Pieter E. Vermaas

Design and use as plans an action-theoretical account

In this paper, we present an action-theoretical account of use and design. Central to this account is the notion of a user plan, which leads us to distinguish a cycle of plan design from one of artefact design. We comment on the nature and scope of our account from the perspective of design methodology in general, and we show that it can be employed to analyse the shortcomings of one design method in particular, namely quality function deployment. Finally, we examine some consequences for a philosophy of artefacts and their functions.

Ascribing Functions to Technical Artefacts: A Challenge to Etiological Accounts of Functions

The aim of this paper is to evaluate etiological accounts of functions for the domain of technical artefacts. Etiological theories ascribe functions to items on the basis of the causal histories of those items; they apply relatively straightforwardly to the biological domain, in which neo‐Darwinian evolutionary theory provides a well‐developed and generally accepted background for describing the causal histories of biological items. Yet there is no well‐developed and generally accepted theory for describing the causal history of artefacts, so the application of etiological theories to the technical domain is hardly straightforward. In this paper we consider the transposition of etiological theories in general from the biological to the technical domain. We argue that a number of etiological theories that appear defensible for biology become untenable for technology. We illustrate our argument by showing that the standard etiological accounts of Neander and Millikan, and some recent attempts to improve on them, provide examples of such untenable theories. 1Introduction 2Desiderata for theories of functions 3Etiological theories in general 3.1Common core and divergent aims 3.2Reproduction versus non‐reproduction etiological theories 3.3Intentionalist versus non‐intentionalist etiological theories 4Problems for etiological theories in the technical domain 5The failure of existing reproduction theories 6The failure of existing non‐reproduction theories 7Improving reproduction by hybridisation 8Conclusions

The coexistence of engineering meanings of function: Four responses and their methodological implications

Abstract In this position paper, the ambiguity of functional descriptions in engineering is considered from a methodological point of view. Four responses to this ambiguity are discussed, ranging from defining a single meaning of function and rejecting the different meanings that are currently used in engineering to accepting these meanings as coexisting in engineering and taking function as a family resemblance concept. Rejecting the different meanings is described as the straightforward response to resolving the ambiguity of functional descriptions, yet in engineering research and design methodology it rather seems to be accepted that engineers do use the coexisting meanings side by side. In this paper, explanations are given of why this practice is beneficial to engineering. Then it is explored how the particular meaning that engineers attach to function depends on the tasks for which functional descriptions are used. Finally, the methodological implications of the four responses to the ambiguity of functional descriptions are discussed.

A formal ontological perspective on the behaviors and functions of technical artifacts

Abstract In this paper we present a formal characterization of the engineering concepts of behavior and function of technical artifacts. We capture the meanings that engineers attach to these concepts by formalizing, within the formal ontology DOLCE, the five meanings of artifact behavior and the two meanings of function that Chandrasekaran and Josephson identified in 2000 within the functional representation approach. We begin our formalization by reserving the term “behavior” of a technical artifact as “the specific way in which the artifact occurs in an event.” This general notion is characterized formally, and used to provide definitions of actual behaviors of artifacts, and the physically possible and physically impossible behaviors that rational agents believe that artifacts have. We also define several other notions, for example, input and output behaviors of artifacts, and then show that these ontologically characterized concepts give a general framework in which Chandrasekaran and Josephsons meanings of behavior can be explicitly formalized. Finally we show how Chandrasekaran and Josephsons two meanings of artifact functions, namely, device-centric and environment-centric functions, can be captured in DOLCE via the concepts of behavioral constraint and mode of deployment of an artifact. A more general goal of this work is to show that foundational ontologies are suited to the engineering domain: they can facilitate information sharing and exchange in the various engineering domains by providing concept structures and clarifications that make explicit and precise important engineering notions. The meanings of the terms “behavior” and “function” in domains like designing, redesigning, reverse engineering, product architecture, and engineering knowledge bases are often ambiguous or overloaded. Our results show that foundational ontologies can accommodate the variety of denotations these terms have and can explain their relationships.

Nano-Technology and Privacy: On Continuous Surveillance Outside the Panopticon

We argue that nano-technology in the form of invisible tags, sensors, and Radio Frequency Identity Chips (RFIDs) will give rise to privacy issues that are in two ways different from the traditional privacy issues of the last decades. One, they will not exclusively revolve around the idea of centralization of surveillance and concentration of power, as the metaphor of the Panopticon suggests, but will be about constant observation at decentralized levels. Two, privacy concerns may not exclusively be about constraining information flows but also about designing of materials and nano-artifacts such as chips and tags. We begin by presenting a framework for structuring the current debates on privacy, and then present our arguments.

Technical artifacts: An integrated perspective

Humans are always interested in distinguishing natural and artificial entities although there is no sharp demarcation between the two categories. Surprisingly, things do not improve when the second type of entities is restricted to the arguably more constrained realm of physical technical artifacts. This paper helps to clarify the relationship between natural entities and technical artifacts by developing a conceptual landscape within which to analyze these notions. The framework is developed by studying three definitions of technical artifact which arise from different perspectives. All these perspectives share two intuitions: that technical artifacts are physical objects that exist by human intervention; and that technical artifacts are entities to be contrasted to natural entities. Yet the perspectives are different in the way they spell out these intuitions: the relevant human intervention may range from intentional selection to intentional production; and the contrast between technical artifacts and natural entities may be introduced by a constitution relation or by defining properties that set technical artifacts apart. The three perspectives are compared and their similarities and dissimilarities are explored with the help of ontological analysis.

Philosophy and Design

0.1: Table of Contents. Introduction. 0.2: Peter Kroes, Andrew Light, Steven A. Moore and Pieter E. Vermaas: Design in Engineering and Architecture: Towards an Integrated Philosophical Understanding. Part I: Engineering Design. 1.1: Maarten Franssen: Design, Use, and the Physical and Intentional Aspects of Technical Artifacts. 1.2: Wybo Houkes: Designing is the Construction of Use Plans. 1.3: Don Ihde: The Designer Fallacy and Technological Imagination. 1.4: Philip Brey: Technological Design as an Evolutionary Process. 1.5: Anke van Gorp and Ibo van de Poel:Deciding on Ethical Issues in Engineering Design. 1.6: Peter-Paul Verbeek: Morality in Design: Design Ethics and the Morality of Technological Artifacts. 1.7: Patrick Feng and Andrew Feenberg:Thinking about Design: Critical Theory of Technology and the Design Process. 1.8: Kiyotaka Naoe: Design Culture and Acceptable Risk. 1.9: Paul B. Thompson: Alienability, Rivalry, and Exclusion Cost: Three Institutional Factors for Design. Part II: Emerging Engineering Design. 2.1: John P. Sullins: Friends by Design: A Design Philosophy for Personal Robotics Technology. 2.2: Bernhard Rieder and Mirko Tobias Schafer: Beyond Engineering: Software Design as Bridge over the Culture/Technology Dichotomy. 2.3: Alfred Nordmann: Technology Naturalized: A Challenge to Design for the Human Scale. 2.4: Daniela Cerqui and Kevin Warwick: Re-designing Humankind: The Rise of Cyborgs, a Desirable Goal? 2.5: Inmaculada de Melo-Martin: Designing People: A Post-Human Future? 2.6: C.T.A. Schmidt: Redesigning Man? 2.7: Kristo Miettinen: Design: Structure, Process, and Function: A Systems Methodology Perspective. 2.8: Ulrich Krohs: Co-designing Social Systems by Designing Technical Artifacts: A Conceptual Approach. 2.9: Kathryn A. Neeley and Heinz C. Luegenbiehl: Beyond Inevitability: Emphasizing the Role of Intention and Ethical Responsibility in Engineering Design. 2.10:S.D. Noam Cook: Design and Responsibility: The Interdependence of Natural, Artifactual, and Human Systems. Part III: Architectural Design. 3.1: Howard Davis: Form and Process in the Transformation of the Architects Role in Society. 3.2: Steven A. Moore and Rebecca Webber: Expert Culture, Representation, and Public Choice: Architectural Renderings as the Editing of Reality. 3.3: Ted Cavanagh: Diverse Designing: Sorting Out Function and Intention in Artifacts. 3.4: Joseph C. Pitt: Design Criteria in Architecture. 3.5: J. Craig Hanks: Cities, Aesthetics, and Human Community: Some Thoughts on the Limits of Design. 3.6: Glenn Parsons: Nature, Aesthetic Values, and Urban Design: Building the Natural City. 4.1: Index.

If engineering function is a family resemblance concept: Assessing three formalization strategies

In this paper we argue that the challenge of the formalization of functions not merely consists of analyzing and formalizing yet another concept; the challenge may also consist of formalizing a concept that is to be taken as a family resemblance concept in the Wittgensteinian sense. We focus on engineering for giving this argument and indicate briefly how the argument can also be given for biological functions. We demonstrate that in engineering there are a number of different meanings attached to the term “function”, and observe that engineers moreover seem to hold that having all these meanings is useful in their field. This observation make plausible that function indeed is to be taken as a family resemblance concept. Then we describe three strategies for the formalization of functions --the revisionary, the overarching and the descriptive strategies --and relate them to a number of the current proposals for this formalization. Assessing the strategies with the meta-ontological goals for formalizations of adequacy and minimality, we argue that if function indeed is to be taken as a family resemblance concept, then the descriptive strategy is to be preferred.

Unique transition probabilities in the modal interpretation

Abstract The modal interpretation of quantum theory ascribes at each instant physical magnitudes with definite values to quantum systems. Starting from certain natural requirements, I determine unique solutions for the evolution of these possessed magnitudes in free systems and in special cases of interacting systems. The evolution is given in terms of transition probabilities that relate the values of the possessed magnitudes at one instant to the values at a second instant. I also determine a joint property ascription to a composite system and its separate subsystems. Finally, I give a proof that the predictions of the modal interpretation with respect to measurement outcomes agree with the predictions of the standard interpretation.

The fine-grained metaphysics of artifactual and biological functional kinds

In this paper we consider the emerging position in metaphysics that artifact functions characterize real kinds of artifacts. We analyze how it can circumvent an objection by David Wiggins (Sameness and substance renewed, 2001, 87) and then argue that this position, in comparison to expert judgments, amounts to an interesting fine-grained metaphysics: taking artifact functions as (part of the) essences of artifacts leads to distinctions between principles of activity of artifacts that experts in technology have not yet made. We show, moreover, that our argument holds not only in the artifactual realm but also in biology: taking biological functions as (part of the) essences of organs leads to distinctions between principles of activity of organs that biological experts have not yet made. We run our argument on the basis of analyses of artifact and biological functions as developed in philosophy of technology and of biology, thus importing results obtained outside of metaphysics into the debate on ontological realism. In return, our argument shows that a position in metaphysics provides experts reason for trying to detect differences between principles of activities of artifacts and organs that have not been detected so far.