Photis Lysandrou

Global inequality as one of the root causes of the financial crisis: a suggested explanation

Abstract The global financial crisis was caused because the volume of toxic assets in the financial system had grown to the point where the system could no longer cope. The dominant view among heterodox economists is that this point of critical mass was reached because of various failures in the financial system. This paper puts the accompanying view that the toxic assets were created largely in response to external pressures, a principle source of which was global inequality: while income inequality was an important factor behind the supply of those assets, wealth concentration was a major factor behind the demand for them. The policy implications of this analysis are that income distribution and wealth ownership have to be more equitably structured if global financial crises are to be avoided in the future. This is not to exclude other proposals for making the financial system more transparent and accountable. The point, rather, is that these proposals are insufficient on their own. No matter how radical the re-structuring of the financial system, as long as there remain external pressures on it to create products or to indulge in practices that are harmful to it, such products and practices will continue to be introduced and financial crises will continue to occur.

The role of shadow banking entities in the financial crisis: a disaggregated view

ABSTRACT This article examines the role of the shadow banking system in the global financial crisis of 2007–9. In order to do this, one must first explain the reasons for the explosive growth of shadow banking in the immediate pre-crisis era. Current explanations for this growth tend to hold two contrasting positions: one emphasising factors endogenous to the banking sector (notably regulatory arbitrage and financial innovation); the other emphasising exogenous factors (notably the ‘search for yield’). Integrating these two explanations, in this article we develop a disaggregated view of the shadow banking system. After clarifying the nature of the relation between the regulated and shadow banking systems, we inquire more closely into the different entities that inhabit the shadow banking system, the different activities that these entities performed and the different financial products that these entities supplied. The disaggregated view of shadow banking suggests that while some parts of the system played an important role in the initial subprime phase of the crisis through their involvement with the toxic securities that were at its centre, other parts of the system were key to the subsequent money and inter-bank phases of the crisis through their close ties with the regulated banks.

The European Commission's Proposal for a Financial Transactions Tax: A Critical Assessment

A financial activities tax (FAT) and a financial transactions tax (FTT) are the main alternative ways of recouping some of the public money used to bail out the financial sector after the great crisis of 2007–08. In preparing a common proposal for the European Union, the European Commission initially appeared to favour the FAT, but then swung its weight behind the FTT in late 2011. Its rationale was that in addition to generating revenue, this tax could also help to stabilize the financial markets by curbing excessive speculative trading. This article takes a different position. Its central argument is that the FTT would amplify rather than dampen market instability by interfering with the functions of important financial institutions. Its chief conclusion is that the FAT is superior to the FTT.

Debt intolerance and the 90 per cent debt threshold: two impossibility theorems

Abstract Two propositions underpin the retreat from post-crisis fiscal expansion instituted by several G7 governments in the summer of 2010. One is that the threat of debt intolerance is general: the reasoning is that the sharp rise in government debt levels caused by post-crisis fiscal expansion will force investors to abandon government bonds in favour of some other asset class. The other proposition is that there is a one-size debt threshold: the reasoning is that no government, those of the G7 countries included, can escape the serious consequences of debt intolerance and the threat of exit should its debt to GDP ratio reach 90 per cent. This paper argues that neither of these propositions can have credibility at a time of continuing global economic slowdown and consequent contraction in the global supplies of investable assets. At such a time investors cannot possibly hold up the threat of intolerance to core economy governments because they have no choice but to store substantial portions of their wealth in the latters bonds, a fact which in turn means that the debt thresholds for core economy governments cannot possibly be the same as the average for other governments.

The best of both worlds: scale economies and discriminatory policies in London’s global financial centre

Abstract From the early 1960s onwards London has managed to vie with New York for the top spot as an international financial centre. Ever since then, London has reigned as a leading global financial hub, despite not having behind it anything like the political or economic backing enjoyed by New York. This paper seeks to explain this phenomenon by building on Kindleberger’s classic analysis of financial centres as international hubs that arise due to economic, geographic and infrastructural advantages, and more recent theories of specialized financial centres which suggest that financial centres deploy discriminatory business practices in order to compete with the scale economy-based centres. Our central claim is that London’s continuing financial supremacy can be traced to the way that the opposing ‘economic’ and ‘political’ sets of criteria necessary for a financial centre are here inextricably fused together in a mutually reinforcing dynamic. Three case studies are used to support this claim: the market for international loans and deposits; the forex (FX) and over the counter (OTC) derivatives markets; and the area of asset and collateral management.

The Differential Impact of Public and Private Governance Institutions on the Different Modes of Foreign Investment

Abstract This paper examines the respective impacts of public and private governance institutions on foreign direct and foreign portfolio investment inflows. We present two hypotheses: (1) there is a strong correlation between the quality of a country’s public governance institutions and the amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) received while the quality of its private governance institutions has no further discernible impact on this correlation; (2) there is a strong correlation between the quality of a country’s public governance institutions and the amount of foreign portfolio investment (FPI) received while the quality of its private governance institutions has a further positive impact on this correlation. Our findings, which are based on panel data analysis, show both hypotheses to be valid.

Commercial corporate governance ratings: an alternative view of their use and impact

The rise in the popularity of commercial corporate governance ratings is at once a source of dismay and a cause for alarm: the former because they do not appear to give accurate predictions of corporate performance and the latter because they add to the pressure on corporations to adapt their governance structures to a benchmark model that takes no account of the conditions in which they operate. This paper gives an alternative view of the potential use and impact of the commercially marketed governance ratings. It argues that their importance to institutional investors lies in providing them with information that accurately summarises corporate loyalty to shareholders rather than accurately predicts corporate performance. It goes on to argue that the commercial governance ratings can bring benefits to an economy by contributing to a new type of managerial control mechanism that is not only more efficient than hostile takeovers and stock options but also helps to reduce the governance role of these instruments.

Global Inequality and the Global Financial Crisis: The New Transmission Mechanism

With contributions from the leading commentators in the field and an over-arching introduction from the editor, the concerns of this updated and revised Handbook are two-fold. Firstly, to redefine the concept of globalisation and dispel the haze that surrounds it through a systematic and thorough examination of the debate. Secondly, to advance the frontiers of current critical thinking on the role and impact of globalisation, on the winners and losers in the process, and on the implications for society, the economy and governance.

The Irrelevance of the European Union's Takeover Directive

The European Commission persists in implementing the Directive on Takeover Bids despite continuing opposition from many member states. This persistence is partly a reflection of the influence exercised by the agency theory of corporate governance and partly a reaction to the emergence of institutional investors as a dominant force in the European capital market. Since these investors prefer to limit shareholdings in companies and since it is a central tenet of agency theory that minority shareholders can only effectively control company managers if they have the takeover weapon at their disposal, it would seem to follow that the European Commission has to create an active takeover market in Europe if it wants to succeed in promoting the interests of institutional investors. This paper argues that the Commissions line of reasoning is wrong. As a result of changes in the scale and structure of institutional asset management and of the corresponding changes in the way that corporations are monitored and compared, the European capital market has acquired a new and direct power of attraction over European companies. Given that institutional investors can already control companies through the gravitational pull of their collective actions, it follows that they do not need to use the hostile takeover weapon as a means of leveraging up their control. Our conclusion is that the European Commission should abandon its attempt to create an active takeover market in Europe on the grounds that this policy not only does not advance the interests of institutional investors but also gets in the way of those policies that do advance their interests.