Peter J. Wilcoxen

Environmental Regulation and U.S. Economic Growth

In this article we quantify the costs of pollution controls by reporting the results of simulations of the growth of the U.S. economy with and without regulation. For this purpose, we have constructed a detailed model of the economy that includes the determinants of long-term growth. We have also analyzed the interaction between industries in order to capture the full repercussions of environmental regulations. However, we have not attempted to assess the benefits resulting from a cleaner environment. We find that pollution abatement has emerged as a major claimant on the resources of the U.S. economy. The cost of emission controls is more than 10% of the total cost of government purchases of goods and services.

The Theoretical and Empirical Structure of the G-Cubed Model

Abstract This paper describes the theoretical and empirical features of G-Cubed, a multi-country, multi-sector intertemporal general equilibrium model. G-Cubed combines the attractive features of macroeconometric models and computable general equilibrium models into a unified framework. It has been used to study a variety of topics including: greenhouse gas policy, trade liberalization, tax policy and macroeconomic policy. This paper is a technical description of the models design.

The Role of Economics in Climate Change Policy

The most important characteristic of climate change as a policy problem is uncertainty. From climatology to economics, uncertainties are pervasive, large and difficult to resolve. However, the economic theory of environmental policy under uncertainty provides a clear guide to the design of an appropriate policy. An efficient and practical approach would be a hybrid that incorporates the best features of tradable permits and emissions taxes. Unfortunately, international negotiations have taken a different approach, focusing on rigid targets and timetables for emissions reductions. The result has been the Kyoto Protocol, an agreement with no real chance of reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

Reducing US carbon emissions: an econometric general equilibrium assessment

Abstract This paper describes research we conducted as part of Energy Modeling Forum 12, a recent study of the costs of limiting carbon dioxide emissions organized by the Energy Modeling Forum at Stanford University. It discusses how our approach differed from that of other participants in EMF-12 and presents several important findings. In particular, we show that in the United States the effects of a carbon tax will be very similar to the effects of a tax placed solely on coal. Outside the coal sector, the principal effect of carbon tax will be to raise the cost of electricity and to shift base load electric generating capacity toward fuels other than coal. At the aggregate level, higher energy prices will cause gross national product to fall unless the revenue from tax is used to reduce high marginal tax rates elsewhere in the economy.

Carbon Taxes and Economic Welfare

THE POSSIBILITY THAT INCREASED concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere might lead to global warming has emerged as a leading environmental concern. Many nations, including the United States, are considering policies to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide. 1 The policy instrument for reducing carbon dioxide emissions most often recommended by economists is a carbon tax.2 A carbon tax, levied on fossil fuels in proportion to the amount of carbon dioxide they produce during combustion, would stimulate firms and households to reduce fossil fuel use and shift the fuel mix toward less-carbon-intensive fuels, such as natural gas. A carbon tax would internalize the externality associated with carbon

Reducing U.S. carbon dioxide emissions: an assessment of different instruments☆

The possibility that carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel use might lead to global warming has become a leading environmental concern. Many scientific and environmental organizations have called for immediate action to limit carbon dioxide production. For the most part, however, public debate has focused on a single policy instrument: a carbon tax applied to fossil fuels in proportion to their carbon content. We present a detailed model of the U.S. economy and use it to compare carbon taxes with two other instruments that could achieve the same reduction in carbon dioxide emissions: a tax on the energy content of fossil fuels (a BTU tax) and an ad valorem tax on fuel use. We find that carbon taxes can achieve a given reduction with the least overall effect on the economy, but with a large effect on coal mining. Energy taxes are fairly similar to carbon taxes but have slightly less impact on coal mining and slightly greater overall cost. In contrast, ad valorem taxes fall much more lightly on coal mining but have a much greater effect on the economy as a whole.

What to expect from an international system of tradable permits for carbon emissions

We use an econometrically estimated multi-region, multi-sector general equilibrium model of the world economy to examine the effects of using a system of internationally tradable emission permits to control world carbon dioxide emissions. We focus, in particular, on the effects of the system on flows of trade and international capital. Our results show that international trade and capital flows significantly alter projections of the domestic effects of the emissions mitigation policy, compared with analyses that ignore international capital flows, and that under some systems of international permit trading the United States is likely to become a significant permit seller, the opposite of conventional wisdom.

A CREDIBLE FOUNDATION FOR LONG TERM INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON CLIMATE CHANGE

To succeed in reducing carbon dioxide emissions, a climate policy must establish credible long-term incentives for investments in new energy-sector capital and in research and development. We argue that credibility implies that international agreements should focus on enhancing coordination and collaboration between countries, rather than on coercion. At the national level, credibility requires political and economic incentives that can be provided by long-term tradable emissions permits, but it needs more flexibility than can be provided by a conventional permit system. We argue that the best mechanism for providing credible long-term incentives is a hybrid system of long and short term emissions permits. Key aspects of the system would be coordinated across countries but the permits would be issued and traded solely within national borders.

Estimates of the costs of Kyoto: Marrakesh versus the McKibbin-Wilcoxen blueprint

In this paper we update our earlier estimates of the cost of the Kyoto Protocol using the G-Cubed model, taking into account the new sink allowances from recent negotiations as well as allowing for multiple gases and new land clearing estimates. Rather than comparing this to the original Kyoto Protocol as other studies have done, we compare the estimates from the current Kyoto Protocol to a realistic alternative to the Kyoto Protocol outlined by McKibbin and Wilcoxen ( 1197a, 1997b, 2002). A key part of the comparison between the two alternatives is not to predict exactly what the outcome for emissions reduction might be at a future date under each approach. What we want to focus on is the importance of the inherent uncertainty about the future that should be at the heart of the design of a suatainable climate policy. To show how important uncertainty is to the design of the climate policies, we take two alternative plausible assumptions about a single aspect of the future predictions and compare the two regimes under these alternative assumptions. Since climate change is all about policy making under uncertainty it is important in comparing regimes to explore how the regimes handle aspects of uncertainty as well as the average performance of the regimes. This comparison illustrates a fundamental difference between the Kyoto Protocol and the Blueprint.

Comparing Climate Commitments: A Model-Based Analysis of the Copenhagen Accord

The political accord struck by leaders at the United Nations negotiations in Copenhagen in December 2009 allows participants to express their greenhouse gas commitments in a variety of ways. This paper compares the environmental and economic performance of these disparate commitments using the G-Cubed model of the global economy. We focus on fossil-fuel-related CO2 and assume targets are achieved domestically. We show how different formulations make the same targets appear different in stringency and explore the Accords spillover effects across countries. We find that commitments by Japan and Europe imply high carbon prices and relatively high GDP losses. The United States and China both have moderate carbon prices and moderate GDP effects. Australia and Eastern Europe/Former Soviet Union have relatively large GDP effects despite small or zero carbon prices because their terms of trade decline. OPEC suffers a large drop in GDP from a sharp decline in world oil demand.