Phillip Y. Lipscy

The Fukushima disaster and Japan's nuclear plant vulnerability in comparative perspective.

We consider the vulnerability of nuclear power plants to a disaster like the one that occurred at Fukushima Daiichi. Examination of Japanese nuclear plants affected by the earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 2011 shows that three variables were crucial at the early stages of the crisis: plant elevation, sea wall elevation, and location and status of backup generators. Higher elevations for these variables, or waterproof protection of backup generators, could have mitigated or prevented the disaster. We collected information on these variables, along with historical data on run-up heights, for 89 coastal nuclear power plants in the world. The data shows that 1. Japanese plants were relatively unprotected against potential inundation in international comparison, but there was considerable variation for power plants within and outside of Japan; 2. Older power plants and plants owned by the largest utility companies appear to have been particularly unprotected.

Japan Under the DPJ: The Paradox of Political Change Without Policy Change

In 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) brought an end to the long reign of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). However, despite high expectations, this politically transformative event has not unleashed significant policy change in Japan. We highlight five electoral factors that have acted as important constraints on policy change under DPJ rule. First, majoritarian electoral rules have led to a convergence in the policy positions of the two major political parties. Second, as the par ties’ policy positions have become more similar, voters have increas ingly cast ballots based on “valence” (i.e., nonpolicy) evaluations. Third, large national vote swings have limited the tenure of young, inexperi enced candidates who might otherwise serve as the instigators of re form. Fourth, Japan’s electoral rules permit inconsistency across policy positions within parties and discourage greater policy coherence. Fifth, the continuing influence of rural regions has limited the scope of pol icy reform under the DPJ. KEYWORDS : electoral systems, Japan, policy change, party realignment, party alternation in power, reform, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) DURING THE PERIOD 2005‐2009, J APAN EXPERIENCED THE COUNTRY ’S most significant political transformation since the formation of the Lib eral Democratic Party (LDP) in 1955. In 2005, the LDP celebrated fifty years of nearly uninterrupted rule with one of its most successful elec tions ever but soon found itself in dramatic decline. Most notably, the Japanese elections of 2007 and 2009 saw the collapse of the LDP, and the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) gained control of both houses of parliament (Diet). The 2007 House of Councillors election gave a DPJ-led coalition a bare majority of the 242 seats in the body, and the DPJ claimed 308 out of the 480 seats in the 2009 House of Represen tatives election. The elections appeared to mark the consolidation of a

A Casualty of Political Transformation? The Politics of Energy Efficiency in the Japanese Transportation Sector

The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) came to power in 2009 promising significant transportation sector reform, but it has struggled to implement its proposals. I argue that the DPJs initiatives faltered due to the legacy of “efficiency clientelism.” Historically, Japanese transportation policy combined two imperatives: (1) encourage efficiency by raising the cost of energy-inefficient transportation, and (2) redistribute benefits to supporters of the incumbent Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Because of the legacy of efficiency clientelism, DPJ campaign pledges—designed to appeal broadly to the general public by reducing transportation costs—ran up against the prospect of sharp declines in revenues and energy efficiency. Efficiency clientelism was well suited to political realities in Japan prior to the 1990s, but recent developments have undercut its viability. This raises profound questions about the sustainability of Japans energy efficiency achievements.

The Politics of Financial Crisis Response in Japan and the United States

We examine the politics of financial crisis response in Japan and the United States. Many existing accounts of Japan’s ‘lost decade’ of the 1990s have emphasized Japanspecific factors, such as structural problems, policy errors, and political dysfunction. We argue that Japan may have been subject to a form of first-mover disadvantage .L ike innovationintheprivatesector,developingeffectivesolutionstonovelpolicyproblems requires a messy process of discovery, experimentation, and repeated failure. Much as late-industrializingcountriesadaptedthemethodsandtechnologiesofearlydevelopers, second-movers can apply effective policies demonstrated by first-movers in a more targeted,efficient,andrapidmanner.WeshowthatthebehaviorofJapanandtheUnited States during their respective financial crises is broadly consistent with this theory. In addition, policy adoption in the United States most clearly reflected lessons from Japan inareaswherethelessonswereconsideredclearandimplementationwaslesspoliticized.

First-Mover Disadvantage: The Politics of Financial Crisis Response in Japan and the United States

We propose that policymakers responding to novel contingencies are subject to first-mover disadvantage. Like innovation in the private sector, developing effective solutions to novel policy problems requires a messy process of discovery, experimentation, and repeated failure. Much as late-industrializing countries adapted the methods and technologies of early developers, second-movers can apply effective policies demonstrated by first-movers in a more targeted, efficient, and rapid manner. Without accounting for this possibility, scholars may reach biased inferences about cross-national variation in political and economic outcomes. We illustrate this theory by examining the response of Japan to its “lost decade” in the 1990s, particularly in comparison with the US subprime crisis of 2008. Most existing accounts of Japan’s slow, ineffective response have focused on country-specific factors such as structural problems and macroeconomic policy mistakes. We show that, consistent with our theory, Japanese financial authorities underwent a lengthy process of discovery, policy experimentation, and innovation during the the 1990s. When the subprime crisis occurred in 2008, US policymakers explicitly adopted successful policy solutions from Japan and applied them with greater scale and rapidity.

Resilience or Retrenchment?: Japanese Security in the Era of Fiscal Austerity

The advanced industrialized world has entered an era of fiscal austerity, with profound implications for international security and the global balance of power. Japan’s predicament is particularly dire: public debt has risen to historically unprecedented levels, and defense expenditures have continually declined for a decade. Nonetheless, we show that Japan is primarily unique for being early – other developed democracies will soon face comparable, long-term fiscal pressures due to three principal factors: financial crises, demographics, and elevated levels of pre-existing debt. As an early mover, how has the Japanese defense establishment responded to fiscal austerity? Consistent with existing accounts of Japan’s reemergence as a more muscular military power, we find that defense spending is characterized by relative resilience, receiving increasingly high priority within the domestic budgetary process. Japanese defense policymakers have also taken advantage of austerity to rationalize the allocation of funding among its services and priorities. However, fiscal austerity is increasingly limiting Japan’s options. The recent buildup of military hardware is attributable to various life extension measures and expenditure shifts from procurement to equipment maintenance, calling into question the quality and long-term viability of Japanese military forces. As these measures run their course over the coming decade, Japan faces the prospect of a sharp reduction in its military capabilities.

The Politics of International Testing

In recent years, an increasing number of countries have participated in cross-national assessments in education (CNAs), but their impact remains underexplored. We argue that CNA participation increases the capacity and motivation of policymakers to implement improvements in education through mechanisms at the elite, domestic, and transnational levels. We find evidence consistent with our propositions using a mixed-method approach, utilizing: 1. a panel dataset covering all CNAs and all countries in the international system; 2. an original survey of 77 education officials directly responsible for the planning and implementation of CNAs in 46 countries; 3. personal interviews with 48 officials in target states, assessment agencies, and donor agencies. Even after accounting for potential self-selection, CNA participation is associated with increases in net secondary enrollment, particularly for girls, and education aid inflows. Qualitative and quantitative evidence also suggests that CNA participation accelerates education reforms. The empirical results consistently support our prediction that CNA participation has a meaningful impact on education policy and outcomes.

Congressional Preferences and the Structure of Delegation: Reassessing the Effect of Divided Government on U.S. Trade Policy

We propose a new theory of how domestic preferences and political institutions interact to determine US trade policy outcomes. First, we argue that congressional representatives cater to distinct subconstituencies on trade. This explains why Democrats and Republicans switched their positions on trade around the 1960s despite facing an increasingly similar composition of industry constituents. For most of US history, Democrats were a pro-trade party supported by export interests, and Republicans a protectionist party supported by import-competing interests. In the recent period, this has reversed. Second, we demonstrate that this finding has important implications for how divided government affects trade. Congressional delegation since the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act (RTAA) allows the president to lower, not raise, tariffs. Hence, we predict that divided government will impede trade policy only conditionally. A pro-trade party supported by exporters faces incentives to delegate authority regardless of the party identity of the president. On the other hand, a protectionist party supported by import-competing interests will be reluctant to delegate authority to an other-party president. Our hypotheses find broad support in congressional voting data.