Peter Lowe

The round table, the dominions, and the Anglo‐Japanese alliance, 1911–1922

The question of the defence of the Dominions bordering the Pacific was fundamental to the transition from Empire to Commonwealth. Tensions between Britain and the Dominions were already apparent before the Great War, fuelled by mistrust of Japan and anxieties arising from the Dominions’ immigration policies. The Round Table recognized the significance of these problems, and, while supporting the Anglo—Japanese Alliance, called for frank discussions to achieve consensus between Britain and the Dominions. This policy was partially adopted by the British Government. After the war, The Round Table argued for an amended alliance, in the context of a wider entente. This option was precluded by the Washington Conference, which gave a significant impetus to subsequent Japanese expansionism.

Change and Stability in Eastern Asia: Nationalism, Communism, and British Policy, 1948–1955

British policy in Eastern Asia, 1948–55, aimed to combine the attainment of change leading to stability, to be secured through cooperating with nationalism against the growing threat from communism. After initial errors, ministers and officials revealed realism and flexibility, as shown in policies towards Burma, Malaya, and China. As regards Japan, the United States dominated decisionmaking and British views were rather negative towards the viability of political reform in the longer term and towards economic revival. The collapse of French authority in Indo-China pushed Anthony Eden towards compromise with the communist powers at the Geneva conference in 1954: Britain diverged from the US in supporting a strictly defensive alliance (SEATO), which was linked with an ambivalent approach to the future of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

After fifty years: the San Francisco Peace Treaty in the context of Anglo-Japanese relations, 1902–52

The approach of the British government towards Japan in 1950–1 was more negative than that of the United States. The British attitude was influenced by several factors: the ignominy of the surrender of Singapore in 1942, resentment at American domination of the Occupation of Japan, apprehension concerning renewed Japanese competition affecting textiles, potteries and shipbuilding, and bitterness resulting from atrocities inflicted on the prisoners-of-war. For most of the century preceding the Pacific War Britain had been the principal power in Eastern Asia and British policy makers found it difficult to adjust to the reduced role Britain occupied in 1950. Labour cabinet ministers revealed some hostility towards Japan during diplomatic exchanges with John Foster Dulles in 1951. Herbert Morrison, the Foreign Secretary, and Hugh Gaitskell, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, were compelled to accept American decisions except on the limited issue of the Congo Basin treaties where Dulles made a concession to Britain. Significant differences in approach to the rival Chinese regimes also created problems in 1951. British forecasts concerning the future of Japan were negative: it was anticipated that, within a decade, Japan could become assertive, with the risk of reactionary right-wing groups emerging.

Review Article: War and War Plans in the Far East

ONG CHIT CHUNG. Operation Matador: Britains War Plans against the Japanese, 1918–1941. Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1997; dist. Portland, Oreg.: ISBS.Pp. xiv, 314.

The Vietnam War

25.00 (US), paper; PETER ELPHICK. Far Eastern File: The Intelligence War in the Far East, 1930–1945. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1997. Pp. xvii, 510. £20.00; GUNTER BISCHOF and ROBERT L. DUPONT, eds. The Pacific War Revisited. Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1997; dist. Toronto: Scholarly Book Services. Pp. xiii, 220.

J. Clements (2008). Prince Saionji: Japan J. Clements (2008). Wellington Koo: China A. Dalby (2010). South East Asia: Prince Charoon and others

38.75 (CDN). Reviewed by Peter Lowe

The Korean War

Introduction P.Lowe - Origins and Alternatives: Comments, Counter-facts and Commitments A.Short - Coping with the United States: Hanois Search for an Effective Strategy N.V.Tung - South Vietnam N.V.Long - The United States and Vietnam D.L.Anderson - The Anti-Vietnam War Movement in the United States T.Wells - Developing an Alliance: The Soviet Union and Vietnam, 1954-1975 I.V.Gaiduk - China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 C.Jian - Australia and the Vietnam War C.Bridge - International Aspects of the Vietnam War A.Parker - Maps - Index

From Singapore to Tokyo Bay, 1941–45

The Paris peace conference of 1919–20 brought together representatives of 32 nations in an ambitious attempt to resolve the numerous problems bequeathed by the First World War. Haus Publishing decided to produce a series of short volumes, focusing on personalities associated with the conference and the three works reviewed here discuss Asian personalities. There is no general editorial preface and the reader deduces that authors were requested to concentrate on the earlier career of each leader, the background to the conference, the deliberations and decisions reached in Paris, and the aftermath. Jonathan Clements has contributed studies discussing the respective roles of Saionji Kinmochi and Wellington Koo. Saionji was an aristocrat of liberal views, supporting the extension of representative government and curbing the power of the military. As a young man he lived in Paris soon after suppression of the Commune and during the decade when the Third Republic established itself with some difficulty. He met Clemenceau almost fifty years before the Paris conference convened. Saionji’s association with Paris fostered lasting suspicions among Japanese conservatives even when Saionji served as prime minister and became “the last of the genro” (elder statesmen who advised the emperor). Clements provides a clear account of Japanese aims before 1914, underlining the significance of the Russo– Japanese War of 1904–5. The outbreak of war in Europe in 1914 afforded an opportunity for Japan to extend its influence in East Asia and the western Pacific while the European powers and the United States were occupied elsewhere. Here Clements should have discussed the contribution of the Japanese foreign minister, Kato Takaaki, who was both an Anglophile and an advocate of consolidating Japanese interests in Manchuria. Kato’s prewar discussions with the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, and their often tense exchanges in 1914–15 should have been assessed succinctly: curiously

Uneasy Readjustment, 1945–58

Preface - Acknowledgements - List of Maps - Abbreviations - Introduction - The Gathering Storm - The Start of the War - China Enters the Conflict - Confusion and Instability - The Departure of MacArthur - The Start of Armistice Talks - The Last Phase of the War and the Signing of an Armistice - The Rebuilding of the Two Korean States and Continued Enmity - Select Bibliography - Index

The search for modern China

There were virtually no political or diplomatic relations between Britain and Japan from December 1941 until the end of the war. The relationship between the two countries was defined by the military and naval encounters in the Asia-Pacific war. An historical distinction has to be drawn between the Pacific war, which was a naval and island-hopping war, and the Asian war, which originated with Japan’s China campaigns in 1937 and spread to Indochina, Malaya, Indonesia and Burma. In the first the Americans carried the overwhelming burden, while in the Asian campaigns Britain and India shared the major role with the Chinese and the Americans. There were inevitably points of tension between the two war zones; and the degree of Anglo-American cooperation which existed was an important factor in British policy towards Japan at the time. The greatest contribution to our understanding in this field has been the distinguished work of the late Professor Christopher Thorne. But Britain also had diplomatic relations with China throughout the war and it is possible to deduce from these and other sources how British policy-makers viewed the progress of the war with Japan and how they saw the future of the East after the tide of war had turned.