Petra Moser

Patents and Innovation: Evidence from Economic History

What is the optimal system of intellectual property rights to encourage innovation? Empirical evidence from economic history can help to inform important policy questions that have been difficult to answer with modern data: 1) Does the existence of strong patent laws encourage innovation? And 2) May patent laws influence the direction - as opposed to the rate - of technical change? Economic history can also help to shed light on the effectiveness of policy tools that are intended to address problems with the current patent system: 3) How do patent pools, as a mechanism to mitigate litigation risks, influence the creation of new technologies? 4) Will compulsory licensing, as a mechanism to improve access to essential innovations in developing countries, discourage innovation in the developing countries? This essay summarizes results of existing research and highlights promising areas for future research.

Do Patent Pools Encourage Innovation? Evidence from the 19th-Century Sewing Machine Industry

Members of a patent pool agree to use a set of patents as if they were jointly owned by all members and license them as a package to other firms. Regulators favor pools as a means to encourage innovation: Pools are expected to reduce litigation risks for their members and lower license fees and transactions costs for other firms. This paper uses the example of the first patent pool in U.S. history, the Sewing Machine Combination (1856-1877) to perform the first empirical test of the effects of a patent pool on innovation. Contrary to theoretical predictions, the sewing machine pool appears to have discouraged patenting and innovation, in particular for the members of the pool. Data on stitches per minute, as an objectively quantifiable measure of innovation, confirm these findings. Innovation for both members and outside firms slowed as soon as the pool had been established and resumed only after it had dissolved.

Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act

Compulsory licensing allows firms in developing countries to produce foreign-owned inventions without the consent of foreign patent owners. This paper uses an exogenous event of compulsory licensing after World War I under the Trading with the Enemy Act to examine the long run effects of compulsory licensing on domestic invention. Difference-in-differences analyses of nearly 200,000 chemical inventions suggest that compulsory licensing increased domestic invention by at least 20 percent.

Prizes, Publicity, and Patents: Non-Monetary Awards as a Mechanism to Encourage Innovation

This paper exploits the selection of prize-winning technologies among exhibitors at the Crystal Palace Exhibition in 1851 to examine whether—and how—ex post prizes that are awarded to high-quality innovations may encourage future innovation. U.S. patent data indicate a 40 per cent increase after 1851 in patenting for prize-winners compared with other exhibits. Results are robust to controlling for technology-specific pre-trends and for the quality of patents. A comparison of changes in patenting for prize-winners with changes for technologies that were described on the front page of the Scientific American suggests that publicity for promising research fields may be an important mechanism by which ex post prizes encourage future innovation.

Patent pools and innovation in substitute technologies—evidence from the 19th-century sewing machine industry

type=main> Patent pools, which combine complementary patents of competing firms, are expected to increase overall welfare but potentially discourage innovation in substitutes for the pool technology. This article exploits a new historical data set on changes in patenting and firm entry for a clearly defined pool technology and substitutes in the 19th-century sewing machine industry. This analysis reveals a substantial increase in innovation for an—albeit technologically inferior—substitute technology. Historical evidence suggests that the creation of a pool-diverted innovation toward an inferior substitute technology by creating differential license fees and litigation risks.