Philipp Schmidt-Dengler

Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games: A Comment

Recursive procedures which are based on iterating on the best response mapping have difficulties converging to all equilibria in multi-player games. We illustrate these difficulties by revisiting the asymptotic properties of the iterative nested pseudo maximum likelihood method for estimating dynamic games introduced by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007). An example shows that the iterative method may not be consistent.

Austrian Demography and Housing Demand: Is There a Connection

This paper analyses the role of demographic factors in the Austrian housing market. Linking demographic issues, in conjunction with the Austrian private housing finance, to the housing demand is the focus of the empirical model developed in this paper. We find statistical support that the demographic factors help to explain for housing demand. However, we emphasize that demographic factor such as the adult population with net migration effect is only one of the key variables which contributes in understanding the Austrian housing demand. Some of our other empirical findings indicate that the Austrian housing demand is inelastic to various economic factors is a concern for some housing policies.

Clustering in N-Player Preemption Games

We study a complete information preemption game in continuous time. A finite number of firms decide when to make an irreversible, observable investment. Upon investment, a firm receives flow profits, which decrease in the number of firms that have invested. The cost of investment declines over time exogenously. We characterize the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome, which is unique up to a permutation of players. When the preemption race among late investors is sufficiently intense, the preemption incentive for earlier investors disappears, and two or more investments occur at the same time. We identify a sufficient condition in terms of model parameters: clustering of investments occurs if the flow profits from consecutive investments are sufficiently close. This shows how clustering can occur in the absence of coordination failures, informational spillovers, or positive payoff externalities.

Inefficient Entry Order in Preemption Games

In a preemption game, players decide when to take an irreversible action. Delaying the action exogenously increases payoffs, but there is an early mover advantage. Riordan (1992) shows that in a preemption game with two asymmetric players, players act in decreasing order of efficiency. This provides a microfoundation to the assumption that entry in a market occurs in the order of profitability, commonly used in the empirical analysis of market entry. We provide a counterexample showing that with more than two players this intuitive result can be reversed. We present a preemption game of entry into a new market. The potential entrants are three asymmetric firms: one “efficient” firm with high post-entry profits, and two “inefficient firms”. We show that the set of parameters such that the equilibrium entry order does not reflect the efficiency ranking is nonempty, and analyse which changes in post-entry profits preserve this entry order.

Entry and Shakeout in Dynamic Oligopoly

In many industries, the number of firms evolves non-monotonically over time. A phase of rapid entry is followed by an industry shakeout: a large number of firms exit within a short period. We present a simple timing game of entry and exit with an exogenous technological process governing firm efficiency. We calibrate our model to data from the post World War II penicillin industry. The equilibrium dynamics of the calibrated model closely match the patterns observed in many industries. In particular, our model generates richer and more realistic dynamics than competitive models previously analyzed. The entry phase is characterized by preemption motives while the shakeout phase mimics a war of attrition. We show that dynamic strategic incentives accelerate early entry and trigger the shakeout by comparing a Markov Perfect Equilibrium to an Open-loop Equilibrium.

Can Amputation Save the Hospital? The Impact of the Medicare Rural Flexibility Program on Demand and Welfare

This paper seeks to understand the impact of the Medicare Rural Hospital Flexibility (Flex) Program on hospital choice and consumer welfare for rural residents. The Flex Program created a new class of hospital, the Critical Access Hospital (CAH), which receives more generous Medicare reimbursements in return for limits on capacity and length of stay. We find that conversion to CAH status resulted in a 4.7 percent drop in inpatient admissions to participating hospitals, almost all of which was driven by factors other than capacity constraints. The Flex Program increased consumer welfare if it prevented the exit of at least 6.5 percent of randomly selected converting hospitals.