Pietro Crocioni

Price Squeezes, Foreclosure, and Competition Law: Principles and Guidelines

This article looks at the definition, conditions and evidence necessary to establish that a price squeeze is an exclusionary abuse, and thus an infringement of EC competition law. It shows that the necessary conditions are demanding, and that the empirical test for a price squeeze must be carried out carefully. It offers practical guidelines for determining whether an exclusionary price squeeze is present, and particularly on the appropriate calculation of downstream margins (the “imputation test”) that should be employed.

Regulating for Non-Price Discrimination the Case of UK Fixed Telecoms

In 2005, Ofcom accepted undertakings from BT, the vertically integrated provider of fixed telecoms services in the UK. These constitute the latest attempt to address discriminatory concerns in fixed telecoms. This paper examines the incentives of vertically integrated operators with market power to discriminate using where possible empirical evidence relevant to the UK and considers possible regulatory responses to this behaviour. Finally, it brief y describes the remedy adopted by Ofcom to deal with this issue.

Pricing calls to mobiles: analysis of the UK Monopolies & Mergers Commission Reports on mobile termination charges

The UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) nine-month inquiry into fixed-to-mobile termination charges provides an exhaustive analysis of competitive and cost factors in mobile telephony. Its recommendations are discussed and compared with those of the telecommunications regulator, OFTEL, which referred the mobile operators to the MMC after failure to agree a further reduction in charges in early 1998. The MMC, following the same general statutory duty required of OFTEL, to promote competition under the Telecommunications Act 1984, provided a radically different analysis and disagreed with most of OFTELs specific proposals suggesting that some were anti-competitive. As telecommunications regulators are increasingly required to implement pro-competitive regulation, the MMCs reports show that the evolving approach of sectoral regulators contains some significant flaws.

To What Extent Can We Rely on Contestability in Merger Policy? Ex Post Evidence from the McGill’s/AWS Merger Decision

The McGill’s/AWS merger was cleared by the UK Competition Commission mainly on the basis of its belief that the threat of entry would be sufficient to prevent unilateral effects from arising post-merger. This is very close to argue that these local bus markets were contestable. This ex post evaluation case study based on the publicly available data and information on frequencies and fares suggests that the entry threat may have not been a strong disciplining force post-merger.

To what extent can we rely on contestability in merger policy? Ex post evidence from McGill’s/AWS†

The McGill’s/AWS merger was cleared by the UK Competition Commission mainly on the basis of its belief that the threat of entry would be sufficient to prevent unilateral effects from arising post-merger. This is very close to argue that these local bus markets were contestable. This ex post evaluation case study based on the publicly available data and information on frequencies and fares suggests that the entry threat may have not been a strong disciplining force post-merger.

There is Always a First Time: Coordinated Effects via Vertical Structural Changes in Anglo/Lafarge

This article explores the UK Competition CommissionA¢â‚¬â„¢s Anglo/Lafarge merger decision (2012) focusing on the reasoning for a finding of coordinated effects in cement. Julie Bon (UK Competition Commission), Pietro Crocioni (UK Office of Communications) & Francesca Sala (UK Competition Commission).