Philip Clark

Velleman's Autonomism*

People sometimes think they have reasons for action. They think, that is, that there is some reason why they should do one thing rather than another. It is worth asking just what it takes for such thoughts to be true. On a certain naive view, what makes them true is a connection between the action and the agent’s good life. Thus, if safety, or excitement, or glory is something you have reason to pursue, this will be because safety, or excitement, or glory would be a good thing in your life. And if you have reason to be cooperative, this will be because it is good to be cooperative, and so on. In a recent article, David Velleman argues for replacing this view with a more Kantian line, on which reasons are reasons in virtue of their connection with autonomy.1 As Velleman notes, his view has points in common with the ‘‘autonomist internalism’’ of another Ann Arbor ethicist, Stephen Darwall, and with Christine Korsgaard’s gloss on Kant’s autonomism.2 But despite the current popularity of Kantian ethics, direct criticism of the naive view remains rare. Thus Velleman’s remarks provide a rare opportunity for some straight talk across party lines. The aim in what follows is to defend the naive view. I shall first raise some problems for Velleman’s proposal and then fend off the objection that serves as his rationale for braving the depths of Kantianism. Velleman’s starting point is Humean motivational skepticism. He seeks to explain the connection between reasons for action and motivation without relativizing reasons to the desires agents just happen to have. His solution is to ground reasons in a desire that is nonoptional for practical reasoners, namely, the goal of acting autonomously. This is not a desire

What Goes without Saying in Metaethics

Reflection on the nature of practical thought has led some philosophers to hold that some beliefs have a necessary influence on the will. Reflection on the nature of motivational explanation has led other philosophers to say that no belief can motivate without the assistance of a background desire. An assumption common to both groups of philosophers is that these views cannot be combined. Agreement on this assumption is so deep that it is taken as going without saying. The only option entertained is which of the views to reject. This way of thinking, I argue, is directly responsible for the deadlock between Humeans like Donald Davidson and Michael Smith, and anti-Humeans like Thomas Nagel and John McDowell. But there is an antidote. The traditional Greek conception of practical reason gives us an attractive way of holding both that all beliefs require assistance and that certain beliefs entail a disposition of the will.

Epistemic buck-passing and the interpersonal view of testimony

Abstract Two ideas shape the epistemology of testimony. One is that testimony provides a unique kind of knowledge. The other is that testimonial knowledge is a social achievement. In traditional terms, those who affirm these ideas are anti-reductionists, and those who deny them are reductionists. There is increasing interest, however, in the possibility of affirming these ideas without embracing anti-reductionism. Thus, Sanford Goldberg uses the idea of epistemic buck-passing to argue that even reductionists can accept the uniqueness of testimonial knowledge, and Jennifer Lackey gives both speaker and hearer an essential role in testimonial justification, rejecting both reductionism and anti-reductionism in favor of what she calls dualism. After distinguishing a weaker and a stronger notion of buck-passing, we show how anti-reductionists can use the stronger notion to motivate their position, and to answer Goldberg’s and Lackey’s challenges.

The Meaning of ‘Good’ and the Possibility of Value

Moore held that to call something good is to ascribe a property to it. But he denied that the property could be expressed in non-evaluative terms. Can one accept this view of the meaning of ‘good’ without falling into skepticism about whether anything can be, or be known to be, good? I suggest a way of doing this. The strategy combines the idea that ‘good’ is semantically entangled, as opposed to semantically isolated, with the idea that rational agents have a generic disposition to follow reasons.