Pierluigi Barrotta

WHY ECONOMISTS SHOULD BE UNHAPPY WITH THE ECONOMICS OF HAPPINESS

The economics of happiness is an influential research programme, the aim of which is to change welfare economics radically. In this paper I set out to show that its foundations are unreliable. I shall maintain two basic theses: (a) the economics of happiness shows inconsistencies with the first person standpoint, contrary claims on the part of the economists of happiness notwithstanding, and (b) happiness is a dubious concept if it is understood as the goal of welfare policies. These two theses are closely related and lead to a third thesis: (c) happiness should be replaced by autonomy as the fundamental goal of welfare economics. To defend my claims I shall show that a hedonic approach to happiness leads to an awkward trilemma. Furthermore, I shall clarify the meaning of “happiness” and “autonomy”, along with their conceptual relationships.

A Neo-Kantian Critique of Von Mises's Epistemology

More than many other Austrians, Mises tried to found aprioristic methodology on a well defined and developed epistemology. Although references to Kant are scattered rather unsystematically throughout his works, he nevertheless used an unequivocal Kantian terminology. He explicitly defended the existence of ‘a priori knowledge’, ‘synthetic a priori propositions’, ‘the category of action’, and so forth.

Contemporary philosophy of science in Italy : An overview

The paper analyses the development of some themes in the contemporary philosophy of science in Italy. Section 1 reviews the dabate on the legacy of neopositivism. The spread of the philosophy of Popper is outlined in Section 2, with particular regard to the problem of the vindication of induction. Section 3 deals with the debate on the incommensurability thesis, while Section 4 examines its consequences on the possible relationships between historical and epistemological studies of science. The last section is devoted to one of the most recent trends in the Italian philosophy of science: the resumption of Aristotelian dialectics.

Concepts, Values, and Scientific Measurements

Whereas in the first chapter I explained the illegitimate use of Hume’s ‘law’ in defence of value-free science, in this chapter we will begin to see positive arguments showing why science is not morally neutral. At least in some cases, moral values determine the meaning of the descriptive terms used in science. These terms, therefore, are both descriptive and evaluative. To understand this statement, I will explain the nature of the pragmatic maxim, by which the meaning of all concepts is established. The chapter concludes with an analysis of cognitive or epistemic values.

Science and Democracy

We have seen why the moral responsibility of science is inevitable. However, society taken as a whole collaborates with science: scientists and ordinary citizens are members of a single community of inquiry, whose aim is the truth. After examining the features of a ‘perfectionist’ democracy, I will clarify why it does not represent a utopian ideal by examining the role and characteristics of both experts and public opinion. We will appreciate how science and society are both fragmented and subject to variable alliances. Finally, we will see the differences between this and other conceptions of the relationship between science and democracy. In this context, the essential role of the concept of truth will be confirmed.

Values and Inductive Risk

Values are not only necessary to establish the meaning of some scientific terms, they also enter into the consequences of accepting or rejecting a theory. This argument, based on ‘inductive risk’, was proposed many years ago and has been returned to and criticised by those who defend the ideal of value-free science. We will examine why these criticisms are unconvincing also by presenting an example: the controversy over climate change, which also has the advantage of showing an unexpected link between this chapter and the previous one. Furthermore, in the last two sections we will see why constructivist concepts of risk must equally be rejected.

Values, Transactional Relationships and the Autonomy of Science

The fifth chapter reinforces the conclusions reached by the fourth. I will argue that moral evaluations are similar to empirical hypotheses, which are factually controllable. Without sacrificing the due distinctions, science and morality are different aspects of the same inquiry, since they use the same empirical process and the objective of both is the truth. The transactional conception of knowledge and reality will further confirm the presence of a moral dimension in scientific research. The inclusion of moral values in scientific research will lead to examining the responsibilities of science. Through historical examples and general arguments, we will see why the scientist does not just have a responsibility only towards truth. The last section will examine the problem of autonomy in science. The fall of the myth of value-free science does not pose any dangers to the autonomy of science. On the contrary, it is a necessary step to reaffirm it and defend it.

Scientific Research and Truth

After examining the scientific method in Peirce’s work and its connection with truth, I will deal with the relationship between pure science – the aim of which is only truth – and applied science – the aim of which is the implementation of practical applications. Here, I will distance myself from Dewey’s instrumentalism, which involves levelling pure science to applied science. In the last section, conclusions will be drawn and the meaning of ‘truth’ and, consequently, of ‘objectivity’ explained. We will begin to see why science and morality are two aspects of the same logic of inquiry, whose aim is the pursuit of truth.