Peter M. Siavelis

Democratic institutional design : the powers and incentives of Venezuelan politicians and interest groups

List of tables List of figures List of abbreviations 1. Studying democratic institutions in Venezuela 2. The electoral systems impact on the role of congress in the policy-making process 3. The Presidents legislative role: the initiation of legislation and presidential decree authority 4. Influencing the executive branch during policy formation: consultative commissions 5. Participating in the execution of policy: the decentralized public administration 6. Institutionalized dominance and its dynamics: the relative participation of business and labor 7. The policy impact: the economic development strategy and patterns of government spending 8. Political institutions, crisis, and reform 9. Venezuelan institutional design in comparative perspective Postscript: the 2000 constitution Notes References Index.

Continuity and Change in the Chilean Party System On the Transformational Effects of Electoral Reform

The party system consequences of Chiles “binomial” (two-member-district) legislative electoral formula have been the subject of much debate. For some analysts, the binomial system limits party system fractionalization and encourages centripetal competition, enhancing the prospects for democratic stability. Others emphasize elements of continuity within the countrys historic multiparty system and contend that the electoral formula may prove destabilizing. This article, arguing that limited electoral reform has limited party system consequences, provides comparative empirical measures showing that neither the degree of party system fractionalization nor the competitive dynamic of the party system has been substantially transformed. However, the binomial formula does increase the incentives for coalition formation and maintenance. The article concludes that the ultimate consequences of electoral reform depend on whether these new incentives for coalition formation can overcome the elements of continuity within the party system in the long term.

CANDIDATE SELECTION PROCEDURES IN TRANSITIONAL POLITIES A Research Note

This research note summarizes initial research from a wider project on the determinants of candidate selection procedures. It seeks to contribute to the growing literature on candidate selection by distinguishing transitional and institutionalized democracies. First, it provides a review of the existing literature, with particular emphasis placed on identifying the existing hypotheses on the determinants of candidate selection procedures. Second, it elucidates why transitional polities differently constrain the choice of legislative candidate selection procedures compared to institutionalized democracies. Third, several hypotheses derived from the literature indicate that the barriers to adopting inclusive legislative candidate selection procedures are higher in transitional than in institutionalized democracies.

ENCLAVES DE LA TRANSICIÓN Y DEMOCRACIA CHILENA

Some of the difficulties of Michelle Bachelet Government and the more generalized crisis of Chile’s governing Concertacion coalition have increasingly been tied to leadership variables, the exhaustion of the coalition with respect to its core ideals, or the need for various types of institutional reform. This paper considers the possibility that the very model of transition which has been lauded as so successful might actually be at the root of the difficulties that today plague both the Concertacion and Chilean democracy more generally. This paper argues that the interaction of the electoral system and the structure of post-authoritarian competition have forced an elitist form of politics that helps to explain the current difficulties plaguing the Concertacion coalition and fueled a generalized crisis of representation. To make this argument it builds on the work of Manuel Antonio Garreton concerning authoritarian enclaves, arguing that there are certain enclaves of the transition that get in the way of the development of a high quality representative democracy. These transitional enclaves include: el cuoteo, elite control of candidate selection and electoral politics, party dominated politics, elitist and extra-institutional policymaking, and the untouchability of the economic model inherited from the Pinochet government.

Insurance for Good Losers and the Survival of Chile's Concertacion

In the transition from military rule to democracy, the government of Augusto Pinochet bequeathed to Chile a unique electoral law by which all legislative seats are contested in two-member districts. A key implication of this rule is that in order to secure legislative majorities, coalitions have to put their strongest candidates in the most precarious electoral list positions. This generates a divergence of interests between coalitions and politicians. Chiles largest coalition, the Concertación, has resolved the dilemma by providing appointed posts to unsuccessful congressional candidates who accept personal political risk on the coalitions behalf. This study argues that this insurance system has provided the critical glue to hold the coalition together since Chiles transition to democracy in 1990. Recent changes in the electoral environment could threaten the Concertacións control over the appointed posts that have sustained this informal institution. This could jeopardize the Concertacións cohesion during the process of negotiating coalition candidate lists for the 2005 legislative elections.

Sistema electoral, desintegración de coaliciones y democracia en Chile: ¿El fin de la Concertación?

Resumen Aunque existe bastante desacuerdo respecto a los efectos politicos que tiene el sistema electoral binominal en Chile, muchos concuerdan en que este proporciona fuertes incentivos para la formacion y la permanencia de las coaliciones de gobierno. Este articulo cuestiona estos supuestos, sosteniendo que la capacidad del sistema electoral para inducir la formacion de coaliciones depende en la realidad del contexto. Basandose en un analisis de niveles relativos de apoyo electoral entre partidos, la poliza de “recompensa” segura para los perdedores en las elecciones mas competitivas, y la sincronizacion y secuencia de las elecciones presidenciales y legislativas, este articulo delinea las condiciones bajo las cuales el sistema de coaliciones se hace mas fuerte o mas debil. Concluye que estas variables se alinean para producir un ambiente poco propicio para el mantenimiento de la coalicion gobernante con la aproximacion de las elecciones presidenciales del 2005. En terminos teoricos, el articulo cuestiona las conexiones directas y mecanicas entre sistema electoral y resultados de partido, argumentando que no deberiamos sorprendernos cuando variaciones del entorno causan resultados distintos a los teoricamente esperados. Estos hallazgos contribuyen a un consenso emergente sobre muchas de las reglas teoricas vinculadas a la conexion entre sistema electoral y desarrollo del sistema de partidos basadas en el modelo norteamericano y europeo que, en el peor de los casos es tenue y, a lo mas, necesitan ser aplicadas con mucho cuidado en America Latina y en el resto del mundo.

Ni Chicha ni Limoná Party Nationalization in Pre- and Post-Authoritarian Chile

Chile’s parties have been characterized as ‘European’ in their development and institutionalization, but ‘Latin American’ in their high degree of political localism. Yet the specialized literature has not tested these tendencies nor developed a theory as to how they may coexist. Using the concept of party nationalization, we establish the veracity of the claims in the literature and propose a theory of static and dynamic nationalization development. We show that, as in Western European systems, Chile’s political parties exhibited progressive static nationalization until 1973. Since re-democratization, parties have demonstrated low levels of static nationalization, while the coalitions are highly nationalized. Concurrently, both parties and the coalitions have exhibited low levels of dynamic nationalization like parties throughout Latin America. We argue that these conflicting patterns are due to the interactive effect of functional cleavages and electoral institutions.

Democracy and Political Institutions in Latin America: Reconciling Approaches

IN LATIN AMERICA. Edited by Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira and Peter Spink. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 1999. Pp. 213.

Los peligros de la ingeniería electoral(y de predecir sus efectos)

55.00 cloth.) STUFFING THE BALLOT BOX: FRAUD, ELECTORAL REFORM, AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN COSTA RICA. By Fabrice E. Lehoucq and Ivan Molina. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. 294.

Electoral Reform Doesn't Matter-or Does It?: A Moderate Proportional Representation System for Chile

60.00 cloth.) CONSERVATIVE PARTIES, THE RIGHT, AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA. Edited by Kevin J. Middlebrook. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000. Pp. 391.