Pieter Moors

Scene Integration Without Awareness: No Conclusive Evidence for Processing Scene Congruency During Continuous Flash Suppression

A recent study showed that scenes with an object-background relationship that is semantically incongruent break interocular suppression faster than scenes with a semantically congruent relationship. These results implied that semantic relations between the objects and the background of a scene could be extracted in the absence of visual awareness of the stimulus. In the current study, we assessed the replicability of this finding and tried to rule out an alternative explanation dependent on low-level differences between the stimuli. Furthermore, we used a Bayesian analysis to quantify the evidence in favor of the presence or absence of a scene-congruency effect. Across three experiments, we found no convincing evidence for a scene-congruency effect or a modulation of scene congruency by scene inversion. These findings question the generalizability of previous observations and cast doubt on whether genuine semantic processing of object-background relationships in scenes can manifest during interocular suppression.

Definitely maybe: can unconscious processes perform the same functions as conscious processes?

Hassin recently proposed the “Yes It Can” (YIC) principle to describe the division of labor between conscious and unconscious processes in human cognition. According to this principle, unconscious processes can carry out every fundamental high-level cognitive function that conscious processes can perform. In our commentary, we argue that the author presents an overly idealized review of the literature in support of the YIC principle. Furthermore, we point out that the dissimilar trends observed in social and cognitive psychology, with respect to published evidence of strong unconscious effects, can better be explained by the way how awareness is defined and measured in both research fields. Finally, we show that the experimental paradigm chosen by Hassin to rule out remaining objections against the YIC principle is unsuited to verify the new default notion that all high-level cognitive functions can unfold unconsciously.

Frequent words do not break continuous flash suppression differently from infrequent or nonexistent words: implications for semantic processing of words in the absence of awareness.

Continuous flash suppression (CFS) has been used as a paradigm to probe the extent to which word stimuli are processed in the absence of awareness. In the two experiments reported here, no evidence is obtained that word stimuli are processed up to the semantic level when suppressed through CFS. In Experiment 1, word stimuli did not break suppression faster than their pseudo-word variants nor was suppression time modulated by word frequency. Experiment 2 replicated these findings, but more critically showed that differential effects can be obtained with this paradigm using a simpler stimulus. In addition, pixel density of the stimuli did prove to be related to suppression time in both experiments, indicating that the paradigm is sensitive to differences in detectability. A third and final experiment replicated the well-known face inversion effect using the same set-up as Experiments 1 and 2, thereby demonstrating that the employed methodology can capture more high-level effects as well. These results are discussed in the context of previous evidence on unconscious semantic processing and two potential explanations are advanced. Specifically, it is argued that CFS might act at a level too low in the visual system for high-level effects to be observed or that the widely used breaking CFS paradigm is merely ill-suited to capture effects in the context of words.

No evidence for surface organization in Kanizsa configurations during continuous flash suppression

Does one need to be aware of a visual stimulus for it to be perceptually organized into a coherent whole? The answer to this question regarding the interplay between Gestalts and visual awareness remains unclear. Using interocular suppression as the paradigm for rendering stimuli invisible, conflicting evidence has been obtained as to whether the traditional Kanizsa surface is constructed during interocular suppression. While Sobel and Blake (2003) and Harris, Schwarzkopf, Song, Bahrami, and Rees (2011) failed to find evidence for this, Wang, Weng, and He (2012) showed that standard configurations of Kanizsa pacmen would break interocular suppression faster than their rotated counterparts. In the current study, we replicated the findings by Wang et al. (2012) but show that neither an account based on the construction of a surface nor one based on the long-range collinearities in the standard Kanizsa configuration stimulus could fully explain the difference in breakthrough times. We discuss these findings in the context of differences in the amplitudes of the Fourier orientation spectra for all stimulus types. Thus, we find no evidence that the integration of separate elements takes place during interocular suppression of Kanizsa stimuli, suggesting that this Gestalt involving figure-ground assignment is not constructed when rendered nonconscious using interocular suppression.

Moving Stimuli Are Less Effectively Masked Using Traditional Continuous Flash Suppression (CFS) Compared to a Moving Mondrian Mask (MMM): A Test Case for Feature-Selective Suppression and Retinotopic Adaptation

Continuous flash suppression (CFS) is a powerful interocular suppression technique, which is often described as an effective means to reliably suppress stimuli from visual awareness. Suppression through CFS has been assumed to depend upon a reduction in (retinotopically specific) neural adaptation caused by the continual updating of the contents of the visual input to one eye. In this study, we started from the observation that suppressing a moving stimulus through CFS appeared to be more effective when using a mask that was actually more prone to retinotopically specific neural adaptation, but in which the properties of the mask were more similar to those of the to-be-suppressed stimulus. In two experiments, we find that using a moving Mondrian mask (i.e., one that includes motion) is more effective in suppressing a moving stimulus than a regular CFS mask. The observed pattern of results cannot be explained by a simple simulation that computes the degree of retinotopically specific neural adaptation over time, suggesting that this kind of neural adaptation does not play a large role in predicting the differences between conditions in this context. We also find some evidence consistent with the idea that the most effective CFS mask is the one that matches the properties (speed) of the suppressed stimulus. These results question the general importance of retinotopically specific neural adaptation in CFS, and potentially help to explain an implicit trend in the literature to adapt one’s CFS mask to match one’s to-be-suppressed stimuli. Finally, the results should help to guide the methodological development of future research where continuous suppression of moving stimuli is desired.

Continuous Flash Suppression: Stimulus Fractionation rather than Integration

Recent studies using continuous flash suppression suggest that invisible stimuli are processed as integrated, semantic entities. We challenge the viability of this account, given recent findings on the neural basis of interocular suppression and replication failures of high-profile CFS studies. We conclude that CFS reveals stimulus fractionation in visual cortex.

Suppressed visual looming stimuli are not integrated with auditory looming signals: evidence from continuous flash suppression

Previous studies using binocular rivalry have shown that signals in a modality other than the visual can bias dominance durations depending on their congruency with the rivaling stimuli. More recently, studies using continuous flash suppression (CFS) have reported that multisensory integration influences how long visual stimuli remain suppressed. In this study, using CFS, we examined whether the contrast thresholds for detecting visual looming stimuli are influenced by a congruent auditory stimulus. In Experiment 1, we show that a looming visual stimulus can result in lower detection thresholds compared to a static concentric grating, but that auditory tone pips congruent with the looming stimulus did not lower suppression thresholds any further. In Experiments 2, 3, and 4, we again observed no advantage for congruent multisensory stimuli. These results add to our understanding of the conditions under which multisensory integration is possible, and suggest that certain forms of multisensory integration are not evident when the visual stimulus is suppressed from awareness using CFS.

Causal events enter awareness faster than non-causal events

Philosophers have long argued that causality cannot be directly observed but requires a conscious inference (Hume, 1967). Albert Michotte however developed numerous visual phenomena in which people seemed to perceive causality akin to primary visual properties like colour or motion (Michotte, 1946). Michotte claimed that the perception of causality did not require a conscious, deliberate inference but, working over 70 years ago, he did not have access to the experimental methods to test this claim. Here we employ Continuous Flash Suppression (CFS)—an interocular suppression technique to render stimuli invisible (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005)—to test whether causal events enter awareness faster than non-causal events. We presented observers with ‘causal’ and ‘non-causal’ events, and found consistent evidence that participants become aware of causal events more rapidly than non-causal events. Our results suggest that, whilst causality must be inferred from sensory evidence, this inference might be computed at low levels of perceptual processing, and does not depend on a deliberative conscious evaluation of the stimulus. This work therefore supports Michotte’s contention that, like colour or motion, causality is an immediate property of our perception of the world.

Faces in commonly experienced configurations enter awareness faster due to their curvature relative to fixation.

The extent to which perceptually suppressed face stimuli are still processed has been extensively studied using the continuous flash suppression paradigm (CFS). Studies that rely on breaking CFS (b-CFS), in which the time it takes for an initially suppressed stimulus to become detectable is measured, have provided evidence for relatively complex processing of invisible face stimuli. In contrast, adaptation and neuroimaging studies have shown that perceptually suppressed faces are only processed for a limited set of features, such as its general shape. In this study, we asked whether perceptually suppressed face stimuli presented in their commonly experienced configuration would break suppression faster than when presented in an uncommonly experienced configuration. This study was motivated by a recent neuroimaging study showing that commonly experienced face configurations are more strongly represented in the fusiform face area. Our findings revealed that faces presented in commonly experienced configurations indeed broke suppression faster, yet this effect did not interact with face inversion suggesting that, in a b-CFS context, perceptually suppressed faces are potentially not processed by specialized (high-level) face processing mechanisms. Rather, our pattern of results is consistent with an interpretation based on the processing of more basic visual properties such as convexity.

Effects of Presentation Type and Visual Control in Numerosity Discrimination: Implications for Number Processing?

Performance in a non-symbolic comparison task in which participants are asked to indicate the larger numerosity of two dot arrays, is assumed to be supported by the Approximate Number System (ANS). This system allows participants to judge numerosity independently from other visual cues. Supporting this idea, previous studies indicated that numerosity can be processed when visual cues are controlled for. Consequently, distinct types of visual cue control are assumed to be interchangeable. However, a previous study showed that the type of visual cue control affected performance using a simultaneous presentation of the stimuli in numerosity comparison. In the current study, we explored whether the influence of the type of visual cue control on performance disappeared when sequentially presenting each stimulus in numerosity comparison. While the influence of the applied type of visual cue control was significantly more evident in the simultaneous condition, sequentially presenting the stimuli did not completely exclude the influence of distinct types of visual cue control. Altogether, these results indicate that the implicit assumption that it is possible to compare performances across studies with a differential visual cue control is unwarranted and that the influence of the type of visual cue control partly depends on the presentation format of the stimuli.