Pierre-François Bonnefoi

3D Graph Visualisation of Web Normal and Malicious Traffic

Once a Web site has been made operational by a company, organisation or individual there is a wish to know the details regarding the connections to the site. In addition, there is a great interest to monitor the activity profile of the Web site in terms of how many hits are received, where they come from, the relationship between this activity and increased revenues of the business and so on. Due to the complexity and volume of data involved in these tasks the only way to manage all of the information is to present it using a visual paradigm. Furthermore, Web sites are likely to be regularly scanned and attacked by both automated and manual means. Companies, organisations and individuals are making every effort to build and maintain secure Web sites. In this paper we will present an ongoing surveillance prototype system which offers a visual aid to the Web analyst by monitoring and exploring 3D graphs. The system offers a visual surveillance of the Web traffic for both normal and malicious activity. Web requests are presented as 3D directed graphs. Colours are used on the 3D graphics to indicate malicious attempts or anomalous traffic and the analyst has the ability to perform visual data analysis by navigating online into the Web request payload, of either normal or malicious traffic

Declarative Modelling in Computer Graphics: Current Results and Future Issues

A review of declarative scene modelling techniques is presented in this paper. After a definition of the purpose of declarative modelling, some existing declarative modellers are classified according to the manner to manage imprecision in scene description. The aim of this paper is to show the importance of declarative scene modelling for a really computer aided design and some open research problems in order to improve drawbacks of this modelling technique. Some suggestions for possible future extensions of declarative modelling are also given.

Secure Autonomous UAVs Fleets by Using New Specific Embedded Secure Elements

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) fleets are becoming more apparent in both military and civilian applications. However security of these systems still remains unsatisfactory if a strong adversary model with a high attack potential (i.e. the adversary has capabilities and knowledge to capture a UAV, to perform side-channel or fault injection or other physical, software or combined attacks in order to gain access to some secret data like cryptographic keys, mission plan, etc.) is considered. The aim of this position paper is to draw security requirements for this kind of adversaries and to propose theoretical solutions based on an embedded Secure Element (SE) that could help to accommodate these requirements. Finally, our proposal on how to use these SEs to secure Autonomous UAVs fleets is presented.

An efficient, secure and trusted channel protocol for avionics wireless networks

Avionics networks rely on a set of stringent reliability and safety requirements. In existing deployments, most of these networks are based on a wired technology, which supports these requirements. Furthermore, this technology simplifies the security management of the network since certain assumptions can be safely made, including the inability of an attacker to access the network, and the fact that it is almost impossible for an attacker to introduce a node into the network. The proposal for Avionics Wireless Networks (AWNs, currently under consideration by multiple aerospace working groups, promises a reduction in the complexity of electrical wiring harness design and fabrication, a reduction in the total weight of wires, increased customization possibilities, and the capacity to monitor otherwise inaccessible moving or rotating aircraft parts such as landing gear and some sections of the aircraft engines. While providing these benefits, the AWN must ensure that it provides levels of safety that are at minimum equivalent to those offered by the wired equivalent. In this paper, we propose a secure and trusted channel protocol that satisfies the stated security and operational requirements for an AWN protocol. There are three main objectives for this protocol. First, the protocol has to provide the assurance that all communicating entities can trust each other, and can trust their internal (secure) software and hardware states. Second, the protocol has to establish a fair key exchange between all communicating entities so as to provide a secure channel. Finally, the third objective is to be efficient for both the initial start-up of the network and when resuming a session after a cold and/or warm restart of a node. The proposed protocol is implemented within a demo AWN, and performance measurements are presented based on this implementation. In addition, we formally verify our proposed protocol using CasperFDR.

A Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol for UAVs Fleets.

Fleets of UAVs will be deployed in near future in reliability and safety critical applications (e.g. for smart cities). To satisfy the stringent level of criticality, each UAV in the fleet must trust the other UAVs with which it communicates to get assurance of the trustworthiness in information received and to be sure not to disclose information to an unauthorized party. In addition, to be protected against an attacker willing to eavesdrop and/or modify the exchanged data, the communication channel needs to be secured, i.e. it has to provide confidentiality and integrity of exchanges. The work presented here is based on our previous research which concluded that it is required that each UAV includes a Secure Element (which we called ARFSSD standing for Active Radio Frequency Smart Secure Device) to withstand an adversary with a high attack potential. In this paper, we propose a secure and trusted channel protocol that satisfies the stated security and operational requirements for a UAV-to-UAV communication protocol. This protocol supports three main objectives: (1) it provides the assurance that all communicating entities can trust each other and can trust their internal (secure) software and hardware states; (2) it establishes a fair key exchange process between all communicating entities so as to provide a secure channel; (3) it is efficient for both the initial start-up of the network and when resuming a session after a cold and/or warm restart of a UAV. The proposed protocol is formally verified using CasperFDR and AVISPA.

Security and performance comparison of different secure channel protocols for Avionics Wireless Networks

The notion of Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) refers to inter-connected pieces of avionics equipment supported by a wired technology, with stringent reliability and safety requirements. If the inter-connecting wires are physically secured so that a malicious user cannot access them directly, then this enforces (at least partially) the security of the network. However, substituting the wired network with a wireless network - which in this context is referred to as an Avionics Wireless Network (AWN) - brings a number of new challenges related to assurance, reliability, and security. The AWN thus has to ensure that it provides at least the required security and safety levels offered by the equivalent wired network. Providing a wired-equivalent security for a communication channel requires the setting up of a strong, secure (encrypted) channel between the entities that are connected to the AWN. In this paper, we propose three approaches to establish such a secure channel based on (i) pre-shared keys, (ii) trusted key distribution, and (iii) key-sharing protocols. For each of these approaches, we present at least two representative protocol variants. These protocols are then implemented as part of a demo AWN and they are then compared based on performance measurements. Most importantly, we have evaluated these protocols based on security and operational requirements that we define in this paper for an AWN.

A Card-less TEE-based Solution for Trusted Access Control.

In this paper, we present a new card-less access control system aiming to replace existing systems based on vulnerable contact-less cards. These existing systems have many vulnerabilities which makes them not secure enough to be deployed to protect restricted areas. We propose to deploy a new access control architecture based on the use of a smartphone to remove the physical card. Our secure access control system is based on Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) in the cloud and Identity Based Encryption (IBE) mechanisms. The authentication protocol deployed on our architecture is based on IBAKE. Finally, a performance evaluation of the protocol is provided.

Trusted Access Control System for Smart Campus

Many access control systems are still based on the first generation of contactless technologies like RFID or NFC despite well known cloning attack. Furthermore, the cost of the deployment of secure cards for large organizations (DESFIRE for instance) is expensive. Also, these systems do not always check authentication of the holders of RFID tags or NFC cards. In this paper, we present a proposal for an architecture to build a secure access control system based on Trusted Execution Environments (TEE), Identity Based Encryption (IBE) mechanisms. We also identify the challenges to overcome before deploying such an architecture.