Przemyslaw Jeziorski

Effects of Mergers in Two-Sided Markets: Examination of the U.S. Radio Industry

This paper studies mergers in two-sided markets by estimating a structural supply-and-demand model using data from the 1996-2006 merger wave in U.S. radio. It makes two main contributions. First, it identifies the conflicting incentives of merged firms to exercise market power on both sides of the market (listeners and advertisers). Second, it disaggregates the effects of mergers into changes in product variety and changes in supplied ad quantity. I find that between 1996 and 2006 listener welfare increased by 0.2% ( 0.3% from extra variety, -0.1% from changes in ad quantity) and advertiser welfare decreased by 21% per-year (it is composed of 17% drop from variety changes, and extra 5% drop from ad quantity adjustments).

Mobile Money in Tanzania

In developing countries with sparse retail banking branches, mobile telecom net- works have emerged as major providers of financial services bypassing traditional banks. Using individual-level mobile money transaction data in Tanzania, we find that the vast majority of these transactions can be classified as either (i) transferring money to others, (ii) transporting money for short distances, or (iii) storing money for short to medium periods of time. We find that the demand for long-distance transfers is less elastic than for short-distance transfers suggesting that the mobile networks compete with traditional cash transportation by bus drivers, in addition to competing with each other. Using the revealed preferences for transportation and storage transactions, we monetize the economic damage caused by a high level of crime. We estimate the willingness to pay to avoid walking with cash an extra kilometer and to avoid storing money at home for an extra day to be 1.1% and 1% of an average transaction, respectively. We propose a Pareto superior price discrimination scheme where cash-out fees that follow a transfer are set to zero, while otherwise cash-out fees are set a bit below transfer fees.

Dynamic auction environment with subcontracting

This article provides evidence on the role of subcontracting in the auction-based procurement setting with private cost variability and capacity constraints. We demonstrate that subcontracting allows bidders to modify their costs realizations in a given auction as well as to control their future costs by reducing backlog accumulation. Restricting access to subcontracting raises procurement costs for an individual project by 12% and reduces the number of projects completed in equilibrium by 20%. The article explains methodological and market design implications of subcontracting availability.

Compatibility and Interoperability in Mobile Phone-Based Banking Networks

In many developing countries of Africa and Asia, cell phones are used (i) to transfer money across individuals; (ii) to securely self-transport money, and (iii) to save/store money. These banking networks ride on top of wireless telecommunications networks. Traditionally each banking network was tied to the network of a telecom carrier and transfers were available only within the carrier’s network, making it incompatible with banking networks of other carriers. In Tanzania, mobile banking under incompatibility was well established for a decade until September 2015 when the second, third, and fourth largest carriers established full compatibility of their banking networks. Analyzing a comprehensive dataset of banking transactions provided by a large telecom carrier in Tanzania, this paper discusses pricing under compatibility, contrasts with pricing under incompatibility. We analyze the transaction termination fees in this environment of practically no regulation, and assesses the individual and collective incentives for compatibility, noting that the largest carrier has remained incompatible. We find that carriers have agreed to very high prices for transfers across networks, and calculate the welfare gains if either (i) across-networks transfers were priced like within-network transfers; or (ii) pricing was at marginal cost.