Philip A. Higham

No special K! A signal detection framework for the strategic regulation of memory accuracy.

Two experiments investigated criterion setting and metacognitive processes underlying the strategic regulation of accuracy on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) using Type-2 signal detection theory (SDT). In Experiment 1, report bias was manipulated by penalizing participants either 0.25 (low incentive) or 4 (high incentive) points for each error. Best guesses to unanswered items were obtained so that Type-2 signal detection indices of discrimination and bias could be calculated. The same incentive manipulation was used in Experiment 2, only the test was computerized, confidence ratings were taken so that receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves could be generated, and feedback was manipulated. The results of both experiments demonstrated that SDT provides a viable alternative to A. Koriat and M. Goldsmiths (1996c) framework of monitoring and control and reveals information about the regulation of accuracy that their framework does not. For example, ROC analysis indicated that the threshold model implied by formula scoring is inadequate. Instead, performance on the SAT should be modeled with an equal-variance Gaussian, Type-2 signal detection model.

Illusory recollection and dual-process models of recognition memory.

Higham and Vokey (2000, Exps.1 & 3)demonstrated that a slight increase in the display duration of a briefly presented word prior to displaying it in the clear for a recognition response increased the bias to respond “old”. In the current research, three experiments investigated the phenomenology associated with this illusion of memory using the standard remember–know procedure and a new, independent–scales methodology. Contrary to expectations based on the fluency heuristic, which predicts effects of display duration on subjective familiarity only, the results indicated that the illusion was reported as both familiarity and recollection. Furthermore, manipulations of prime duration induced reports of false recollection in all experiments. The results—in particular, the implications of illusory recollection—are discussed in terms of dual–process, fuzzy–trace, two–criteria signal detection models and attribution models of recognition memory.

A REVIEW OF THE COGNITIVE INTERVIEW

Abstract In this critique of the Cognitive Interview (CI), discussion is organized around four themes; (1) the effectiveness of various components of the CI, (2) the relationship between the CI and other interviewing methods such as the Guided Memory Interview, the Standard Interview, and the Structured Interview, (3) different measures of memory performance and (4) the effect of training quality on interviewer performance. We comment on some of the theoretical and methodological issues to be considered in CI research and the practical considerations relating to the use of the CI in the field.

Strong cues are not necessarily weak: Thomson and Tulving (1970) and the encoding specificity principle revisited

Performance on tests in which there is control over reporting (e.g., cued recall with the option to withhold responses) can be characterized by four parameters: free- and forced-report retrieval (correct responses retrieved from memory when the option to withhold responses is exercised and when it is not, respectively), monitoring (discrimination between correct and incorrect potential responses), and report bias (willingness to report responses). Typically, researchers do not examine all these components in cued-test performance; blanks are sometimes counted the same as errors, meaning that the (free-report) performance index is contaminated with report bias and monitoring ability. In this research, a two-stage testing procedure is described that allows measures of free- and forced-report retrieval, monitoring, and bias to be derived from the original encoding specificity experiments (Thomson & Tulving, 1970). The results show that their cue-reinstatement manipulation affected free-report retrieval, but once report bias and monitoring effects were removed by forcing output, retrieval was unaffected.

Beyond dissociation logic: evidence for controlled and automatic influences in artificial grammar learning.

Evidence for unconscious learning has typically been based on dissociations between direct and indirect tests of learning. Because of some inherent problems with dissociation logic, we applied the logic of opposition to 2 artificial grammar learning experiments. In Experiment 1, participants were exposed to 2 different sets of letter strings, generated from 2 different grammars, and later rated test strings for grammaticality with either in-concert (rate grammatical strings consistent with either structure) or opposition (rate grammatical only strings from 1 of the structures) instructions. Manipulating response deadline affected controlled, but not automatic influences. In Experiment 2, after similar training, a source-monitoring test was administered from which the in-concert and opposition conditions were derived. The test indicated that varying the retention interval affected controlled, but not automatic, influences. The results are discussed in terms of awareness, knowledge representation, and metacognitive processing.

Selecting accurate statements from the cognitive interview using confidence ratings.

Participants viewed a videotape of a simulated murder, and their recall (and confidence) was tested 1 week later with the cognitive interview. Results indicated that (a) the subset of statements assigned high confidence was more accurate than the full set of statements; (b) the accuracy benefit was limited to information that forensic experts considered relevant to an investigation, whereas peripheral information showed the opposite pattern; (c) the confidence-accuracy relationship was higher for relevant than for peripheral information; (d) the focused-retrieval phase was associated with a greater proportion of peripheral and a lesser proportion of relevant information than the other phases; and (e) only about 50% of the relevant information was elicited, and most of this was elicited in Phase 1.

Investigating strength and frequency effects in recognition memory using type-2 signal detection theory.

Criterion- versus distribution-shift accounts of frequency and strength effects in recognition memory were investigated with Type-2 signal detection receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis, which provides a measure of metacognitive monitoring. Experiment 1 demonstrated a frequency-based mirror effect, with a higher hit rate and lower false alarm rate, for low frequency words compared with high frequency words. In Experiment 2, the authors manipulated item strength with repetition, which showed an increased hit rate but no effect on the false alarm rate. Whereas Type-1 indices were ambiguous as to whether these effects were based on a criterion- or distribution-shift model, the two models predict opposite effects on Type-2 distractor monitoring under some assumptions. Hence, Type-2 ROC analysis discriminated between potential models of recognition that could not be discriminated using Type-1 indices alone. In Experiment 3, the authors manipulated Type-1 response bias by varying the number of old versus new response categories to confirm the assumptions made in Experiments 1 and 2. The authors conclude that Type-2 analyses are a useful tool for investigating recognition memory when used in conjunction with more traditional Type-1 analyses.

Judgment heuristics and recognition memory: Prime identification and target-processing fluency

In three experiments, the effect of identification of a briefly presented word (prime) on a subsequent recognition response to that word (target) was investigated. Theories of current processing fluency (e.g., Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989) suggest that prime identification should reduce P(old) relative to prime misidentification because awareness of the prime provides a source to which to attribute target fluency, rendering attributions to prior presentation less likely. However, counter to these predictions, Experiment 1 demonstrated that prime identification increased P(old) relative to misidentified primes. It is hypothesized that this reversed effect was due to participants’ using a heuristic that related prime identification success to prior presentation but was not based on current processing fluency. In Experiment 2, participants were induced to avoid using this heuristic by making an alternate source for prime identification success (display duration) highly available. Under these circumstances, prime identification reduced P(old) relative to prime misidentification, suggesting that participants now relied on current processing fluency rather than on prime identification success. Experiment 3 replicated the results of Experiments 1 and 2, but with fixed rather than variable prime displays.

Learning the Experimenter's Design Tacit: Sensitivity to the Structure of Memory Lists

Two experiments are reported that draw an analogy between experiments on verbal memory and experiments on tacit learning. Rules that experimenters use to select words for memory experiments, such as frequency, length, and grammatical class, produce consistencies to which subjects can become sensitive. Replicating the key results from the tacit learning literature, subjects in our experiments discriminated new words consistent with the experimenters’ selection rules from inconsistent words, even when they could not describe those rules. The results also reveal a close relation between the information underlying both recognition memory and classification judgements. In particular, a “mirror effect” (Glanzer & Bowles, 1976) is found with both tasks. Implications for research on memory and learning are discussed.

Regulation of Memory Accuracy With Multiple Answers: The Plurality Option

We report two experiments that investigated the regulation of memory accuracy with a new regulatory mechanism: the plurality option. This mechanism is closely related to the grain-size option but involves control over the number of alternatives contained in an answer rather than the quantitative boundaries of a single answer. Participants were presented with a slideshow depicting a robbery (Experiment 1) or a murder (Experiment 2), and their memory was tested with five-alternative multiple-choice questions. For each question, participants were asked to generate two answers: a single answer consisting of one alternative and a plural answer consisting of the single answer and two other alternatives. Each answer was rated for confidence (Experiment 1) or for the likelihood of being correct (Experiment 2), and one of the answers was selected for reporting. Results showed that participants used the plurality option to regulate accuracy, selecting single answers when their accuracy and confidence were high, but opting for plural answers when they were low. Although accuracy was higher for selected plural than for selected single answers, the opposite pattern was evident for confidence or likelihood ratings. This dissociation between confidence and accuracy for selected answers was the result of marked overconfidence in single answers coupled with underconfidence in plural answers. We hypothesize that these results can be attributed to overly dichotomous metacognitive beliefs about personal knowledge states that cause subjective confidence to be extreme.