R. Quentin Grafton

Private Property and Economic Efficiency: A Study of a Common-Pool Resource

The British Columbia halibut fishery provides a natural experiment of the effects of “privatizing the commons.” Using firm‐level data from the fishery 2 years before private harvesting rights were introduced, the year they were implemented, and 3 years afterward, a stochastic frontier is estimated to test for changes in technical, allocative, and economic efficiency. The study indicates that (1) the short‐run efficiency gains from privatization may take several years to materialize and can be compromised by restrictions on transferability, duration, and divisibility of the property right; (2) substantial long‐run gains in efficiency can be jeopardized by preexisting regulations and the bundling of the property right to the capital stock; and (3) the gains from privatization are not just in terms of cost efficiency but include important benefits in revenue and product form.

Individual transferable quotas: theory and practice

The paper examines the theory and practice of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) in fisheries. Using the experience of several countries, a number of ITQ programmes are examined with respect to fisher compliance and their effect upon economic efficiency, employment, the harvesting shares of fishers, cost recovery and rent capture.This paper was prepared for a general readership including fisheries managers and scientists. Readers interested in a more theoretical treatment are referred to Arnason (1990) and Boyce (1992).

Individual transferable quotas in multispecies fisheries

Dale Squires and Samuel F. Herrick, Jr are at the U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service, P.O. Box 271, La Jolla, California 92038-0271, USA. Harry Campbell is at the University of Queensland, Queensland, Australia. Stephen Cunningham and Sean Pascoe are at the University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, UK. Christopher Dewees is at the University of California, Davis, Davis USA. R. Quentin Grafton is at the University of Ottawa, Ottawa Canada. James Kirkley is at the Virginia Institute of Marine Science, Gloucester, VA, USA. Sean Pascoe is also at the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Canberra, Australia. Kjell Salvanes is at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, Norway. Bruce Shallard can be contacted at Bruce Shallard and Associates, New Zealand. Bruce Turris is at the Canada Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Vancouver, Canada. Niels Vestergaard is at the Danish Institute for Fisheries Economics Research, Esbjerg, Denmark.

Prices versus Rationing: Marshallian Surplus and Mandatory Water Restrictions*

An aggregate daily water demand for Sydney is estimated and used to calculate the difference in Marshallian surplus between using the metered price of household water to regulate total consumption versus mandatory water restrictions for the period 2004/2005. The loss in Marshallian surplus from using mandatory water restrictions is calculated to be

Governance of the commons: a role for the state?

235 million. On a per capita basis this equates to approximately

An Integrated Assessment of Water Markets: A Cross-Country Comparison

55 per person or about

The Economics of the Environment and Natural Resources

150 per household - a little less than half the average Sydney household water bill in 2005. Copyright

SOCIAL CAPITAL AND NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE: A CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS

The paper examines property regimes and common-pool resources. Using examples and case studies, the relative merits of private, community, and state-based rights are detailed. The insights from the case studies and an analysis of institution costs provide a tentative framework for understanding the role of the state in the governance of the commons.

Capacity utilization measures and excess capacity in multi-product privatized fisheries

This article presents an integrated framework for assessing water markets in terms of their institutional foundations, economic efficiency, and environmental sustainability. This framework can be a tool for (a) comparing different water markets, (b) tracking performance over time, and (c) identifying ways in which water markets might be adjusted by policy makers to achieve desired goals. The framework is used to identify the strengths and limitations of five water markets: (a) Australia’s Murray-Darling Basin, (b) the western United States, (c) Chile (in particular the Limarí Valley), (d) South Africa; and (v) China (in particular, the North). The framework helps identify which of these water markets are currently able to contribute to integrated water resource management, which criteria underpin these markets, and which features of these markets may require further development. The findings for each market, as well as comparisons between them, provide general insights into water markets and how water governance can be improved.

Technical efficiency effects of input controls: evidence from Australia's banana prawn fishery

List of Figures. List of Tables. List of Boxes. Preface. Acknowledgements. Introduction. Part I: Economics of the Environment:. 1. Models, Systems, and Dynamics. 2. Property Rights. 3. Economics of Pollution Control. Part II: Resource Economics:. 4. Bioeconomics of Fisheries. 5. Forestry Economics. 6. Water Economics. 7. Economics of Non--renewable Resources. Part III: Environmental Valuation:. 8. Environmental Valuation: Introduction and Theory. 9. Environmental Valuation: Stated Preference Methods. 10. Environmental Values Expressed Through Market Behavior. Part IV: Global Environment:. 11. Growth and the Environment. 12. Environmental Accounting. 13. Trade and Environment. 14. The Global Commons. 15. Biodiversity. 16. Sustaining the Environment. Glossary. Index