Pritish Behuria

Between party capitalism and market reforms: understanding sector differences in Rwanda

Different strategies have been used by the Rwandan government to promote capitalist accumulation. In some sectors, party and military owned enterprises are predominant. In others, the government has chosen to embrace market-led reforms. Ultimately, the vulnerability experienced by ruling elites contributes to the choice of how capital accumulation is promoted in different sectors. Ruling elites use party and military enterprises to centralise rents and establish control over the direction of economic policy. However, centralising rents is a political choice and excludes individuals from developing access to rents. The pyrethrum sector shows that the use of such groups has resulted in unequal outcomes despite increases in productivity. Reduced international prices have stunted further productivity. Conversely, the mining sector shows evidence of the pursuit of market-led reforms. These reforms have been accompanied by rapid growth in domestic production and exports. Foreign investment was necessary in order to bring capital and expertise to the sector. However, the government has struggled to retain the capacity to enforce legislation and discipline foreign investors in line with national priorities. Both sectors show evidence that ruling elites have been prompted by vulnerability to commit to economic development. Constraints that have accompanied strategies pursued in these sectors have forced the government to work ‘reactively’ to achieve strategic targets

Centralising rents and dispersing power while pursuing development? Exploring the strategic uses of military firms in Rwanda

ABSTRACT The Rwandan Patriotic Front has achieved significant economic progress while also maintaining political stability. However, frictions among ruling elites have threatened progress. This paper explores the use of military firms in Rwanda. Such firms are used to invest in strategic industries, but the use of such firms reflects the vulnerability faced by ruling elites. Military firms serve two related purposes. First, ruling elites use such firms to centralise rents and invest in strategic sectors. Second, the proliferation of such enterprises and the separation of party- and military-owned firms contribute to dispersing power within a centralised hierarchy.

Learning from role models in Rwanda: incoherent emulation in the construction of a neoliberal developmental state

ABSTRACT In the twenty-first century, developing country policymakers are offered different market-led role models and varied interpretations of ‘developmental state role models’. Despite this confusion, African countries pursue emulative strategies for different purposes – whether they may be for economic transformation (in line with developmental state strategies), market-led reforms or simply to signal the implementation of ‘best practices’ to please donors. Rwanda has been lauded for the country’s economic recovery since the 1994 genocide, with international financial institutions and heterodox scholars both praising different facets of its development strategy. This paper argues that Rwanda is an example of a country that has simultaneously pursued emulative strategies for different purposes – often even within the same sector. Two studies of emulation are explored: the emulation of Singapore’s Economic Development Board through the establishment of Rwanda’s own Rwanda Development Board (RDB) and the evolution of Rwanda’s financial sector with reference to the use of contending market-led and developmental state models. The paper argues that in Rwanda, incoherent emulation for different purposes has resulted in contradictory tensions within its development strategy and the construction of a neoliberal developmental state.

Countering threats, stabilising politics and selling hope: examining the Agaciro concept as a response to a critical juncture in Rwanda

ABSTRACT The political settlements literature [Khan, M. Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-enhancing Institutions. School of Oriental and African Studies Working Paper, 2010. Accessed June 19, 2014. http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/9968; North, D., J. Wallis, and B. Weingast. Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009] has assigned a privileged role to rents as instruments used by ruling elites to maintain political stability. Since then, there has been some attempt [Hickey, S. Thinking about the Politics of Inclusive Development: Towards a Relational Approach. Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre Working Paper No. 1, 2013; Hudson, D., and A. Leftwich. 2014. From Political Economy to Political Analysis. Development Leadership Programme Research Paper 25, Birmingham] to highlight how ideas may play a similarly important role in contributing to political stability. This article explores how ruling elites in Rwanda responded to a ‘critical juncture’ in 2012 when donors withdrew foreign aid after they alleged that the Rwandan Patriotic Front government was supporting rebel groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Ruling elites then used an idea – Agaciro (a Kinyarwanda word, which means dignity or self-respect) – as one instrument to maintain political stability and legitimise its revised development programme in Rwanda. Ruling elites have also used the rhetoric around Agaciro to target the younger generation in Rwanda. This paper argues that Agaciro is symbolic of the vulnerabilities faced by ruling elites in Rwanda today. These vulnerabilities are a specific outcome of the Rwandan developmental strategy, which combines neoliberal market-led reforms, with some developmental state-like policies. The Agaciro concept was also operationalised, with the creation of an Agaciro Development Fund (AgDF) in 2012. The AgDF was legitimised on the basis of a commitment to self-reliance (among elites) during a time where symbolic coalition building among elites was important for political stability. However, Agaciro is also used to project the country’s development strategy (particularly in relation to entrepreneurship and financial inclusion) as one of opportunity, instead of acknowledging the severe inequality that has been associated with development in Rwanda thus far.

Book Review: Williams, Michelle, editor. 2014: The End of the Developmental State?

Williams, Michelle, editor. 2014: The End of the Developmental State? London and New York: Routledge. xxi + 257 pp. £90.00 (hardback), £24.99 (paperback). ISBN 978–0-415–85482–5.

The art of coercion: the primitive accumulation and management of coercive power

in what is seen as ‘internal affairs’ can lead the state to operate in favour of a more restrained policy regarding freedom of expression. However, the latter is uncritically seen as an indication of a ‘repressive authoritarian state’ in this chapter. Despite this small lacuna, this book sustains its commitment to a clear and concise focus. A general theme throughout this book is the added value of the ways in which meso, micro-level studies of cases can contribute, theoretically, rather than merely empirically, to large-N data in the field of political violence. Although it is divided into three sections according to time, space and milieu, they are presented in an integrated and coherent manner, with each section constantly echoing the others in terms of the critical spirit which challenges conventional wisdom. sixteen short but informative and refined chapters are organised tightly around this theme, which makes it highly intriguing and readable for scholars and students interested in the critical developments in the literature regarding the causes of political violence.