Philip Williamson

The British government and the City of London in the twentieth century

The relationship between the British government and the City of London has become central to debates on modern British economic, political and social life. For some the Citys financial and commercial interests have exercised a dominant influence over government economic policy, creating a preoccupation with international markets and the strength of sterling which impaired domestic industrial and social well-being. Others have argued that government seriously constricted financial markets, jeopardising Britains most successful economic sector. This collection of essays was the first book to address these issues over the entire twentieth century. It brings together leading financial and political historians to assess the government-City relationship from several directions and by examination of key episodes. As such, it will be indispensable not just for the study of modern British politics and finance, but also for assessment of the worldwide problem of tensions between national governments and international financial centres.

'Safety first' : Baldwin, the Conservative party, and the 1929 general election.

The Conservative partys preparations for the 1929 general election have been harshly treated by historians. Because the election was lost, they have understandably concentrated on explaining the defeat and so looked for weaknesses in Conservative leadership, policies and organization. It is also understandable that in the light of subsequent economic analysis, the Conservative election platform of ‘Safety First’ has suffered badly from comparison with the Keynesian-style policies of the Liberal party programme, We can conquer unemployment . But the contention here is that all too easily such hindsight has impeded a proper understanding of Conservative policies and tactics.

Baldwin's reputation : politics and history, 1937-1967.

In one fundamental sense, a British post-war consensus certainly existed: repudiation and denigration of interwar governments and their leaders. Stanley Baldwin was the chief victim, as it became widely believed during the 1940s that he had ‘failed to rearm’ the nation in the 1930s. Examination of the history of Baldwins reputation after his retirement – precisely why and how it collapsed – reveals a striking case of the contingent construction of historical interpretation. Partisan politics, legitimation of a new regime, a Churchillian bandwagon, self-exoneration, and selective recollection together reinforced hindsight and a wartime appetite for scapegoats to create a public myth, which despite manifest evidence to the contrary was accepted as historical ‘truth’ by historians and other intellectuals. The main indictment was accepted even by Baldwins appointed biographer, who added a further layer of supposed psychological deficiencies. Attempts to establish an effective defence were long constrained by official secrecy and the force of Churchills post-war prestige. Only during the 1960s did political distance and then the opening of government records lead to more balanced historical assessments; yet the myth had become so central to larger myths about the 1930s and 1940s that it persists in general belief.

Stanley Baldwin: Conservative Leadership and National Values

Introduction: the historical problem 1. Public career 2. Political leadership 3. Influences: business and ethics 4. Influences: community and service 5. Purposes and methods 6. Capitalism and industrial relations 7. Democracy and public values 8. Country and empire 9. Soul and providence 10. Armaments and anti-totalitarianism Conclusion.