Phillip Wolff

Causal reasoning with forces

Causal composition allows people to generate new causal relations by combining existing causal knowledge. We introduce a new computational model of such reasoning, the force theory, which holds that people compose causal relations by simulating the processes that join forces in the world, and compare this theory with the mental model theory (Khemlani et al., 2014) and the causal model theory (Sloman et al., 2009), which explain causal composition on the basis of mental models and structural equations, respectively. In one experiment, the force theory was uniquely able to account for peoples ability to compose causal relationships from complex animations of real-world events. In three additional experiments, the force theory did as well as or better than the other two theories in explaining the causal compositions people generated from linguistically presented causal relations. Implications for causal learning and the hierarchical structure of causal knowledge are discussed.

Direct causation in the linguistic coding and individuation of causal events.

This research proposes a new theory of direct causation and examines how this concept plays a key role in the linguistic coding and individuation of causal events. According to the no-intervening-cause hypothesis, a causal chain can be described by a single-clause sentence and construed as a single event if there are no intervening causers between the initial causer and the final causee. Consistent with this hypothesis, participants used single-clause sentences (lexical causatives) more often than two-clause sentences (e.g. periphrastic causatives) for causal chains in which (1) the causer and causee touched (Experiments 1 and 2), and (2) an intervening entity could be construed as an enabling condition rather than another cause (Experiments 2-4). In addition, event judgments paralleled linguistic descriptions: chains that could be described with single-clause expressions were more often construed as single events than chains that could not (Experiments 1-3). Implications for languages other than English, for the linguistic coding of accidental outcomes and for the relationship between cognition and language in general are discussed.

Models of Causation and the Semantics of Causal Verbs.

This research examines the relationship between the concept of CAUSE as it is characterized in psychological models of causation and the meaning of causal verbs, such as the verb cause itself. According to focal set models of causation (; ), the concept of CAUSE should be more similar to the concepts of ENABLE and PREVENT than either is to each other. According to a model based on theory of force dynamics, the force dynamic model, the concepts of CAUSE, ENABLE, and PREVENT should be roughly equally similar to one another. The relationship between these predictions and the meaning of causal verbs was examined by having participants sort causal verbs and rate them with respect to the dimensions specified by the two models. The results from five experiments indicated that the force dynamic model provides a better account of the meaning of causal verbs than do focal set models of causation. Implications for causal inference and induction are discussed.

Categorization inside and outside the laboratory : essays in honor of Douglas L. Medin

This volume raises key questions about the nature and universality of naturally occurring concepts in human thinking. The work showcased in this book suggests that categories can differ significantly across cultures with respect to fundamental human concepts such as space, time, and objecthood. The building of bridges across communities that do not frequently interact has been inspired by the pioneering work of cognitive psychologist Douglas L. Medin, to whom this book is dedicated.

Linguistic relativity: Linguistic relativity

The central question in research on linguistic relativity, or the Whorfian hypothesis, is whether people who speak different languages think differently. The recent resurgence of research on this question can be attributed, in part, to new insights about the ways in which language might impact thought. We identify seven categories of hypotheses about the possible effects of language on thought across a wide range of domains, including motion, color, spatial relations, number, and false belief understanding. While we do not find support for the idea that language determines the basic categories of thought or that it overwrites preexisting conceptual distinctions, we do find support for the proposal that language can make some distinctions difficult to avoid, as well as for the proposal that language can augment certain types of thinking. Further, we highlight recent evidence suggesting that language may induce a relatively schematic mode of thinking. Although the literature on linguistic relativity remains contentious, there is growing support for the view that language has a profound effect on thought. WIREs Cogni Sci 2011 2 253-265 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.104 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.

For Want of a Nail: How Absences Cause Events.

Causation by omission is instantiated when an effect occurs from an absence, as in The absence of nicotine causes withdrawal or Not watering the plant caused it to wilt. The phenomenon has been viewed as an insurmountable problem for process theories of causation, which specify causation in terms of conserved quantities, like force, but not for theories that specify causation in terms of statistical or counterfactual dependencies. A new account of causation challenges these assumptions. According to the force theory, absences are causal when the removal of a force leads to an effect. Evidence in support of this account was found in 3 experiments in which people classified animations of complex causal chains involving force removal, as well as chains involving virtual forces, that is, forces that were anticipated but never realized. In a 4th experiment, the force theorys ability to predict synonymy relationships between different types of causal expressions provided further evidence for this theory over dependency theories. The findings show not only how causation by omission can be grounded in the physical world but also why only certain absences, among the potentially infinite number of absences, are causal.

When Russians learn English: How the semantics of causation may change *

We examined how the semantics of causal expressions in Russian and English might differ and how these differences might lead to changes in the way second language learners understand causal expressions in their first language. According to the dynamics model of causation (Wolff, 2007), expressions of causation based on CAUSE verbs (make, force) differ from expressions based on ENABLE verbs (let, help, allow) primarily in terms of the causees inherent tendency toward an endstate, that is, the causees physical or intentional inclination for a particular state of affairs. In Russian, the tendency appears to be based on internally derived forces, whereas in English, the tendency may be based on either internally or externally derived forces. In two experiments, English and Russian monolinguals and bilinguals described animations in which the causees tendency was systematically varied. When the causees tendency was ambiguous, English and Russian monolinguals’ descriptions differed, suggesting that the causal expressions differ in meaning across languages. Of primary interest, Russian–English and English–Russian bilinguals’ causal descriptions differed from those of monolingual speakers of their first language, and in the direction of the second language, even though they performed the task in the first language. This L2 → L1 transfer is explained in terms of the memory phenomenon of retrieval-induced reconsolidation.

Causers in English, Korean, and Chinese and the individuation of events

Abstract The kinds of entities that can be described as causing an event depend, in part, on the language one speaks. Whereas in English and Chinese it is possible to say The knife cut the bread or The key opened the door, in Korean and many other languages, such sentences sound very odd. According to the initiator hypothesis, languages fall into two major groups with respect to possible external arguments in causal expressions: those that require that the causer be capable of generating its own energy and those that require only that the causer participate in the causal chain leading up to a particular result. In support of this hypothesis, we show that ability to self-energize has a larger impact on acceptability ratings in Korean than in either English or Chinese (Exp. 1). We also show that restrictions on possible causers extend to the semantics of possible causes in the descriptions of animations depicting causal chains (Exp. 2). Finally, we show that cross-linguistic differences in the linguistic coding of causers may have consequences for the way people conceptualize animations of causal chains in terms of number of events (Exp. 3). Implications for the representation of verb meaning and the semantics of external arguments in other languages are discussed.

Causation, Touch, and the Perception of Force

Abstract Much of the thinking on causation recognizes that it entails more than spatial–temporal contiguity or correlation, but it has been difficult to specify exactly what that extra component of thought is. In this paper, we argue that the representation of causal relations is based on the feeling of force as understood through the sense of touch. Grounding causation in people’s sense of touch allows us to address the long-standing challenges that have been raised against force-based approaches to causation. In support of our proposal, we review research on the perception of causation that provides support for a force-based view of causation. We also describe recent findings that establish a direct connection between people’s impressions of causation and their sense of touch. We conclude by showing how a force-based view can be extended to handle the problem of how abstract causal relations are represented and acquired.

Spatial language and the psychological reality of schematization.

Although the representations underlying spatial language are often assumed to be schematic in nature, empirical evidence for a schematic format of representation is lacking. In this research, we investigate the psychological reality of such a format, using simulated motion during scene processing—previously linked to schematization—as a diagnostic. One group of participants wrote a verbal description of a scene and then completed a change detection task assessing simulated motion, while another group completed only the latter task. We expected that effects of simulated motion would be stronger following language use than not, and specifically following the use of spatial, relative to non-spatial, language. Both predictions were supported. Further, the effect of language was scene independent, suggesting that language may encourage a general mode of schematic construal. The study and its findings illustrate a novel approach to examining the perceptual properties of mental representations.