Pim Haselager

The brain–computer interface cycle

Brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) have attracted much attention recently, triggered by new scientific progress in understanding brain function and by impressive applications. The aim of this review is to give an overview of the various steps in the BCI cycle, i.e., the loop from the measurement of brain activity, classification of data, feedback to the subject and the effect of feedback on brain activity. In this article we will review the critical steps of the BCI cycle, the present issues and state-of-the-art results. Moreover, we will develop a vision on how recently obtained results may contribute to new insights in neurocognition and, in particular, in the neural representation of perceived stimuli, intended actions and emotions. Now is the right time to explore what can be gained by embracing real-time, online BCI and by adding it to the set of experimental tools already available to the cognitive neuroscientist. We close by pointing out some unresolved issues and present our view on how BCI could become an important new tool for probing human cognition.

The Asilomar Survey: Stakeholders' Opinions on Ethical Issues Related to Brain-Computer Interfacing

Brain-Computer Interface (BCI) research and (future) applications raise important ethical issues that need to be addressed to promote societal acceptance and adequate policies. Here we report on a survey we conducted among 145 BCI researchers at the 4th International BCI conference, which took place in May–June 2010 in Asilomar, California. We assessed respondents’ opinions about a number of topics. First, we investigated preferences for terminology and definitions relating to BCIs. Second, we assessed respondents’ expectations on the marketability of different BCI applications (BCIs for healthy people, BCIs for assistive technology, BCIs-controlled neuroprostheses and BCIs as therapy tools). Third, we investigated opinions about ethical issues related to BCI research for the development of assistive technology: informed consent process with locked-in patients, risk-benefit analyses, team responsibility, consequences of BCI on patients’ and families’ lives, liability and personal identity and interaction with the media. Finally, we asked respondents which issues are urgent in BCI research.

Understanding motor resonance

The discovery of mirror neurons in monkeys, and the finding of motor activity during action observation in humans are generally regarded to support motor theories of action understanding. These theories take motor resonance to be essential in the understanding of observed actions and the inference of action goals. However, the notions of “resonance,” “action understanding,” and “action goal” appear to be used ambiguously in the literature. A survey of the literature on mirror neurons and motor resonance yields two different interpretations of the term “resonance,” three different interpretations of action understanding, and again three different interpretations of what the goal of an action is. This entails that, unless it is specified what interpretation is used, the meaning of any statement about the relation between these concepts can differ to a great extent. By discussing an experiment we will show that more precise definitions and use of the concepts will allow for better assessments of motor theories of action understanding and hence a more fruitful scientific debate. Lastly, we will provide an example of how the discussed experimental setup could be adapted to test other interpretations of the concepts.

2009 Special Issue: A note on ethical aspects of BCI

This paper focuses on ethical aspects of BCI, as a research and a clinical tool, that are challenging for practitioners currently working in the field. Specifically, the difficulties involved in acquiring informed consent from locked-in patients are investigated, in combination with an analysis of the shared moral responsibility in BCI teams, and the complications encountered in establishing effective communication with media.

Can there be such a thing as embodied embedded cognitive neuroscience

Contemporary cognitive neuroscience, for the most part, aims to figure out how cognitive processes are realized in the brain. This research goal betrays the fields commitment to the philosophical position that cognizing is something that the brain does. Since the 1990s, philosophers and cognitive scientists have started to question this position, arguing that the brain constitutes only one of several contributing factors to cognition, the other factors being the body and the world. This latter position we refer to as embodied embedded cognition (EEC). Although cognitive neurosciences research practice and EEC do not seem to fit well together at present, it is pertinent to ask if a variant of cognitive neuroscience can be developed that sets itself research goals that are more congenial to the EEC view. In this paper we investigate this possibility. We put forth a new guiding metaphor of the role of the brain in cognitive behavior to replace the current cognitivist metaphor of the brain as an information-processing device. We also identify a research agenda that naturally arises from our metaphor. In this way we hope to provide an impetus for cognitive neuroscientists to pursue an EEC-inspired research program.

Ethical Issues in Brain-Computer Interface Research, Development, and Dissemination

The steadily growing field of brain–computer interfacing (BCI) may develop useful technologies, with a potential impact not only on individuals, but also on society as a whole. At the same time, the development of BCI presents significant ethical and legal challenges. In a workshop during the 4th International BCI meeting (Asilomar, California, 2010), six panel members from various BCI laboratories and companies set out to identify and disentangle ethical issues related to BCI use in four case scenarios, which were inspired by current experiences in BCI laboratories. Results of the discussion are reported in this article, touching on topics such as the representation of persons with communication impairments, dealing with technological complexity and moral responsibility in multidisciplinary teams, and managing expectations, ranging from an individual user to the general public. Furthermore, we illustrate that where treatment and research interests conflict, ethical concerns arise. On the basis of the four case scenarios, we discuss salient, practical ethical issues that may confront any member of a typical multidisciplinary BCI team. We encourage the BCI and rehabilitation communities to engage in a dialogue, and to further identify and address pressing ethical issues as they occur in the practice of BCI research and its commercial applications.

Hierarchies in action and motor control

In analyses of the motor system, two hierarchies are often posited: The first—the action hierarchy—is a decomposition of an action into subactions and sub-subactions. The second—the control hierarchy—is a postulated hierarchy in the neural control processes that are supposed to bring about the action. A general assumption in cognitive neuroscience is that these two hierarchies are internally consistent and provide complementary descriptions of neuronal control processes. In this article, we suggest that neither offers a complete explanation and that they cannot be reconciled in a logical or conceptually coherent way. Furthermore, neither pays proper attention to the dynamics and temporal aspects of neural control processes. We will explore an alternative hierarchical organization in which causality is inherent in the dynamics over time. Specifically, high levels of the hierarchy encode more stable (goal-related) representations, whereas lower levels represent more transient (actions and motor acts) kinematics. If employed properly, a hierarchy based on this latter principle of temporal extension is not subject to the problems that plague the traditional accounts.

Machines Outperform Laypersons in Recognizing Emotions Elicited by Autobiographical Recollection

Over the last decade, an increasing number of studies have focused on automated recognition of human emotions by machines. However, performances of machine emotion recognition studies are difficult to interpret because benchmarks have not been established. To provide such a benchmark, we compared machine with human emotion recognition. We gathered facial expressions, speech, and physiological signals from 17 individuals expressing 5 different emotional states. Support vector machines achieved an 82% recognition accuracy based on physiological and facial features. In experiments with 75 humans on the same data, a maximum recognition accuracy of 62.8% was obtained. As machines outperformed humans, automated emotion recognition might be ready to be tested in more practical applications.

What do mirror neurons mirror

Single cell recordings in monkeys provide strong evidence for an important role of the motor system in action understanding. This evidence is backed up by data from studies of the (human) mirror neuron system using neuroimaging or TMS techniques, and behavioral experiments. Although the data acquired from single cell recordings are generally considered to be robust, several debates have shown that the interpretation of these data is far from straightforward. We will show that research based on single-cell recordings allows for unlimited content attribution to mirror neurons. We will argue that a theoretical analysis of the mirroring process, combined with behavioral and brain studies, can provide the necessary limitations. A complexity analysis of the type of processing attributed to the mirror neuron system can help formulate restrictions on what mirroring is and what cognitive functions could, in principle, be explained by a mirror mechanism. We argue that processing at higher levels of abstraction needs assistance of non-mirroring processes to such an extent that subsuming the processes needed to infer goals from actions under the label ‘mirroring’ is not warranted.

A Lazy Brain? Embodied Embedded Cognition and Cognitive Neuroscience

From the article: Abstract Over the last decades, philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that the brain constitutes only one of several contributing factors to cognition, the other factors being the body and the world. This position we refer to as Embodied Embedded Cognition (EEC). The main purpose of this paper is to consider what EEC implies for the task interpretation of the control system. We argue that the traditional view of the control system as involved in planning and decision making based on beliefs about the world runs into the problem of computational intractability. EEC views the control system as relying heavily on the naturally evolved fit between organism and environment. A ‘lazy’ control structure could be ‘ignorantly successful’ in a ‘user friendly’ world, by facilitating the transitory creation of a flexible and integrated set of behavioral layers that are constitutive of ongoing behavior. We close by discussing the types of questions this could imply for empirical research in cognitive neuroscience and robotics.