Peter Söderlund
Åbo Akademi University
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Publication
Featured researches published by Peter Söderlund.
West European Politics | 2007
Elina Kestilä; Peter Söderlund
This article seeks, firstly, to explore the influence of local level institutional and socioeconomic determinants on the Progress Party vote in Norway. Secondly, it examines whether the impact of these factors varies between municipal and parliamentary elections. Comparative subnational analysis of six elections (1995–2005) is conducted, treating 430–435 Norwegian municipalities as the units of analysis. Five variables related to electoral institutions, party competition, electoral behaviour and socioeconomic conditions are set against the Progress Partys vote share in a Tobit regression model. The results show that long-term institutional and party system variables have a permanent impact on the Progress Partys electoral fortunes, whereas the effect of short-term factors related to voting behaviour and socioeconomic conditions varies considerably according to the electoral context and election type. Furthermore, the political opportunity structure seems to be a stronger predictor of the Progress Party vote in the municipal elections than in the national ones.
Communist and Post-communist Studies | 2003
Peter Söderlund
Abstract Scholars have characterized the relationship between a state center and regions, especially in federal states, as an ongoing bargaining game. The central objective in this study is to demonstrate the importance of political, economic, geographic and cultural determinants, or structural resources, in center-region relations in the Russian Federation during the 1990s. Structural resources have provided regional leaders with structural power in the federal bargaining game. According to my findings, politically superior, wealthy, culturally distinct, geopolitically and geoeconomically important and peripherally located regions were favored in the bilateral treaty process between 1994 and 1998 and were given chance to conclude treaties at an early stage.
Politics and the Life Sciences | 2015
Peter Söderlund; Lauri Rapeli
Abstract. In search of a better understanding of inequalities in citizen political engagement, scholars have begun addressing the relationship between personal health and patterns of political behavior. This study focuses on the impact of personal health on various forms of political participation. The analysis contributes to existing knowledge by examining a number of different participation forms beyond just voting. Using European Social Survey data from 2012/2013 for Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden (N = 8,060), self-reported turnout and six alternative modes of political engagement were modeled as dependent variables. Contrary to expectations, poor health did not depress participation across all forms. As assumed by the increased activism hypothesis, all else equal, people with poor health were more active than their healthy counterparts in direct contacts with power holders and demonstrations. The results reveal a “reversed health gap” by showing that people with health problems are in fact more politically active than what previous research, which has focused on voting, has suggested. Although the magnitude of the gap should not be overdramatized, our results stress the importance of distinguishing between different forms of participation when analyzing the impact of health on political engagement. Nevertheless, the findings show that poor health can stimulate people into political engagement rather than depressing activity. This finding holds when the effects of several sociodemographic and motivational factors are controlled for.
European Political Science Review | 2014
Elina Kestilä-Kekkonen; Peter Söderlund
What populist right parties offer (the supply side) should be examined in relation to the preferences of the populist right electorate (the demand side). This article examines how the supply and demand in the electoral market are met by assessing the relative importance of party, party leader, and district-level candidate for the right-wing populist vote. The study is set in an electoral system, which uses preferential voting for candidates in multi-member districts, namely Finland, where all three objects of vote choice may matter. We analyse post-election survey data for the 2011 parliamentary election in which the right-wing populist True Finns party gained almost one fifth of the national vote. The results show that being guided by the characteristics of the party leader is a much stronger predictor the of the True Finns vote than being affected by party or district-level candidate characteristics.
Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties | 2009
Peter Söderlund; Elina Kestilä-Kekkonen
Abstract Scholars argue that party identification is a predictor of support for the political system. In this study we explore the relationship between party identification and political trust on the far right of the political spectrum, i.e. among radical right‐wing voters known to be anti‐elitist and suspicious about political institutions and actors. Political trust is measured as trust in parliament and trust in politicians. Our empirical analyses concentrate on Austria, Denmark and Norway, where radical right parties have attracted widespread public support. Individual‐level data from the European Social Survey (2002/2003) are analysed by applying ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression analysis. Unlike the general theory of political trust would lead us to argue, the analysis shows overall that party identification of radical right‐wing voters does not necessarily increase their trust in parliament and politicians. The results suggest that party identification is negatively related to political trust among radical right‐wing voters in Norway while the results are more ambiguous in Denmark and Austria.
European Journal of Political Research | 2016
Peter Söderlund
This study examines if prime ministers parties are punished or rewarded by voters to a lesser extent in candidate-centred electoral systems compared to party-centred systems. Candidate-centred systems allow the voters greater choice in determining the fate of individual candidates at the district level and create incentives for candidates to cultivate a personal vote rather than pursuing a party vote. Voters in these systems are more likely to focus on individual candidates than on parties, thus fostering individual accountability at the expense of collective (party) accountability. Cross-sectional time-series data for 23 OECD countries between 1961 and 2014 were analysed. Two indices of intraparty efficiency (the Farrell–McAllister Index and the Shugart Index) were used to capture the candidate-centredness of electoral systems. The analysis of aggregate-level data with almost 300 observations showed that incumbent parties tend to win or lose fewer votes in candidate-centred electoral systems. This effect has become stronger over time. Candidate-centredness has a weak moderating impact on the state of the economy on the degree of public sanctioning of government parties.
Regional & Federal Studies | 2005
Peter Söderlund
This study discusses the ability of subnational heads of government to constrain the power of the federal government in the Russian Federation. The intention is to examine under which conditions regional executives have operated since the beginning of the 1990s. The study also takes a comparative approach by examining the formal institutional strength of subnational executives in 24 other contemporary federal states. The Russian executives have had potential for strong leadership at the regional level and moderate abilities to exercise influence at the parliamentary arena, while the regions have been allocated with few constitutional powers.
Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties | 2017
Hanna Wass; Mikko Mattila; Lauri Rapeli; Peter Söderlund
ABSTRACT Several studies suggest that people suffering from ill health or disabilities have a lower propensity to vote. Using six rounds of the European Social Survey, we examine whether the effect of health or functional disabilities on electoral participation is less or more pronounced in countries which utilize a wider range of facilitation instruments, such as advance or postal voting, proxy voting and voting outside the polling stations. Our findings show that with the exception of proxy voting, voter facilitation instruments not only have insignificant main effects but also a negative interaction effect with poor health/functional ability (FA). As a result, voter facilitation intensifies the health-related differences but not by activating those who are more active to begin with, as suggested in previous studies. The endogeneity argument thus seems most warranted explanation for our findings: countries with low turnout among people with impaired FA or health are more likely to adapt facilitation practices.
Scandinavian Political Studies | 2016
Elina Kestilä-Kekkonen; Peter Söderlund
Several scholars agree that low political trust has fundamental negative implications for society at large. This study tests the power of institutional performance theory in explaining the differences between individuals in political trust (cross-sectional) and fluctuations of political trust over time (longitudinal). Indeed, the dominant scholarly debate has concerned whether political trust is stable and dependent of endogenous factors such as political socialization and social trust, or whether it is exogenous (i.e., in constant fluctuation due to later experiences with institutions and the outputs they produce). In terms of cross-sectional differences, the aim is to assess the relative impact institutional performance on political trust of a citizen. As regards the longitudinal approach, political trust varies over time and from an explanatory perspective it is important also to understand how well the institutional performance theory predicts over-time variation of political trust. The study employs repeated European Social Survey data for Finland between 2004 and 2013. The results show, first and foremost, the strong impact of evaluations of institutional performance on political trust: satisfaction with government and economy explains differences both between individuals and over time. Social trust and welfare state performance are also strong predictors, but they explain differences only at the individual level and do not predict over-time variations.
Europe-Asia Studies | 2005
Peter Söderlund
POLITICAL SCIENTISTS HAVE ASSERTED that popular legitimacy and durable leadership tend to increase the power and influence of political leaders. 1 In line with these assumptions, popular and durable Russian regional executive leaders should have been attributed with greater levels of bargaining power in centre – region relations. This study seeks to test whether regional leaders in the Russian Federation have been able to transform political strength and authority at the regional level—as measured by election outcomes and time in power—into political influence at the federal level. While controlling for economic, cultural and geographical variables—which can be associated with political resources that enhance the bargaining power of regional leaders—regression analyses do show a positive and statistically significant relationship between votes for regional chief executives and their federal-level influence in 2003. From 1996 practically all of the regional chief executives in the Russian Federation became elected by, and accountable to, their regional constituencies. Since the regional leaders were elected to public office, they enjoyed legitimacy and authority. Ideally, the regional presidents and governors had the potential to act as electorally generated institutional veto players, who had the capacity to constrain the central government. In order to effectively act as veto players, subnational leaders should have the power and authority to either prevent laws from getting passed at the national level by influencing national legislators or block policy initiatives put forward by the central government by refusing to comply at the implementation stage (Stepan, 2004; Mainwaring & Samuels, 2004). In Russia, the ability of regional governments to challenge the central government became possible during and after the demise of the Soviet Union. The final stages of the Soviet period saw the weakening of centralised and communist power and the regional authorities managed to procure greater levels of power and authority. The central authorities still played a major role, but the representatives of the regions— especially those in the ethnic republics—were by no means insignificant political actors. Stoner-Weiss (1997, p. 73) points out that it was quite a natural progression that regional politicians by 1990, in the midst of the transition process towards greater democracy in the Soviet Union, longed for greater control over policy within their