Peter Møllgaard

Government-assisted oligopoly coordination? A concrete case

Danish ready-mixed concrete is produced in regional oligopolies. Firms rely on price discrimination through secret discounts. The antitrust authority interprets this as lack of competition and has decided to activate its chief weapon against dormant competition: To make the market more transparent it now regularly publishes list prices and discounts of 5-7 firms and two grades of concrete in three regions. Following initial publication, average prices of reported grades increased by 15-20 percent while other prices increase by a mere 1-2 percent. The paper investigates whether this may be due to a business upturn, capacity constraints, etc., but none of these seem to have much explanatory power. In addition, prices of various non-reported grades moved in line with the general price level suggesting that a better explanation is the facilitation of tacit coordination brought about by the antitrust authority.

Host-country Absorption of Technology: Evidence from Automotive Supply Networks in Eastern Europe

This paper provides an analysis of technology transfer in automotive supply networks in six EU candidate countries with important vehicle (component) industries. We survey more than 400 firms, representing roughly half of the automotive supply industry. In addition, we have in-depth information from 39 case studies. We address the generation, the origin, and the quality of technology transfer. In terms of generation, we look at the determinants of who receives technology along the value chain, and who passes it on. In terms of origin, we compare local and foreign-owned firms and those with mixed ownership. We also compare differences across the countries. In terms of quality, we discuss the change-inducing effects of technology as perceived by recipient firms. Our results confirm the salience of networks and the key role of MNCs for the generation and diffusion of technology. We also find that diffusion of technology happens within the countries so that host countries absorb more technology than is immediately apparent and commonly believed.

Competition Policy and Innovation

We briefly review the rationale behind technological alliances and provide a snapshot of their role in global competition, especially insofar as it is based around intellectual capital. They nicely illustrate the increased importance of horizontal agreements and thus establish the relevance of the topic. We move on to discuss the organisation of industries in a dynamic context and draw out consequences for competition policy. We conclude with an outlook on the underlying tensions between technology alliances, competition policy, and industrial policy.

Industrial Economics in Scandanavia, 1880–1980

This encyclopaedic work celebrates the scores of leading pioneers who created the modern economic field of industrial organization, at the heart of which lie competition and monopoly, the two great forces that drive modern markets. Their pioneering work has shaped the fields growing research as well as the past, present and future debates in Europe and America over several centuries. This landmark book includes authoritative entries on all the major figures in both Europe and North America.

Assessment of damages in the district heating pipe cartel

The pre-insulated pipe cartel was established 1990 in Denmark, was extended to Italy and Germany during 1991 and re-organised in 1994 to cover the entire common market. Cartel members engaged in market sharing, price setting, bid rigging, coordinated predation and delaying of innovation. The European Commission fined the cartel in 1998. In 2005 four Danish municipalities successfully sued three cartel members and received large damage payments. The paper reviews the EU case, explains the economics of cartels, describes different approaches to determining damages and shows how this was done in practice. Keywords: cartel damages, pre-insulated pipes JEL: L13, L41, L61/L95