R. Manjula

Motivating Knowledge Agents: Can Incentive Pay Overcome Social Distance?

This paper studies the interaction of incentive pay and social distance in the dissemination of information. We analyse theoretically as well as empirically the effect of incentive pay when agents have pro-social objectives, but also preferences over dealing with one social group relative to another. In a randomised field experiment undertaken across 151 villages in South India, local agents were hired to spread information about a public health insurance programme. Relative to flat pay, incentive pay improves knowledge transmission to households that are socially distant from the agent, but not to households similar to the agent.

How Effective are Social Audits under MGNREGS? Lessons from Karnataka

This case study on social audits under MGNREGS in Karnataka aims to provide suggestions on how to improve the design and implementation of social audits in the state. With the help of the primary data collected from five grama panchayats in Chitradurga district, the paper argues that although the documentary evidence shows that social audits are conducted they do not fulfil the main objective of engaging the beneficiaries of the scheme and making the scheme effective. Social audit process is compromised by the influence wielded by village elites which results in the exclusion of poor labourers for whom the scheme is primarily meant. The social audit process could be made more participatory by ensuring that it is conducted in an impartial manner.

Collusion, Co-option and Capture: Social Accountability and Social Audits in Karnataka, India

The concept of accountability has generated extensive discussion in studies of international development, linking it with good governance, democratisation, participatory development and empowerment. Indias national rural employment guarantee scheme, which aims to improve the rural infrastructure and reduce poverty by providing wage work to the rural poor, involves mandatory social audit by the beneficiaries of the scheme, in order to ensure accountability of those implementing the scheme. In this paper, we examine the social audit process in a district in the state of Karnataka to ascertain the role played by the beneficiaries in achieving such accountability. We find that Vigilance and Monitoring Committees, entrusted to spearhead the social audit process in villages, consist mainly of males and cultivators, some of whom are large landowners. We also find that social audits are dominated by the local elite who stifle “voices” from below.