Pierre Perruchet

Implicit learning and statistical learning: one phenomenon, two approaches.

The domain-general learning mechanisms elicited in incidental learning situations are of potential interest in many research fields, including language acquisition, object knowledge formation and motor learning. They have been the focus of studies on implicit learning for nearly 40 years. Stemming from a different research tradition, studies on statistical learning carried out in the past 10 years after the seminal studies by Saffran and collaborators, appear to be closely related, and the similarity between the two approaches is strengthened further by their recent evolution. However, implicit learning and statistical learning research favor different interpretations, focusing on the formation of chunks and statistical computations, respectively. We examine these differing approaches and suggest that this divergence opens up a major theoretical challenge for future studies.

Synthetic Grammar Learning: Implicit Rule Abstraction or Explicit Fragmentary Knowledge?

3 experiments were designed to demonstrate that classifying new letter strings as grammatical (i.e., conforming to a set of rules called a synthetic grammar) or ungrammatical may proceed from fragmentary conscious knowledge of the bigrams constituting the grammatical strings displayed in the study phase, rather than from an unconscious structured representation of the grammar, as Reber (1989) contended. In Experiment 1, grammaticality judgments of subjects initially studying grammatical letter strings did not differ from judgments by subjects learning from a list of the bigrams making up these strings. In Experiment 2, judgments about nongrammatical strings composed of valid bigrams placed in invalid locations were extremely poor, although better than chance. In Experiment 3 the explicit knowledge of bigrams as assessed by a recognition procedure appeared sufficient to account for observed performance on a standard test of grammaticality.

Conscious knowledge and changes in performance in sequence learning: evidence against dissociation

Two experiments examined the relation between explicit knowledge and motor performance on the serial reaction time task developed by Nissen and Bullemer (1987). Tests of free recall and recognition of sequence components revealed that reliable explicit knowledge was acquired after an amount of practice that was hardly sufficient to improve mean motor performance. In addition, reaction time improvement was limited to the ending trials of the 3- and 4-trial sequence components that Ss recalled or recognized. These results were replicated in Experiment 3, in which Ss were trained under attentional distraction in the task developed by Cohen, Ivry, and Keele (1990). Overall, these findings undermine the most direct experimental support for the widespread view that conscious knowledge and performance in sequence-learning tasks tap 2 independent knowledge bases in normal Ss.

Implicit learning out of the lab: the case of orthographic regularities

Childrens (Grades 1 to 5) implicit learning of French orthographic regularities was investigated through nonword judgment (Experiments 1 and 2) and completion (Experiments 3a and 3b) tasks. Children were increasingly sensitive to (a) the frequency of double consonants (Experiments 1, 2, and 3a), (b) the fact that vowels can never be doubled (Experiment 2), and (c) the legal position of double consonants (Experiments 2 and 3b). The latter effect transferred to never doubled consonants but with a decrement in performance. Moreover, this decrement persisted without any trend toward fading, even after the massive amounts of experience provided by years of practice. This result runs against the idea that transfer to novel material is indicative of abstract rule-based knowledge and suggests instead the action of mechanisms sensitive to the statistical properties of the material. A connectionist model is proposed as an instantiation of such mechanisms.

The self-organizing consciousness

We propose that the isomorphism generally observed between the representations composing our momentary phenomenal experience and the structure of the world is the end-product of a progressive organization that emerges thanks to elementary associative processes that take our conscious representations themselves as the stuff on which they operate, a thesis that we summarize in the concept of Self-Organizing Consciousness (SOC).

Does the mastery of center-embedded linguistic structures distinguish humans from nonhuman primates?

In a recentScience article, Fitch and Hauser (2004; hereafter, F&H) claimed to have demonstrated that cotton-top tamarins fail to learn an artificial language produced by a phrase structure grammar (Chomsky, 1957) generating center-embedded sentences, whereas adult humans easily learn such a language. We report an experiment replicating the results of F&H in humans but also showing that subjects learned the language without exploiting in any way the center-embedded structure. When the procedure was modified to make the processing of this structure mandatory, the subjects no longer showed evidence of learning. We propose a simple interpretation for the difference in performance observed in F&H’s task between humans and tamarins and argue that, beyond the specific drawbacks inherent in F&H’s study, researching the source of the inability of nonhuman primates to master language within a framework built around Chomsky’s hierarchy of grammars is a conceptual dead end.

A critical reappraisal of the evidence for unconscious abstraction of deterministic rules in complex experimental situations

Abstract In a recent experiment (Lewicki et al., 1988) subjects were submitted to a four-choice RT paradigm for 3600 trials. On each of the successive logical blocks of five trials, the first two locations of the target were randomly distributed, and the last three locations were determined by complex rules. Although subjects were unable to verbalize the actual nature of the manipulation, performance on the last trials of each block improved at a faster rate and was better overall than performance on the first trials. In addition, subsequent rules changes on 480 additional trials only affected performance on the last three trials of each block. The present paper demonstrates that contrary to Lewicki et als assertions this performance pattern requires neither acquisition of tacit knowledge of the composition rules, nor partitioning by the subjects of the sequence into logical blocks of five trials. Rather, the results can be accounted for by the relative frequency of a few simple sequences of target locations. Moreover, this alternative explanation alone correctly anticipates some striking features of fine-grained performance (Lewicki et al., 1988). The discussion focuses on methodological implications of these findings for investigation of unconscious learning, and speculates on what and how people learn when they encounter a complex and structured situation.

An attention-based associative account of adjacent and nonadjacent dependency learning.

In 5 experiments, results showed that when participants are faced with materials embedding relations between both adjacent and nonadjacent elements, they learn exclusively the type of relations they had to actively process in order to meet the task demands, irrespective of the spatial contiguity of the paired elements. These results are consonant with current theories positing that attention is a necessary condition for learning. More important, the results provide support for a more radical conception, in which the joint attentional processing of 2 events is also a sufficient condition for learning the relation between them. The well-documented effect of contiguity could be a by-product of the fact that attention generally focuses on contiguous events. This reappraisal considerably extends the scope of approaches based on associative or statistical processes.

The dissociation of explicit and implicit memory in depressed patients

Twenty-three in-patients fulfilling DSM-III-R criteria for major depressive disorder were submitted to a standard cued recall test, and to a word-stem completion test devised to assess the effect of the initial presentation without the explicit retrieval of the words being necessary. Results show that depressed patients are impaired on the cued recall task in comparison with controls matched for sex, age, and educational level. However, the two groups do not differ in the word-stem completion task. This dissociation between explicit and implicit expressions of memory disappeared when patients recovered, although they were still hospitalized and under psychotropic medication. These results are examined in the light of the distinction between effortful and automatic processes.

Dissociation between priming and recognition in the expression of sequential knowledge

Exposure to a repeating sequence of target stimuli in a speeded localization task can support both priming of sequence-consistent responses and recognition of sequence components. Here, a task is introduced in which measures of priming and recognition are obtained concurrently, and it is demonstrated that priming of sequence-consistent responses occurs even when test stimuli are not recognized. The results show that sequence knowledge can be expressed in the absence of conscious recognition. However, we also show that this result is consistent with a simple model in which priming and recognition depend on exactly the same underlying memory strength variable.