Rachel Cummings

Speed Faults in Computation by Chemical Reaction Networks

Chemical reaction networks (CRNs) formally model chemistry in a well-mixed solution. Assuming a fixed molecular population size and bimolecular reactions, CRNs are formally equivalent to population protocols, a model of distributed computing introduced by Angluin, Aspnes, Diamadi, Fischer, and Peralta (PODC 2004). The challenge of fast computation by CRNs (or population protocols) is to not rely on a bottleneck “slow” reaction that requires two molecules (agent states) to react (communicate), both of which are present in low (O(1)) counts. It is known that CRNs can be fast in expectation by avoiding slow reactions with high probability. However, states may be reachable from which the correct answer may only be computed by executing a slow reaction. We deem such an event a speed fault. We show that the predicates stably decidable by CRNs guaranteed to avoid speed faults are precisely the detection predicates: Boolean combinations of questions of the form “is a certain species present or not?”. This implies, for instance, that no speed fault free CRN decides whether there are at least two molecules of a certain species—i.e., speed fault free CRNs “can’t count”.

Accuracy for Sale: Aggregating Data with a Variance Constraint

We consider the problem of a data analyst who may purchase an unbiased estimate of some statistic from multiple data providers. From each provider i, the analyst has a choice: she may purchase an estimate from that provider that has variance chosen from a finite menu of options. Each level of variance has a cost associated with it, reported (possibly strategically) by the data provider. The analyst wants to choose the minimum cost set of variance levels, one from each provider, that will let her combine her purchased estimators into an aggregate estimator that has variance at most some fixed desired level. Moreover, she wants to do so in such a way that incentivizes the data providers to truthfully report their costs to the mechanism. We give a dominant strategy truthful solution to this problem that yields an estimator that has optimal expected cost, and violates the variance constraint by at most an additive term that tends to zero as the number of data providers grows large.

Privacy and Truthful Equilibrium Selection for Aggregative Games

We study a very general class of games -- multi-dimensional aggregative games -- which in particular generalize both anonymous games and weighted congestion games. For any such game that is also large, we solve the equilibrium selection problem in a strong sense. In particular, we give an efficient weak mediator: a mechanism which has only the power to listen to reported types and provide non-binding suggested actions, such that a it is an asymptotic Nash equilibrium for every player to truthfully report their type to the mediator, and then follow its suggested action; and b that when players do so, they end up coordinating on a particular asymptotic pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the induced complete information game. In fact, truthful reporting is an ex-post Nash equilibrium of the mediated game, so our solution applies even in settings of incomplete information, and even when player types are arbitrary or worst-case i.e. not drawn from a common prior. We achieve this by giving an efficient differentially private algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium in such games. The rates of convergence to equilibrium in all of our results are inverse polynomial in the number of players n. We also apply our main results to a multi-dimensional market game. Our results can be viewed as giving, for a rich class of games, a more robust version of the Revelation Principle, in that we work with weaker informational assumptions no common prior, yet provide a stronger solution concept ex-post Nash versus Bayes Nash equilibrium. In comparison to previous work, our main conceptual contribution is showing that weak mediators are a game theoretic object that exist in a wide variety of games --- previously, they were only known to exist in traffic routing games. We also give the first weak mediator that can implement an equilibrium optimizing a linear objective function, rather than implementing a possibly worst-case Nash equilibrium.

The Empirical Implications of Privacy-Aware Choice

This paper initiates the study of the testable implications of choice data in settings where agents have privacy preferences. We adapt the standard conceptualization of consumer choice theory to a situation where the consumer is aware of, and has preferences over, the information revealed by her choices. The main message of the paper is that little can be inferred about consumers’ preferences once we introduce the possibility that the consumer has concerns about privacy. This holds even when consumers’ privacy preferences are assumed to be monotonic and separable. This motivates the consideration of stronger assumptions and, to that end, we introduce an additive model for privacy preferences that has testable implications.

Probability 1 computation with chemical reaction networks

The computational power of stochastic chemical reaction networks (CRNs) varies significantly with the output convention and whether or not error is permitted. Focusing on probability 1 computation, we demonstrate a striking difference between stable computation that converges to a state where the output cannot change, and the notion of limit-stable computation where the output eventually stops changing with probability 1. While stable computation is known to be restricted to semilinear predicates (essentially piecewise linear), we show that limit-stable computation encompasses the set of predicates

The Strange Case of Privacy in Equilibrium Models

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Speed faults in computation by chemical reaction networks

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