Peter Zachar
Auburn University at Montgomery
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Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America | 2014
Ingrid A. van de Leemput; Marieke Wichers; Angélique O. J. Cramer; Denny Borsboom; Francis Tuerlinckx; Peter Kuppens; Egbert H. van Nes; Wolfgang Viechtbauer; Erik J. Giltay; Steven H. Aggen; Catherine Derom; Nele Jacobs; Kenneth S. Kendler; Han L. J. van der Maas; Michael C. Neale; Frenk Peeters; Evert Thiery; Peter Zachar; Marten Scheffer
Significance As complex systems such as the climate or ecosystems approach a tipping point, their dynamics tend to become dominated by a phenomenon known as critical slowing down. Using time series of autorecorded mood, we show that indicators of slowing down are also predictive of future transitions in depression. Specifically, in persons who are more likely to have a future transition, mood dynamics are slower and different aspects of mood are more correlated. This supports the view that the mood system may have tipping points where reinforcing feedbacks among a web of symptoms can propagate a person into a disorder. Our findings suggest the possibility of early warning systems for psychiatric disorders, using smartphone-based mood monitoring. About 17% of humanity goes through an episode of major depression at some point in their lifetime. Despite the enormous societal costs of this incapacitating disorder, it is largely unknown how the likelihood of falling into a depressive episode can be assessed. Here, we show for a large group of healthy individuals and patients that the probability of an upcoming shift between a depressed and a normal state is related to elevated temporal autocorrelation, variance, and correlation between emotions in fluctuations of autorecorded emotions. These are indicators of the general phenomenon of critical slowing down, which is expected to occur when a system approaches a tipping point. Our results support the hypothesis that mood may have alternative stable states separated by tipping points, and suggest an approach for assessing the likelihood of transitions into and out of depression.
Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology | 2002
Peter Zachar
PRAGMATIST THEORIES of scientific classification are intended to be pluralistic models that recognize different ways of cutting up the world as valuable, but do not require us to adopt whatever-goes relativism or metaphysical antirealism. How ironic that my application of pragmatism to psychopathology has been charged with not being sufficiently pluralistic because it tries to fit all psychiatric disorders into the Procrustean bed of practical kinds.
Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine | 2012
James Phillips; Allen Frances; Michael A. Cerullo; John Chardavoyne; Hannah S. Decker; Michael B. First; Nassir Ghaemi; Gary Greenberg; Andrew C. Hinderliter; Warren Kinghorn; Steven G. LoBello; Elliott B. Martin; Aaron L. Mishara; Joel Paris; Joseph M. Pierre; Ronald W. Pies; Harold Alan Pincus; Douglas Porter; Claire Pouncey; Michael A. Schwartz; Thomas S. Szasz; Jerome C. Wakefield; G. Scott Waterman; Owen Whooley; Peter Zachar
In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM - whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part I of this article will take up the first two questions. With the first question, invited commentators express a range of opinion regarding the nature of psychiatric disorders, loosely divided into a realist position that the diagnostic categories represent real diseases that we can accurately name and know with our perceptual abilities, a middle, nominalist position that psychiatric disorders do exist in the real world but that our diagnostic categories are constructs that may or may not accurately represent the disorders out there, and finally a purely constructivist position that the diagnostic categories are simply constructs with no evidence of psychiatric disorders in the real world. The second question again offers a range of opinion as to how we should define a mental or psychiatric disorder, including the possibility that we should not try to formulate a definition. The general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances.
Archive | 2000
Peter Zachar
This interdisciplinary work addresses the question, What role should psychological conceptualization play for thinkers who believe that the brain is the organ of the mind? It offers readers something unique both by systematically comparing the writings of eliminativist philosophers of mind with the writings of the most committed proponents of biological psychiatry, and by critically scrutinizing their shared “anti-anthropomorphism” from the standpoint of a diagnostician and therapist. Contradicitng the contemporary assumption that common sense psychology has already been proven futile, and we are just waiting for an adequate scientifically-based replacement, this book provides explicit philosophical and psychological arguments showing why, if they did not already have both cognitive and psychodynamic psychologies, philosophers and scientists would have to invent them to better understand brains. (Series A)
Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine | 2012
James Phillips; Allen Frances; Michael A. Cerullo; John Chardavoyne; Hannah S. Decker; Michael B. First; Nassir Ghaemi; Gary Greenberg; Andrew C. Hinderliter; Warren Kinghorn; Steven G. LoBello; Elliott B. Martin; Aaron L. Mishara; Joel Paris; Joseph M. Pierre; Ronald W. Pies; Harold Alan Pincus; Douglas Porter; Claire Pouncey; Michael A. Schwartz; Thomas S. Szasz; Jerome C. Wakefield; G. Scott Waterman; Owen Whooley; Peter Zachar
In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM – whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part 1 of this article took up the first two questions. Part 2 took up the second two questions. Part 3 now deals with Questions 5 & 6. Question 5 confronts the issue of utility, whether the manual design of DSM-III and IV favors clinicians or researchers, and what that means for DSM-5. Our final question, Question 6, takes up a concluding issue, whether the acknowledged problems with the earlier DSMs warrants a significant overhaul of DSM-5 and future manuals. As in Parts 1 & 2 of this article, the general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances.
Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine | 2012
James Phillips; Allen Frances; Michael A. Cerullo; John Chardavoyne; Hannah S. Decker; Michael B. First; Nassir Ghaemi; Gary Greenberg; Andrew C. Hinderliter; Warren Kinghorn; Steven G. LoBello; Elliott B. Martin; Aaron L. Mishara; Joel Paris; Joseph M. Pierre; Ronald W. Pies; Harold Alan Pincus; Douglas Porter; Claire Pouncey; Michael A. Schwartz; Thomas S. Szasz; Jerome C. Wakefield; G. Waterman; Owen Whooley; Peter Zachar
In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM – whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part I of this article took up the first two questions. Part II will take up the second two questions. Question 3 deals with the question as to whether DSM-V should assume a conservative or assertive posture in making changes from DSM-IV. That question in turn breaks down into discussion of diagnoses that depend on, and aim toward, empirical, scientific validation, and diagnoses that are more value-laden and less amenable to scientific validation. Question 4 takes up the role of pragmatic consideration in a psychiatric nosology, whether the purely empirical considerations need to be tempered by considerations of practical consequence. As in Part 1 of this article, the general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances.
Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology | 2010
Peter Zachar; Nancy Nyquist Potter
This article critically examines Louis Charland’s claim that personality disorders are moral rather than medical kinds by exploring the relationship between personality disorders and virtue ethics. We propose that the conceptual resources of virtue theory can inform psychiatry’s thinking about personality disorders, but also that virtue theory as understood by Aristotle cannot be reduced to the narrow domain of ‘the moral’ in the modern sense of the term. Some overlap between the moral domain’s notion of character-based ethics and the medical domain’s notion of character-based disorders is unavoidable. We also apply a modified version of John Sadler’s “moral wrongfulness test” to borderline and narcissistic personality disorders. With respect to both diagnoses, we argue that they involve negative moral evaluations, but may also have indispensable nonmoral features and, therefore, classify legitimate psychiatric disorders.
Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine | 2012
James Phillips; Allen Frances; Michael A. Cerullo; John Chardavoyne; Hannah S. Decker; Michael B. First; Nassir Ghaemi; Gary Greenberg; Andrew C. Hinderliter; Warren Kinghorn; Steven G. LoBello; Elliott B. Martin; Aaron L. Mishara; Joel Paris; Joseph M. Pierre; Ronald W. Pies; Harold Alan Pincus; Douglas Porter; Claire Pouncey; Michael A. Schwartz; Thomas S. Szasz; Jerome C. Wakefield; G. Scott Waterman; Owen Whooley; Peter Zachar
In the conclusion to this multi-part article I first review the discussions carried out around the six essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis – the position taken by Allen Frances on each question, the commentaries on the respective question along with Frances’ responses to the commentaries, and my own view of the multiple discussions. In this review I emphasize that the core question is the first – what is the nature of psychiatric illness – and that in some manner all further questions follow from the first. Following this review I attempt to move the discussion forward, addressing the first question from the perspectives of natural kind analysis and complexity analysis. This reflection leads toward a view of psychiatric disorders – and future nosologies – as far more complex and uncertain than we have imagined.
Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology | 2009
Peter Zachar
Dr. Aragona’s article in this issue of Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology makes some important points regarding the relationship between comorbidity rates and the classification system currently used in psychiatry. Particularly persuasive is his claim that observed patterns of comorbidity are, in important respects, consequences of the structure of the classification system. I am not convinced, however, that comorbidity is best conceptualized as an artifact of the taxonic structure of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and the International Classification of Diseases (ICD). Instead, I suggest that the use of dichotomies such as true versus artifactual should be used with caution when psychiatric classification is being discussed. In contrast with the artifact hypothesis, I argue that the phenomena covered by the term “comorbidity” are real, expectable features of the psychiatric domain. They are not the phlogiston and luminiferous ether of psychiatry. I am skeptical of the notion that high comorbidity rates as a whole can be understood as Kuhnian anomalies, or that there is a crisis, or that after a period of revolutionary science a new paradigm would eliminate these ‘anomalies.’ In short, high rates of comorbidity in psychiatry will not simply disappear once scientists develop a better nosological paradigm. High levels of comorbidity can, however, be both lowered and provided a better, evidence-based conceptual framework.
Annual Review of Clinical Psychology | 2017
Peter Zachar; Kenneth S. Kendler
Many scholars believe that psychiatric nosology is undergoing a crisis of confidence. Some of the issues up for debate hark back to the introduction of the natural history approach to classification in the seventeenth century. Natural histories map sameness and difference rather than speculate about causes. In contrast, the natural classification approach aspires to carve nature at the joints by demarcating classifications by causes. Natural classifications are more ideal scientifically, but speculation about causality has had a poor track record in psychiatric nosology. A natural classification of psychiatric disorders may have the added burden of requiring normative assumptions in addition to the discovery of fact. In the natural classification tradition, the epistemic iteration perspective, the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) initiative, and dimensional models offer different views about the criteria of naturalness (or validity). Also in this tradition, some thinkers believe that causes can be empirically indexed by latent variable models, especially if the latent variables are moderately heritable, but these assumptions may be neither statistically nor genetically warranted.