Philip Sabin

The face of Roman battle

Our perspectives on ancient history can sometimes be significantly affected by contributions from scholars of other disciplines. An obvious example from the military field is Edward Luttwaks 1976 book on The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire . Luttwak is a respected and insightful commentator on modern strategic issues, and his distinctive contribution was to analyse Roman military affairs in terms of modern concepts such as ‘armed suasion’ and the distinction between ‘power’ and ‘force’. His book has prompted considerable debate among specialist ancient historians, and although much of this has been critical of his ideas (largely due to the alleged anachronism of applying them in the Roman context), there is no doubt that the injection of this new dimension has helped to influence subsequent thinking on Roman imperial defence.

Warfare in ancient literature: the paradox of war

Wars and fighting are very prominent in the literature of classical antiquity. This chapter looks at literary sources about war and fighting and the problems of using them. It concentrates on three types of fighter: archers, women, slaves. The chapter deals with the interaction between military and non-military institutions: the relationship between the state and organized violence, and attitudes to that relationship as they are displayed in the literary sources, are topics of central importance to the ancient historiography of warfare. It explores why there is so much about war in ancient literature if war was not regarded as the natural, normal state of affairs. Homers Iliad, with its nearly incessant fighting, might seem to provide a complete reply to any notion that war was viewed by Greeks as unnatural. The chapter ends with six suggestions for the resolution of the paradox of war.

Modelling the Outcomes of International Crises Using Confrontation Analysis

Aim. To explore the professional application of Professor Nigel Howard’s 1998 Confrontation Analysis method of modelling political conflicts. Case Study. The Confrontation Analysis methodology was applied to the design of a political-military (pol-mil) game held at the UK’s Defence Academy in 2011 to examine the future course of the then current Libyan Civil War. Methodology. Confrontation Analysis provides a structured schema to help identify the parties involved in a dispute, highlight the differences in their narratives, find the subsequent dilemmas and attempt to resolve them to move the situation on. This helps provide rigour to analysis, negotiation and decision making as it clearly documents initial policy positions and subsequent changes through the use of cards which summarise each stakeholder’s position at each stage. Value. The methodology, used in conjunction with role-play and multi-player teams, was found to have some utility, not in forecasting detailed outcomes, but in highlighting key aspects of the potential development of the situation. This research concluded that Confrontation Analysis can make a significant contribution to understanding and analyzing international crises as well as assisting in formulating successful national policy. Confrontation Analysis can be also be an invaluable part of a learning process for analysts and key decision makers facing real crises.

Wargaming in higher education: Contributions and challenges

Wargames, especially on historical conflicts, do not currently play much part in the booming academic use of simulation and gaming techniques. This is despite the fact that they offer rich vehicles for active learning and interactive exploration of conflict dynamics. Constraints of time, expertise and resources do make it challenging to employ wargames in academia, but a greater problem is the stigma which wargaming attracts due to its association with childish enthusiasts and its perceived deficiencies as a modelling technique. This article builds on my many years of teaching and research experience with wargames to show how playing and designing them can benefit students and scholars alike.

The benefits and limits of computerization in conflict simulation

Computing is not the only way to model and simulate humanities problems. In the specific field of conflict simulation, there is a long and continuing tradition of using manual modelling techniques such as maps and counters to create playable games which mirror some of the dynamics of real armed conflicts. Computer games are not automatically superior to such manual models, since mass market commercial software focuses far more on entertainment than on realistic simulation, and since the enormous capabilities of computers tend to encourage detailed incorporation of quantifiable technicalities at the expense of the vital but much less tractable human element. The biggest limitation of computer models is their limited transparency and design accessibility for non-programmers such as humanities students and scholars. Manual modelling offers a valuable ‘bridge’ between computing and traditional humanities scholarship, allowing easier generation and use of specifically tailored models, and building synergistic relationships which foster more widespread and effective adoption of digital techniques. ................................................................................................................................................................................. A key concern of digital humanities scholars is to define and articulate what methodological advantages computing may bring to the understanding of problems in the humanities as opposed to the natural sciences. My KCL colleague Willard McCarty has written eloquently on this issue, and he has made the very important point that techniques such as ‘modelling’ and ‘simulation’ are not limited to the specific field of computing, but have a much broader history and application within intellectual endeavour as a whole (McCarty, 2002, 2004). My colleagues Matthew Kirschenbaum, Patrick Juola, and I built on this important truth that modelling and computing are not necessarily synonymous when we presented a panel at DH 2010 on ‘Wargames in a Digital Age’, drawing on our specific expertise in the field of conflict simulation. In this short article, I endeavour to show with reference to this particular case study that computing has limits as well as benefits as a modelling medium, and that a better understanding of these advantages and disadvantages may help digital humanities scholars to develop even more effective methodological synergies in the future. Ever since the development of Kriegsspiel nearly two centuries ago, military professionals and enthusiasts have used simulation and gaming techniques to model real military conflicts (Allen, 1987; Perla, 1990; Dunnigan, 1992). This phenomenon builds on the theoretical similarity between war and games, in that both are dialectical strategic contests between opposing wills, each struggling to prevail (Huizinga, 1970, ch. 5; Cornell and Allen, 2002). Hence, Clausewitz said that ‘In the whole range of human activities, war most closely resembles a game of cards’ (von Clausewitz, 1976, p. 86). There are now many thousands of published wargames, covering almost every historical conflict. Correspondence:

Western Strategy in the New Era: the Apotheosis of Air Power?

As we enter a new century, air power is no longer a novelty. We now have 100 years of theory and practical experience on which to base our employment of this form of military force. Although this period is still dwarfed by the centuries and even millennia of tradition and experience underpinning our use of land and maritime power, the ‘air power century’ offers a very rich background of examples and ideas on which twenty-first century air strategy may be based.

THE FUTURE OF UK AIR POWER

Abstract Air power has attracted both plaudits and stigma over the past two decades. In Britains coming defence review, financial pressures and the sheer unpredictability of future contingencies will make it harder than ever to shape aerospace priorities. It is vital to avoid corrosive inter-service disputes and undue preoccupation with high-profile platforms, and to shape UK air power as an inherently joint capability in which software matters just as much as hardware.