Philip G. Berger

Diversification's effect on firm value

Abstract We estimate diversifications effect on firm value by imputing stand-alone values for individual business segments. Comparing the sum of these stand-alone values to the firms actual value implies a 13% to 15% average value loss from diversification during 1986–1991. The value loss is smaller when the segments of the diversified firm are in the same two-digit SIC code. We find that overinvestment and cross-subsidization contribute to the value loss. The loss is reduced modestly by tax benefits of diversification.

Investor Valuation of the Abandonment Option

We investigate whether investors price and the real option to abandon the firm for its liquidation value. Theory prices this real option as an American put with both a stochastic strike price (liquidation value) and a stochastic value of the underlying security (the value of cash flows). The major empirical implications are that firm value increases in liquidation value, after controlling for expected going-concern cash flows, and that more generalizable assets produce more abandonment option value. We use both discounted analyst forecasts of future earnings and industry-median cash flow multipliers to proxy for expected going-concern cash flows, and we rely on prior literature to categorize assets as more or less specialized. Using these measures, we find strong support for the major empirical predictions of abandonment put option theory.

Explicit And Implicit Tax Effects Of The Research-And-Development Tax Credit

This paper investigates the effects of the 1981 Research and Development (R&D) tax credit, first, by examining the impact of the credit on the level of R&D investment and, second, by estimating the magnitude of the implicit tax created by the credit. The two effects are interrelated because an increase in the level of R&D investment will increase the demand for R&D inputs, thus reducing the pretax rate of return from R&D activity.1 I test the credits investment effect using a time-series R&D spending model that includes both factors from the industrial organization literature (to control for nontax effects) and an R&D credit usability variable to capture the incentive created by the credit. Previous research has produced mixed evidence on whether the credit had any positive

Discretionary Disclosure in Financial Reporting: An Examination Comparing Internal Firm Data to Externally Reported Segment Data

We use confidential, U.S. Census Bureau, plant-level data to investigate aggregation in external reporting. We compare firms’ plant-level data to their published segment reports, conducting our tests by grouping a firm’s plants that share the same four-digit SIC code into a “pseudo-segment.�? We then determine whether that pseudo-segment is disclosed as an external segment, or whether it is subsumed into a different business unit for external reporting purposes. We find pseudo-segments are more likely to be aggregated within a line-of-business segment when the agency and proprietary costs of separately reporting the pseudo-segment are higher and when firm and pseudo-segment characteristics allow for more discretion in the application of segment reporting rules. For firms reporting multiple external segments, aggregation of pseudosegments is driven by both agency and proprietary costs. However, for firms reporting a single external segment, we find no evidence of an agency cost motive for aggregation.

Motives for forming research & development financing organizations☆

Abstract We study the decision to fund R&D through a separate financing organization (an ‘RDFO’) that takes the form of either a limited partnership or a corporation. The RDFO offers tax and financial reporting benefits. As a form of external funding, it also creates moral hazard and adverse selection problems (information costs). Using convertible debt as a comparative form of external funding, we find that debt-related (but not equity-related) financial reporting benefits affect the decision to form RDFOs, the evidence is mixed on whether taxes influence the formation decision, and the information costs of RDFOs restrict their use.

Commercial Lending Concentration and Bank Expertise: Evidence from Borrower Financial Statements

Lending concentration features prominently in models of information acquisition by banks, but empirical evidence on its role is limited. Using bank-level loan exposures, we find banks are less likely to collect audited financial statements from firms in industries and regions in which they have more exposure. These findings are stronger in settings in which adverse selection is acute and muted when the bank lacks experience with an exposure. Our results offer novel evidence on how bank characteristics are related to the type of financial information they use and support theoretical predictions suggesting portfolio concentration reveals a banks relative expertise.

Discussion of Valuation of Internet Stocks-An IPO Perspective

The discussion reviews BMS’s analysis of how summary financial data from the IPO prospectus are associated with the IPO offer price and the initial market price. The authors focus on whether the value drivers associated with these prices differ between internet and non-internet firms, and between the offer price and the day one ending price. They conclude that there are differences in the value drivers used to value Internet versus non-Internet firms, and further differences in the value drivers used to arrive at the offer price and the day one ending price. The review raises several concerns about these conclusions. One concern is that the reader confronts a challenge in trying to interpret the differences between the value drivers affecting the offer price and the day one ending price. The review discusses two factors for the reader to consider before interpreting these differences. The review also critiques the paper’s avoidance of disaggregated financial statement information in the value driver analyses and details several research design concerns.

Discussion of “Differential Market Reactions to Revenue and Expense Surprises”

Ertimur et al. (2003, this issue) study the difference in the market;s reaction to revenue versus expense surprises. The discussion first reviews their main findings and assesses the papers potential contributions. Alternative explanations are then considered for the base-line result that the market reacts more to revenue surprises than to expense surprises. The hypothesized reasons for revenue surprises to matter more are critiqued, as are the tests of the hypotheses, and potential extensions that would link these test to financial statement analysis are suggested. Finally, two aspects of the assessment of how the reaction to revenue and expense surprises differs across value and growth firms are discussed: The definitions of value and growth firms and the potential benefits of assessing why analyst revenue forecasts are (not) observed for many value (growth) firms.

Discussion of 'Anomalous Stock Returns Around Internet Firms' Earnings Announcements'

Trueman, Wong, and Zhang (TWZ) investigate an apparent anomaly in the pricing of internet firms around their earnings announcements, which they attribute to price pressure. The discussion addresses three concerns. The paper is unusual in choosing an event (earnings announcements) that does not appear to have an obvious non-information-related reason for triggering unjustified changes in demand for the firms shares. Relatedly, there are limitations to the tests made of the price pressure hypothesis. Finally, the discussion elaborates on TWZs brief mention of the difficulties with implementing a profitable trading strategy based on the stock return pattern they document.