreneurship from the firm perspective.
Psychology & Marketing | 2007
Chien-Hsin Lin; Hsin-Yu Shih; Peter J. Sher
Food Quality and Preference | 2010
Ching-Hsuan Yeh; Ching-I Chen; Peter J. Sher
technology management for global future - picmet conference | 2006
Peter J. Sher; Chien-Hsin Lin
portland international conference on management of engineering and technology | 2014
Hsiao-Chen Mei; Peter J. Sher; Chu-Wen Chen; Shihmin Lo
portland international conference on management of engineering and technology | 2010
Hsiao-Chen Mei; Joseph L. Che; Shihmin Lo; Peter J. Sher
portland international conference on management of engineering and technology | 2014
Beryl Zi-Lin Kuo; Hsin-Yu Shih; Peter J. Sher