R. Øystein Strøm

Governance and Politics: Regulating Independence and Diversity in the Board Room

This paper analyzes the economic rationale for board regulation in place and for introducing new regulation in the future. We relate the value of the firm to the use of employee directors, board independence, directors with multiple seats, and to gender diversity. Our evidence shows that the firm creates more value for its owners when the board has no employee directors, when its directors have strong links to other boards, and when gender diversity is low. We find no relationship between firm performance and board independence. These characteristics of value-creating boards support neither popular opinion nor the current politics of corporate governance.

The Impact of Entrepreneur‐CEOs in Microfinance Institutions: A Global Survey

Microfinance is a global high–growth industry, in which entrepreneurship is prevalent and substantial. Based on the theoretical argument that microfinance entrepreneur–chief executive officers (CEOs) are “motivated agents” with a unique ability to hire and socialize mission–oriented staff, we hypothesize that these CEOs produce more sustainable microfinance institutions (MFIs) with better social performance and lower costs. This study utilizes data from 295 MFIs in 73 developing countries, assessed between 1998 and 2010. Our empirical evidence suggests that entrepreneur–managed MFIs feature higher social performance, greater financial sustainability, and lower costs.

What Drives the Microfinance Lending Rate

Is the microfinance institution (MFI) able to charge unduly high lending rates and obtain a profitability incompatible with perfect competition? We use a global panel data set of MFIs. The Panzar and Rosse revenue test in static and dynamic versions is employed, together with analyses of price (the lending rate) and return on assets. We control for microfinance specific variables such as average loan and institutional background variables, and also perform estimations in sub-samples of ownership types, regulation, and founder type. We find that the average MFI does not enjoy monopoly market power in its market, but cannot reject that perfect competition or monopolistic competition are better descriptions of the MFIs average market type. The conclusions hold up in both static and dynamic regressions, as well as in different sub-samples.

Audit Quality and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Microfinance Industry

This study uses a unique, hand-collected sample of microfinance institutions from 73 countries that typically are not investigated in accounting research to analyze the relationships between audit quality and governance mechanisms. We examine two measures of audit quality, namely, the use of Big Four auditors and the presence of internal auditors who report to the boards of these institutions. The empirical analysis of this study reveals that these two quality metrics are highly related, although we also demonstrate that these metrics capture distinctive aspects of audit quality. In particular, the presence of internal auditors is related to other indicators of stricter governance, whereas the use of Big Four auditors is generally unrelated to other control mechanisms. This study illustrates that there is no single association between audit quality and governance; instead, the relationships between these two characteristics are dependent on the specific mechanism that is investigated. However, for situations in which a significant relationship between audit quality and governance does exist, the sign of this relationship is always positive. Thus, our data support the complementarity view of these two traits that is espoused by prior research. We find no support for the contention that these control mechanisms function as substitutes.

Audit Quality and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Microfinance Industry: Audit Quality and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Microfinance Industry

This study uses a unique hand�?collected sample of for�?profit and nonprofit microfinance institutions from 70 developing countries to analyse the relationships between audit quality and governance mechanisms. We examine two measures of audit quality, namely, the use of Big Four auditors and the presence of internal auditors. The empirical analysis of this study reveals that these two quality metrics are highly related, although we also demonstrate that these metrics capture distinctive aspects of audit quality. In particular, the presence of internal auditors is related to other indicators of stricter governance, whereas the use of Big Four auditors is generally unrelated to other governance mechanisms. For situations in which a significant relationship between audit quality and governance does exist, the sign of this relationship is always positive. Thus, our data support the complementarity view of these two traits that is espoused by prior research.

Measuring microfinance performance

Controversies have been a hallmark of microfinance in the years following the initial euphoria due to the awarding of the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize to Grameen Bank and Mohammad Yunus. MFIs have been accused of making people credit-dependent. How, though, do we measure their success or lack of it? This paper aims to discuss various ways of measuring MFI performance.

What Explains Governance Structure in Non-Profit and For-Profit Microfinance Institutions?

This paper aims to explain the choice of board and CEO characteristics in microfinance institutions (MFI). Explanations are sought in substitution or complementarity between the characteristics, external governance variables, and financial performance and outreach performance to the poor. The data are from 290 MFIs in 61 countries, and the logit regressions methodology is employed. The board and CEO characteristics are board size, CEO-chairman duality, international directors, and female CEO. We find relationships among these variables, and also that the external governance variables ownership type (shareholder owned) and international initialization induce smaller board, less duality, more international directors, and fewer female CEOs. Except for the female CEO result we argue that these results are consistent. The consistency is repeated for outreach performance to poor individuals and small businesses. We believe the study may inform better performance studies in the future, and also to motivate better governance in MFIs.

Better Firm Performance with Employees on the Board

This book explores the revolutionary development of the theory of the firm over the past 35 years. Despite rapid progress in the field, new developments in the microeconomic and industrial organization literature have been relatively scant. This book attempts to redress the balance by providing a comprehensive overview of the theory of the firm before moving on to examine firms and the organization of their economic activities. The contributors also investigate the impact of ownership structure and board composition on firm performance and study how the institutional framework of an economy affects investment decisions.

Myths in microfinance

Microfinance – the provision of financial services to the poor – is high on the public agenda. We discuss and evaluate three myths regarding microfinance based on new data from rated microfinance institutions (MFIs). The first myth is that an efficient MFI needs to be shareholder owned; second that its governance should first and foremost address the potential conflict between owners and managers; and third that MFIs are drifting away from their poorer customers towards serving the wealthier. The data do not support any of these myths. We conclude that microfinance is a viable business model.

Female leaders and financial inclusion: Evidence from microfinance institutions

This research advances the hypothesis that female leaders – chief executive officers (CEOs), chairs, and directors – of a microfinance institution (MFI) give more priority to the poorest families in loan provision than male leaders do. We differentiate between a depth and a width dimension of financial inclusion. The data set is a unique global panel of MFIs collected from MFI raters’ reports. Our sample is also unique in the sense that about one-third of all MFIs have a female CEO. The problem of endogeneity for the female leader is resolved by running Heckman’s two-step endogenous dummy variable estimation with an instrument for the female leader. We find evidence of greater depth financial inclusion (smaller average loans, more gender bias) with a female leader but not for width financial inclusion (credit client growth). Female leaders exhibit greater altruism and greater competition avoidance but not greater risk aversion than male peers.