Philip J. Candreva

Congressional Delegation of Spending Power to the Defense Department in the Post-9–11 Period

The advantages of increased delegation of resource management authority by Congress have long been argued by defense leadership. It is an important issue because of its relevance to congressional assessment of defense management, budget priorities, and how to enforce policy preferences. This paper investigates the series of supplemental appropriations for the war on terrorism to determine (a) under what conditions, and how and why Congress delegates budget authority to defense, (b) what happened with respect to the degree of delegation after appropriation during budget execution, and (c) what this case teaches us about the evolving budgetary relationship between Congress and the Defense Department.

Business Management Reform in the Department of Defense in Anticipation of Declining Budgets

Business management reform efforts have been part of the U.S. Defense Department agenda for decades. Current reform efforts have explicitly established the goal of generating, harvesting, and reinvesting savings from business management reform to buy more capital items; that is, they have focused on a measurable reallocation from operating and support costs to investment within a given budget top line. Recent increases in the defense top line, largely related to the war on terrorism, are not likely to persist; in addition, an examination of the factors affecting the top line suggests that a decline in the near term is likely. An examination of current and past defense management reforms suggests that efficiency-seeking business management reforms are not likely to generate sufficient resources to cover a budget decline. Instead, management reform should be sustained for reasons of stewardship and accountability.

Congressional Control Over Defense and Delegation of Authority in the Case of the Defense Emergency Response Fund

Emerging theories of civil-military relations take a more nuanced look at the role of the actors involved, particularly noting the critical role of the legislature in modern democracies. An important tool of control for the legislature is the power of the purse, so circumstances of delegated spending authority by the legislature to the military are worthy of study. This study investigates a series of supplemental appropriations enacted by the U.S. Congress to pay for the war on terrorism and situates the story in the current literature on civil-military relations. The case describes an episode in which the legislature was willing to delegate authority, how the executive responded, and the circumstances under which the legislature returned to traditional forms of oversight.

Rethinking Acquisition Reform: Cost-Growth Solutions May Aggravate More Important Problems

There is increasing dissatisfaction with cost growth in major defense acquisition programs. Cost growth crowds out other investments, stresses budgets or causes schedule slips, all of which result in a military force that is less capable than previously expected. Several recent studies have recommended two categories of reforms: capital budgeting reforms seek stability in acquisition accounts, and rational cost model reforms seek to reduce the percentage increase of final cost over budget estimates. In both categories, undesirable secondary effects may be worse than the desirable primary effects; specifically, reforms that reduce cost growth may do so by driving total costs higher. This study examines these reforms and discusses their secondary effects. The paper concludes that the current practice of generating low estimates, coupled with dissatisfaction with cost growth may best serve to limit total cost.