R. van Woudenberg

Truths that Science cannot Touch

In this article I argue (i) that truth is the goal of science, (ii) that there is no clear demarcation between science and non-science (the demarcation is not to be found in method, nor in certain assumptions being made, nor in the nature of the results of scientific inquiry, nor in a supposed disinterestedness on the part of scientists), and (iii) that notwithstanding the absence of a clear demarcation, there are truths, that science obviously can touch, but also truths, even truths that we can know, that science obviously cannot touch.

The knowledge Relation

Contrastivism is the claim that the knowledge relation is ternary, it relates three relata: a subject, a proposition, and a class of contrastive propositions. The present paper is a discussion of Jonathan Schaffer’s arguments in favour of contrastivism. The case is made that these are unconvincing: the traditional binary account of knowledge can handle the phenomena that ternarity is claimed to handle in a superior way.Contrastivism is the claim that the knowledge relation is ternary, it relates three relata: a subject, a proposition, and a class of contrastive propositions. The present paper is a discussion of Jonathan Schaffer’s arguments in favour of contrastivism. The case is made that these are unconvincing: the traditional binary account of knowledge can handle the phenomena that ternarity is claimed to handle in a superior way.

Thomas Reid between Externalism and Internalism

over the last three decades or so, Thomas Reid has been a source of inspiration for a number of epistemologists with a broadly externalist orientation.1 For them, Reid broke the spell of internalism, roughly the thesis that justification (or whatever it is that bridges the gap between mere true belief and knowledge) exclusively requires the occurrence of factors that are somehow “internal” to the subject. as will appear in due course, many lines of thought in Reid merit the externalist’s enthusiasm. at the same time this should not make us oblivious to the fact that in Reid’s work we also find lines of thought that unmistakably have an “internalist” ring. The aim of this paper is to identify these strands and inquire how they relate: are they opposed to one another, uneasy bedfellows, or friendly neighbors? before starting out, however, some preliminary remarks are in order. First, the paper focuses on Reid’s views about belief (not knowledge). More specifically, it focuses on the conditions that Reid holds must be satisfied if a belief is to have “positive epistemic status” (PES for short)—an expression that I use to cover various different words that Reid himself uses, such as ‘just,’ ‘appropriate,’ and (as will be explained later) ‘nonweak.’ I shall be assuming that the various words Reid uses refer to one and the same positive status. Second, I shall take ‘externalism’ and ‘internalism’ to refer to different views as to the nature of the conditions that have to be satisfied in order for a belief to have PES. To explain the differences between internalism and externalism, I join in with Michael bergmann, who says,

Disagreement, Design and Thomas Reid

This paper argues that Reids first principle of design can be more widely accepted then one might suppose, due to the fact that it specifies no marks of design. Also it is explicated that the relation of the principle, on the one hand, and properly basic design beliefs on the other, is a relation of presupposition. It is furthermore suggested that Reids discussion of what can be done in case of disagreement about first principles points to a position that is relevant to the current debates in the Epistemology of Disagreement literature and that merits further elaboration.This paper argues that Reids first principle of design can be more widely accepted then one might suppose, due to the fact that it specifies no marks of design. Also it is explicated that the relation of the principle, on the one hand, and properly basic design beliefs on the other, is a relation of presupposition. It is furthermore suggested that Reids discussion of what can be done in case of disagreement about first principles points to a position that is relevant to the current debates in the Epistemology of Disagreement literature and that merits further elaboration.

The Epistemic Status of Evolutionary Theory

ABSTRACT The theory of evolution continues to be a bone of contention among certain groups of theistic believers. This paper aims to bring some light to the debate about it, by introducing a framework for epistemic appraisal which can provide a realistic and sober assessment of the epistemic credentials of the various parts of evolutionary theory. The upshot is a more nuanced epistemic appraisal of the theory of evolution, which shows that there are significant differences in epistemic standing between its various parts. Any serious conversation about the theory of evolution ought to reflect these facts.

The Nature of the Humanities

In this paper I aim to state the nature of the humanities, contrasting them with the natural sciences. I argue that, compared with the natural sciences, the humanities have their own objects, their own aims, and their own methods.

Design Hypotheses Behave Like Skeptical Hypotheses (Or: Why We Cannot Know that Design Hypotheses Are False)

It is often claimed that, as a result of scientific progress, we now know that the natural world displays no design. Although we have no interest in defending design hypotheses, we will argue that establishing claims to the effect that we know the denials of design hypotheses is more difficult than it seems. We do so by issuing two skeptical challenges to design-deniers. The first challenge draws inspiration from radical skepticism and shows how design claims are at least as compelling as radical skeptical scenarios in undermining knowledge claims, and in fact probably more so. The second challenge takes its cue from skeptical theism and shows how we are typically not in an epistemic position to rule out design.

Een Scotistisch argument voor dualisme

In his recent book Waar geest is, is vrijheid [Where there is mind, there is freedom], Guus Labooy sets forth an original and intriguing argument, inspired by the work of John Duns Scotus, for substance dualism in the philosophy of mind. In this paper we argue that his argument, although worthy of serious attention, is under-supported. In section 2 we question the significance of the particular scotistic notion of freedom he uses in his argument, even though we agree with his premise that humans do possess freedom in the libertarian sense. In section 3 we argue that Labooy fails to make his key contention that significant freedom requires an irreducible immaterial soul sufficiently plausible. The key problem is that he does not consider the work of physicalists who also believe in libertarian freedom. In addition, it is not self-evident that an immaterial soul, as opposed to a physical body, can possess significant freedom. This requires argument. In section 4 we comment on Labooy’s specific conception of dualism and advise him to change it into a conception in which the soul — and not the composition of soul and body — is the human person, for the latter conception has absurd consequences.

REDE EN RELIGIE. FILOSOFIE IN HET VOORTGEZET ONDERWIJS

In 1974 werd voor het eerst op een Nederlandse school het eindexamen filosofie afgenomen. 13 VWO leerlingen namen daaraan deel. Deze Gideonsbende is sindsdien gestaag gegroeid, de laatste jaren zelfs zo sterk, dat van een kleine bende geen sprake meer kan zijn. In 2007 werd op 158 VWO scholen het eindexamen filosofie afgenomen, waaraan 2861 leerlingen deelnamen. Bovendien is het sinds 2000 ook mogelijk om op de HAVO eindexamen filosofie te doen. In 2007 gebeurde dat op 57 scholen, waaraan 801 leerlingen deelnamen.1 Dit zijn voor een ieder die liefde voor filosofie heeft natuurlijk spectaculaire gebeurtenissen.