Philip E. Mosely

The Soviet Union and the United Nations

From its founding the United Nations has been a frequent source of puzzlement and embarrassment to Soviet policy makers. Given the reticence of Soviet statesmen, past and present, and the inaccessibility of Soviet diplomatic archives, we can only speculate about the expectations which were in the minds of Premier Joseph Stalin and Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov when they gave their approval to the Moscow Four-Nation Declaration on General Security of October 1943, the first great-power commitment to the establishment of a new international organization. For United States policy makers, certainly, this unprecedented commitment, buttressed by the Vandenberg Resolution, marked an important change in their nations perspective and purpose. It represented a new determination, even if a vaguely defined one, to cooperate with other nations in establishing and maintaining a better foundation for international peace and order. For the Soviet leaders, who were celebrating the grim liberation of Kiev in the midst of the Moscow Conference, there was probably little time, and certainly no leisure, to speculate about the possible congruence or incongruence of Soviet ambitions with the stabilizing and even static assumptions that underlay a revived and expanded peacekeeping league of states.

The Treaty with Austria

By the Moscow Declaration of 1943 the Soviet, British and United States governments pledged their efforts to reestablish a “free and independent Austria” after the the defeat of Germany. In the spring of 1950, five years after the liberation of Austria from German forces and Nazi rule, this pledge, like many other war-time declarations of aims, remained unfulfilled and the Austrians were still asking, as a Viennese witticism put it, when they would be “liberated from their liberators.”

Iceland and Greenland: an American Problem

THE German occupation of Denmark on April 9 peremptorily raised the question as to the future of Greenland and Iceland. In the long run, of course, the fate of these two islands depends on the outcome of the present war; their present status, however, is a matter of immediate concern to several gov ernments including that of the United States. American consular representa tives, for instance, have been sent both to Reykjavik and to Godthaab. The million dollar credit opened for Iceland by the Export-Import Bank in March 1940 has been confirmed. Both the American Red Cross and a privately or ganized committee are actively preparing to aid Greenland in the emergency. As for Great Britain, on May 9 she placed Iceland under British protection for the duration of the war. British troops are now stationed in Iceland to prevent a surprise landing there by German air or naval forces. Greenland, last of Denmarks colonies, has been administered by a benevo lent bureaucracy whose enlightened social and educational policies have been highly beneficial to the natives. Only in Greenland have the Eskimos grown in numbers; everywhere else under white rule their race has declined. Since Greenland is a colony, Denmark is legally free to transfer her sovereignty over it to Germany; or the German Government, acting as a self-appointed defender of a vassal Danish state, might seek to exercise the latters rights there. Iceland is in a very different position. The Law of Union of November 30, 1918, which was adopted by the Danish Rigsdag and the Icelandic Alting, placed the relations of the two countries on a new basis. Strictly speaking, this law was neither a statute nor a treaty, but a tertium quid. It recognized Iceland as a sovereign state and established a personal union between the two nations. It also provided a limited measure of real union in that the conduct of Icelands foreign relations was left in the hands of Denmark until such time as Iceland should itself take over this function. However, any subsequent agreements which Denmark made with outside states were to be binding on Iceland only with the consent of the Icelandic Government. Unlike Austria and Hungary under the Dual Monarchy, Denmark and Iceland were separate entities in international law. The relation of Iceland to Denmark was, for all practical purposes, identical with that of the British Dominions to the United Kingdom under the Statute of Westminster. The absence of a common authority for the two countries was emphasized by a provision that the Swedish and Norwegian Governments should appoint arbitrators to settle disputes which could not be ironed out by direct negotiation between the two partners to the union. The Law of 1918 also provided for the eventual abrogation of the union; after December 31, 1940, either country was to be free to demand the opening of negotiations for revising the Law. If no new agreement were effected within three years of such a demand, the parliaments might annul the union by a two-thirds vote, which had to be confirmed in a popular plebiscite by a three fourths majority of those voting, with three-fourths of the electorate particip?t

Russian Policy in 1911-12

HE second series of the great Soviet publication on Russian foreign policy, 1878-1917, has now been inaugurated with the appearance of _ ATolumes XVIII and XIX.1 Of the third series, which made its debut in 1931, ten volumes, in thirteen parts, have been published, covering the period from January 14, 1914, to April 13, 1916; further volumes are to carry this great task of editing to November 7, 1917. A part of the third series has also appeared in German. The first series is to embrace the period 1878-1900. Meanwhile, the second series, which is to deal with the years 1900-1914, instead of 1904-14, as originally announced, has begun to appear. With twentyfour volumes planned for the second series alone, it is a safe prediction that the Soviet publication will eventually surpass even Die 9rosse Polittk in size and detail. Volumes XVIII and XIX of the new series cover the twelve months from May 14, 1911, to May 13, 1912. They contain 1,763 documents; of them, 414, or nearly 24 per cent, have been published previously105 each in Sieberts Entente diplomacy and the world and in the Orange Book on Persia, 74 in Krawny arkAiv, 63 in Materialy po istorii franko-russkikh otrzoshenit, 42 in Stieves Der diplomatwshe Schriftwechsel Izwolskis, and a scattering elsewhere. Despite this limitation and despite the fact that German, English, French, Austrian, and Serbian documents are already available for this period, the

The Soviet Union and the United States: Problems and Prospects

viet policy and have refurbished its arsenal of diplomatic and psychological weapons. The new flexibility of their tactics has brought important gains and promises more for the future. Stalins threats and bludgeonings-the pressures against Greece and Turkey, the attempt to starve West Berlin into submission, the Communist attack on South Korea -forced the threatened countries of the free world into countermeasures and new defense arrangements and made the United States, reluctantly, the chief bastion and promoter of resistance to further Soviet expansion. At first timidly, since 1954 with growing self-assurance, the new Soviet leadership has shifted and varied its tactics. Has it changed its basic strategy?

Hopes and Failures: American Policy Toward East Central Europe, 1941–1947

When the attack on Pearl Harbor plunged the United States into its second world war, the immediate concern of political leaders and public opinion alike was to train its manpower and to mobilize its industrial resources as the fisrst step in the long up-hill climb from initial defeat to decisive victory, first against Germany, then against Japan. Its prime political aim was to forge and maintain an effective working alliance with its major allies, Britain and the Soviet Union. If either faltered or failed in the joint effort, the road to victory and postwar security would stretch out beyond the horizon. After almost two decades of selfimposed isolation, American power was now to be concerned intimately with decisions, taken or not taken, which would in turn affect all parts of the world. Neither possessing the British tradition of continuity in its diplomacy nor possessed by the ruthless Soviet drive for expansion, impsrovised American policy-making toward many areas, including East Central Europe, sometimes mistook sympathy for policy, hope for action.

Waldemar Gurian and Russian Studies in America

It was typical of Waldemar Gurian that, rich in philosophical thought and human understanding, he in turn enriched each field of studies which he touched, not least the field of Russian studies. Just because we, his colleagues and friends, have long grown accustomed to tum to him for creative and discriminating initiative and for the benefit of his wise judgment, and because he never failed with modesty and insight to meet these constant demands, it is difficult, now that he is gone from our midst, to measure precisely the manifold and essential contributions which he made to the strengthening of this important and difficult field of investigation. Yet it has clearly grown in strength and in usefulness to a free society because of his strength of mind and spirit.

KINTNER, WILLIAM R. The Front Is Everywhere: Militant Communism in Action. Pp. xi, 274. Norman: Univer sity of Oklahoma Press, 1950.

most intelligent individuals distrust the Politburo preachings. Yet it is a tribute to thetoughness of the human mind that after one-third of a century of Communist propaganda at least some Russians still make up their own minds. In short, a reservoir of good will for America still survives among part of the Soviet public. This book is one of the best ever written in English about Russia and is &dquo;must reading&dquo; for any serious student of foreign affairs today. Its faults are in presentation, rather than factual. Thus, the exciting material is often handled in dull

3.75

T HE problem which now dominates all aspects of postwar politics is that of the antagonism between American and Soviet politics. If there is a ballot on admitting new members to the United Nations, or a decision to be taken on reconstruction in Germany, it cannot be discussed on the merits of the case. Each position is taken with an eye to its effect upon the two contending greatest powers. The extreme polarization of power is reflected along sensitive frontiers, as in Norway and Iran. It cuts across critical areas of homogeneous nationalities, as in the cases of Germany, Austria, and Korea. It is paralleled in dangerous fissures within many national communities and is reflected in the continuing unrest within Soviet satellites and in the struggles of the Communist parties in France and Italy, in Greece and China. The factors of conflict, which have been traced in several articles in this volume, have been tumultuous and remain dangerous. The dangers are increased by the fact that both Soviet and American centers of power are largely self-contained; the outlook and purposes of each of these powers are generated internally, are secreted from its own way of life. The intentional or unforeseen repercussions of their acts affect many other peoples in their most sensitive interests and aspirations. In addition, each of these two great powers finds it difficult to arrive at a coherent judgment of the power and intentions of the other.

Soviet-American Relations Since the War

League of Nations failed to extinguish all sparks of war, but agencies like the World Court and conciliation devices set up under the arbitration treaties have not ushered in an era of world peace. Instead, we find many nations preparing programs for armament that are far more ambitious than those which preceded the outbreak of the World War. In the face of these disturbing facts Professor Bemis is certain that the &dquo;present world, particularly the nonAmerican continents, does not present a happy augury.&dquo; CHARLES C. TANSILL