Quentin Smith

An Analysis of Holiness

This inquiry is motivated by the question: if atheism is true, is it nevertheless the case that holiness or sacredness is exemplified? I believe the answer to this question is affirmative, and that the path to its affirmation lies in the rejection of the traditional assumption that holiness is a single and simple property of a divinity that eludes analysis. The opposite view, that there are several complex properties comprising holiness, makes it manifest that there are holy beings, even a holy ‘supreme being’, even if there is no God and no gods.

A More Comprehensive History of the New Theory of Reference

This essay continues the effort of some previous essays to present a more accurate history of the origins of the New Theory of Reference. The “New Theory of Reference” is typically used by philosophers in different ways; for example, sometimes it is used to refer to a theory that essentially includes the historical chain theory of reference. But the consequence of this is that Kaplan, Perry, Salmon, Marcus, Wettstein, Almog and many others commonly identified with this theory are excluded. The “New Theory of Reference”, which is used as a name or referentially used definite description, can be used to refer to many different ideas and in this essay I use it in the following narrow and broad senses.

Alexius Meinong on objects of higher order and Husserl's phenomenology

On the Psychology of Complexions and Relations. 1891.- Supplementary Notes by Ernst Mally.- An Essay Concerning the Theory of Psychic Analysis. 1894.- Supplementary Notes by Stephen Witasek.- On Objects of Higher Order and their Relationship to Internal Perception. 1899.- Additional Notes by Auguste Fischer.- Critical Notes on E. Husserls Ideas on a Pure Phenomenology, Volume I. After 1914.

The Incompatibility of STR and the Tensed Theory of Time

Many philosophers think that the Special Theory of Relativity is compatible with the tensed or A-theory of time (“mind-independent temporal becoming”). They have argued that the future can be indeterminate or future relative to a reference frame. However, “relative futurity” is not a tensed or A-determination, but a relation that obtains in a B-series in a universe in which the tenseless theory of time (temporal features consist only of earlier than, later than and simultaneity) is true. I shall argue this point in this paper.

Problems with John Earman's attempt to reconcile theism with general relativity

Discussions of the intersection of general relativity and thephilosophy of religion rarely take place on the technical levelthat involves the details of the mathematical physics of generalrelativity. John Earmans discussion of theism and generalrelativity in his recent book on spacetime singularities is anexception to this tendency. By virtue of his technical expertise,Earman is able to introduce novel arguments into the debatebetween theists and atheists. In this paper, I state and examineEarmans arguments that it is rationally acceptable to believethat theism and general relativity form a mutually consistent oreven mutually supportive pair. I conclude that each of hisarguments is unsound.

Direct, Rigid Designation and a Posteriori Necessity: A History and Critique

This paper aims to accomplish two interdependent goals, one historical and one philosophical. First, I aim to present a partial history of the theories of direct, causal or rigid reference as they appear in the New Theory of Reference, an account additional to that presented in [Smith, 1995a, 1995b]. Second, I aim to critically assess and further develop these theories.

Explanatory Rationalism and Contingent Truths

This paper extends the orthodox bounds of explanatory rationalism by showing there can be an explanation of why there are positive contingent truths. A positive contingent truth is a true proposition that entails that at least one contingent concrete object exists. It is widely thought that it is impossible to explain why there are positive contingent truths. For example, it is thought by Rowe that ‘God created the universe’ is a positive contingent truth and therefore cannot explain why there are positive contingent truths. I show, however, that the reasoning behind this orthodox view is unsound and that it is possible to explain why there are positive contingent truths.

Actuality and Actuality as of a Time

Readers of Michael Tooley’s excellent book Causation: A Realist Approach (1987) will rightly predict that Time,Tense, and Causation will also contain many interesting and highly original theses that are supported by some intricate precisely formulated arguments. The main thesis of his new book is that the tensed or dynamic theory of time does not require any irreducible A- properties, tensed concepts, tensed propositions, tensed facts or tensed truth conditions, and implies instead that reality consists only of irreducible tenseless facts, tenseless concepts, tenseless propositions and like. According to Tooley, the thesis that the tensed theory of time is true, that the future is unreal and the present and past are real, and yet that reality consists only of tenseless facts, etc., is neither self-contradictory nor false. He rejects five familiar tenets of the tensed theory of time: (1) Tenseless temporal concepts are analyzable in terms of tensed temporal concepts, such as the concepts of the past, present and future. (2) The concepts of past, present and future are semantically basic. (3) Familiar tensed sentences do not include indexicals and express the same proposition at different times of utterance. (4) There is no conceptually basic, tenseless existential quantifier that ranges over all entities. (5) The classical concept of truth should be rejected in favor of a temporally indexed concept of truth.

Time, Space and Physical Objects a Reply to Ned Markosian

Ned Markosian presents an interesting defense of the Spatial Location Account of physical objects. Something is a physical object if and only if it is located in space.

Is Precedence a Secondary Quality? A Reply to Robin Le Poidevin

Le Poidevin’s argument is that defenders of the tenseless theory of time must explain the aspects of our experience of time that seem to suggest that the tensed theory of time is true. In particular, he mentions (1) what is experienced is always experienced at present; (2) we seem to share the same present and (3) we perceive that one thing occurs after another. Regarding the third point, we perceive something y as occurring after something x because in part our perception of y is causally influenced by our perception of x.