Peter Ove Christensen

Information and the Cost of Capital: An Ex-Ante Perspective

ABSTRACT: Recent articles have demonstrated that increased public disclosure can decrease firms’ cost of capital. The focus has been on the impact of information on the cost of capital subsequent to the release of the information (the ex post cost of capital). We show that the reduction in the ex post cost of capital is offset by an equal increase in the cost of capital for the period leading up to the release of the information (the preposterior cost of capital). Thus, within the class of models framing the recent discussion, there is no impact on the ex ante cost of capital covering the full time span of the firm. The extent to which information is made publicly or privately available affects the timing of the resolution of uncertainty and when the information is reflected in equilibrium prices, but there is no impact on initial equilibrium prices. Within a noisy rational expectations equilibrium, rational investors may actually benefit from a higher ex post cost of capital.

Dynamic Incentives and Responsibility Accounting: A Comment

Revisits the finding of a ratchet effect causing losses through lack of commitment by managers through their contracts by Indjejikian and Narda (1999). Demonstrates that equilibrium can be achieved by assuming the principal can commit in advance to offer a fair second-period contract and the agent can commit to stay for that period. Shows that the principal, by committing to seasonal period incentive rates in advance and to a fair fixed wage, can achieve full efforts from agents. Assumes that principals can offer a long-term contract which is ratchet-proof if no renegation takes place. Concludes that the principals ability, or not, to commit to a second-period incentive rate in advance, is important, since it ties in the agent for a second period.

Equilibrium in securities markets with heterogeneous investors and unspanned income risk

In a finite time horizon, incomplete market, continuous-time setting with dividends and investor incomes governed by arithmetic Brownian motions, we derive closed-form solutions for the equilibrium risk-free rate and stock price for an economy with finitely many heterogeneous CARA investors and unspanned income risk. In equilibrium, the Sharpe ratio is the same as in an otherwise identical complete market economy, whereas the risk-free rate is lower and, consequently, the stock price is higher. The reduction in the risk-free rate is highest when the more risk-averse investors face the largest unspanned income risk.

The Stewardship Role of Analyst Forecasts, and Discretionary Versus Non-Discretionary Accruals

We examine the interaction between discretionary and non-discretionary accruals in a stewardship setting. Contracting includes multiple rounds of renegotiation based on contractible accounting information and non-contractible but more timely non-accounting information. We show that accounting regulation aimed at increasing earnings quality from a valuation perspective (earnings persistence) may have a significant impact on how firms rationally respond in terms of allowing accrual discretion in order to alleviate the impact on the stewardship role of earnings. Increasing the precision of more timely non-accounting information (analyst earnings forecasts) increases the ex ante value of the firm and reduces costly earnings management. There is an optimal level of reversible non-discretionary accrual noise introduced through revenue recognition policies. Tight rules-based accounting regulation, as opposed to leaving firms more choice over non-discretionary accrual policies, may lead firms to rationally respond by inducing costly earnings management. More generally, regulating both earnings persistence and the tightness of admissible auditing policies may not result in less equilibrium earnings management.

Dynamic Spanning in the Consumption-Based Capital Asset Pricing Model

Under the assumptions of the Consumption-based Capital Asset Pricing Model (CCAPM), Pareto optimal consumption allocations are characterized by each agents consumption process being adapted to the filtration generated by the aggregate consumption process of the economy. The wealth processes of the agents, however, are adapted to the finer filtration generated by aggregate consumption and the conditional distribution of future aggregate consumption. Therefore, in order to achieve pareto optimal consumption allocations, a sufficiently varied set of assets must exist such that any wealth process adapted to this finer filtration can be implemented by dynamically trading in that set of assets. We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of such a set of assets based on dynamically trading contingent claims on aggregate consumption. In addition, we give sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria in a dynamically effectively complete market in which agents are only able to trade in contingent claims on aggregate consumption, the market portfolio of firms, and a (numeraire) zero-coupon bond. We demonstrate the role of short- and long-term contingent claims on aggregate consumption for the implementation of Pareto optimal allocations inthe presence of short- and long-term risks. In addition, in the presence of personal risks, we demonstrate the role of insurance contracts. JEL Classification: G13.