Peter Tiersma

Local and General Markedness

University of California, San Diego The work of Jakobson-and later, of Greenberg-has developed the notion of MORPHOLOGICAL MARKEDNESS. In this view, certain morphological categories (e.g. noun singulars) are considered unmarked or more basic in relation to others (e.g. noun plurals). It is shown here that there are some principled exceptions to the general markedness conventions. One example of such LOCAL MARKEDNESS, as this type of markedness reversal will be called, is that nouns whose referents naturally occur in groups or pairs show many of the effects of being unmarked in the plural. The consequences of such local markedness in terms of language acquisition, paradigm regularization, lexical borrowing, and the formation of double morphology are explored in some detail.*

Some Myths about Legal Language

Over the centuries, much has been written about the language of the law. The language of lawyers is archaic and conservative. It is full of Latin and French. It is wordy and redundant, pompous and dull, and either highly precise or maddeningly indeterminate. Perhaps the most interesting suggestion is that legal language is itself a myth, in that it is really just ordinary language with a great deal of technical terminology. Some of these assertions have more than a kernel of truth, others are complete myths, and yet others should be relegated to that status as quickly as possible.

Introducing “Language & Law”

to the journal of the International Language and Law Society (www.illa.org). All manner of all scientific discourse is couched in language. This holds for language in the domain of law with a vengeance: all concepts in law are linguistically constituted and expressed. All legally relevant meanings and contexts are transported through the vehicle of language. They are thus created through and in language, and cannot therefore be independent of language, just as the law cannot be independent of society, which is where language resides. While the laws of nature would be valid even if nobody would ever have verbalized them, the laws of society only come about via communication. The laws of society do not exist before they are debated and negotiated. The “meaning”–and the change of meaning–of concepts in law, as well as the “interpretation” of terms is to a large extent some kind of linguistic analysis, with attendant and persistent problems including issues of vagueness, ambiguity, precision and “plainness”. Apart from this inherent fundamental affinity between language and law, there are numerous ways in which the legal process at various stages involves language in negotiations or contestations, such as court proceedings or police interviews, for which linguistic analysis has developed well-established concepts of description and explanation. These concepts can be taken up to elucidate the legal process and help analyze and teach successful procedure. Language, languages, and dialects are themselves often the issue in many legal procedures around the world, apart from the language-related issues of access to justice. In addition, there are many ways in which law, language and society are inextricably interrelated. Law-makers and judges should be supplied with a body of scientific knowledge to draw upon in making their decisions. It is therefore appropriate that an international society should advance and focus research on the interdependence of language and law in all of its facets, from theoretical approaches to the resolution of practical issues. With the world moving together ever closer in trade, law and communication, it is appropriate that the study of language in law comprise all points of interface between these disciplines. As these issues appear in law generally and are not restricted to a particular JLL 1 (2012): 1–2