Rachel L. Stricof

Statewide NICU Central-Line-Associated Bloodstream Infection Rates Decline After Bundles and Checklists

OBJECTIVE: In 2008, all 18 regional referral NICUs in New York state adopted central-line insertion and maintenance bundles and agreed to use checklists to monitor maintenance-bundle adherence and report checklist use. We sought to confirm whether adopting standardized bundles and using central-line maintenance checklists reduced central-line–associated bloodstream infections (CLABSI). METHODS: This was a prospective cohort study that enrolled all neonates with a central line who were hospitalized in any of 18 NICUs. Each NICU reported CLABSI and central-line utilization data and checklist use. We used χ2 to compare CLABSI rates in the preintervention (January to December 2007) versus the postintervention (March to December 2009) periods and Poisson regression to model adjusted CLABSI rates. RESULTS: Each study period included more than 55 000 central-line days and more than 200 000 patient-days. CLABSI rates decreased 67% statewide (risk ratio: 0.33 [95% confidence interval: 0.27–0.41]; P < .0005); after adjusting for the altered central-line–associated bloodstream infection definition in 2008, by 40% (risk ratio: 0.60 [95% confidence interval: 0.48–0.75]; P < .0005). A total of 13 of 18 NICUs reported using maintenance checklists for 10% to 100% of central-line days. The checklist-use rate was associated with the CLABSI rate (coefficient: −0.57, P = .04). A total of 10 of 18 NICUs were independent CLABSI rate predictors, ranging from 1 site with greatly reduced risk (incidence rate ratio: 0.04, P < .0005) to 1 site with greatly increased risk (incidence rate ratio: 2.87, P < .0005). CONCLUSIONS: Although standardizing central-line care elements led to a significant statewide decline in NICU CLABSIs, site of care remains an independent risk factor. Using maintenance checklists reduced CLABSIs.

Multi-Society Guideline for Reprocessing Flexible Gastrointestinal Endoscopes

Flexible gastrointestinal endoscopy is a valuable diagnostic and therapeutic tool for the care of patients with gastrointestinal and pancreaticobiliary disorders. Compliance with accepted guidelines for the reprocessing of gastrointestinal endoscopes between patients is critical to the safety and success of their use. When these guidelines are followed, pathogen transmission can be effectively prevented. Increased efforts and resources should be directed to improve compliance with these guidelines. Further research in the area of gastrointestinal endoscope reprocessing should be encouraged. The organizations that endorsed this guideline are committed to assisting the FDA and manufacturers in addressing critical infection control issues in gastrointestinal device reprocessing.

Development of a statewide collaborative to decrease NICU central line-associated bloodstream infections

Objective:To characterize hospital-acquired bloodstream infection rates among New York States 19 regional referral NICUs (at regional perinatal centers; RPCs) and develop strategies to promote best practices to reduce central line-associated bloodstream infections (CLABSIs).Study Design:During 2006 and 2007, RPC NICUs reported bloodstream infections, patient-days and central line-days to the Department of Health, and shared their results. Aiming to improve, participants created a central line-care bundle based on visiting a potentially best performing NICU and reviewing the literature.Result:All 19 RPCs participated in this quality initiative, contributing 218 096 patient-days and 56 911 central line-days of observation. Individual RPC nosocomial sepsis infection (NI) rates ranged from 1.0 to 5.8 NIs per 1000 patient-days (2006), and CLABSI rates ranged from 2.6 to 15.1 CLABSIs per 1000 central line-days (2007). A six-fold rate variation among RPC NICUs was observed. Participants unanimously approved a level-1 evidence-based central line-care bundle.Conclusion:Individual RPC rates and consequent morbidity and resource use attributable to these infections were substantial and varied greatly. No center was without infections. It is hoped that the cooperation and accountability exhibited by the RPCs will result in a major network for characterizing performance and improving outcomes.

Multiple Clusters of Hepatitis Virus Infections Associated With Anesthesia for Outpatient Endoscopy Procedures

BACKGROUND & AIMS Hepatitis B virus (HBV) and hepatitis C virus (HCV) can be transmitted during administration of intravenous anesthesia when medication vials are used for multiple patients using incorrect technique. We investigated an outbreak of acute HBV and HCV infections among patients who received anesthesia during endoscopy procedures from the same anesthesiologist (anesthesiologist 1), in 2 different gastroenterology clinics. METHODS Chart reviews, patient interviews, clinic site visits and infection control assessments, and molecular sequencing of patient isolates were performed. Patients treated by anesthesiologist 1 on specific procedure days were offered testing for blood-borne pathogens. Endoscopy and anesthesia procedures were reviewed; HCV quasispecies analysis was performed. RESULTS Six cases of outbreak-associated HCV infection and 6 cases of outbreak-associated HBV infection were identified in clinic 1. One outbreak-associated HCV infection was identified in clinic 2. HCV quasispecies sequences from the patients were nearly identical (96.9%-100%) to those from source patients with chronic viral hepatitis. All affected patients in both clinics received propofol from anesthesiologist 1, who inappropriately used a single-patient-use vial of propofol for multiple patients. Reuse of syringes to redose patients, with resulting contamination of medication vials used for subsequent patients, likely resulted in viral transmission. CONCLUSIONS Twelve persons acquired HBV and HCV infections (6 hepatitis C, 5 hepatitis B, and 1 coinfection) in 2 separate offices as a result of receiving anesthesia from anesthesiologist 1. Gastroenterologists are urged to review carefully the injection, medication handling, and other infection control practices of all staff under their supervision, including providers of anesthesia services.

Risk factors for coronary artery bypass graft chest surgical site infections in New York State, 2008

BACKGROUND All hospitals in New York State (NYS) are required to report surgical site infections (SSIs) occurring after coronary artery bypass graft surgery. This report describes the risk adjustment method used by NYS for reporting hospital SSI rates, and additional methods used to explore remaining differences in infection rates. METHODS All patients undergoing coronary artery bypass graft surgery in NYS in 2008 were monitored for chest SSI following the National Healthcare Safety Network protocol. The NYS Cardiac Surgery Reporting System and a survey of hospital infection prevention practices provided additional risk information. Models were developed to standardize hospital-specific infection rates and to assess additional risk factors and practices. RESULTS The National Healthcare Safety Network risk score based on duration of surgery, American Society of Anesthesiologists score, and wound class were not highly predictive of chest SSIs. The addition of diabetes, obesity, end-stage renal disease, sex, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and Medicaid payer to the model improved the discrimination between procedures that resulted in SSI and those that did not by 25%. Hospital-reported infection prevention practices were not significantly related to SSI rates. CONCLUSIONS Additional risk factors collected using a secondary database improved the prediction of SSIs, however, there remained unexplained variation in rates between hospitals.

Prevention of Hospital‐Onset Clostridium difficile Infection in the New York Metropolitan Region Using a Collaborative Intervention Model

Abstract: The incidence, severity, and associated costs of Clostridium difficile (C. difficile) infection (CDI) have dramatically increased in hospitals over the past decade, indicating an urgent need for strategies to prevent transmission of C. difficile. This article describes a multifaceted collaborative approach to reduce hospital‐onset CDI rates in 35 acute care hospitals in the New York metropolitan region. Hospitals participated in a comprehensive CDI reduction intervention and formed interdisciplinary teams to coordinate their efforts. Standardized clinical infection prevention and environmental cleaning protocols were implemented and monitored using checklists. Monthly data reports were provided to hospitals for facility‐specific performance evaluation and comparison to aggregate data from all participants. Hospitals also participated in monthly teleconferences to review data and highlight successes, challenges, and strategies to reduce CDI. Incidence of hospital‐onset CDI per 10,000 patient days was the primary outcome measure. Additionally, the incidence of nonhospital‐associated, community‐onset, hospital‐associated, and recurrent CDIs were measured. The use of a collaborative model to implement a multifaceted infection prevention strategy was temporally associated with a significant reduction in hospital‐onset CDI rates in participating New York metropolitan regional hospitals.

Comparison of 2 Clostridium difficile surveillance methods: National Healthcare Safety Network's laboratory-identified event reporting module versus clinical infection surveillance.

OBJECTIVE To determine whether the Centers for Disease Control and Preventions National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) laboratory-identified (LabID) event reporting module for Clostridium difficile infection (CDI) is an adequate proxy measure of clinical CDI for public reporting purposes by comparing the 2 surveillance methods. DESIGN Validation study. SETTING Thirty New York State acute care hospitals. METHODS Six months of data were collected by 30 facilities using a clinical infection surveillance definition while also submitting the NHSN LabID event for CDI. The data sets were matched and compared to determine whether the assigned clinical case status matched the LabID case status. A subset of mismatches was evaluated further, and reasons for the mismatches were quantified. Infection rates determined using the 2 definitions were compared. RESULTS A total of 3,301 CDI cases were reported. Analysis of the original data yielded a 67.3% (2,223/3,301) overall case status match. After review and validation, there was 81.3% (2,683/3,301) agreement. The most common reason for disagreement (54.9%) occurred because the symptom onset was less than 48 hours after admission but the positive specimen was collected on hospital day 4 or later. The NHSN LabID hospital onset rate was 29% higher than the corresponding clinical rate and was generally consistent across all hospitals. CONCLUSIONS Use of the NHSN LabID event minimizes the burden of surveillance and standardizes the process. With a greater than 80% match between the NHSN LabID event data and the clinical infection surveillance data, the New York State Department of Health made the decision to use the NHSN LabID event CDI data for public reporting purposes.

Trends in validity of central line–associated bloodstream infection surveillance data, New York State, 2007-2010

BACKGROUND In 2007, New York State (NYS) hospitals began mandatory public reporting of central line-associated bloodstream infection (CLABSI) data associated with intensive care units (ICUs) into the National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN). Facilities were required to use the NHSN device-associated CLABSI criteria to identify laboratory-confirmed bloodstream infections. METHODS Onsite audits were conducted in ICUs by NYS hospital-acquired infection program staff using a standardized database. Hospitals provided ICU patient medical records with a positive blood culture during a selected time frame. RESULTS Between 2007 and 2010, an average of 79% of all reporting hospitals were audited annually. Of the 5,697 patients audited, 3,104 (54%) had a central line in place, and 650 of the patients with a central line (21%) were identified as having a CLABSI by the hospital-acquired infection program reviewer. Between 2007 and 2010, the specificity increased from 90% to 99%, whereas the sensitivity remained stable at approximately 71%. As a result of the audit process, the NYS 2010 CLABSI rate increased by 5.6%. CONCLUSIONS A standardized audit process has helped improve the accuracy of CLABSI reporting. Data validation provides consistent data for measuring the progress of infection prevention strategies and allows for relevant comparison of ICU data.

Multidrug-Resistant Tuberculosis. Recommendations for Reducing Risk during Travel for Healthcare and Humanitarian Work

Healthcare and humanitarian workers who travel to work where the incidence of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR TB) is high and potential transmission may occur are at risk of infection and disease due to these resistant strains. Transmission occurs due to inadequate transmission control practices and the inability to provide timely and accurate diagnosis and treatment of persons with MDR TB. Patients risk exposure if active TB is unrecognized in workers after they return to lower-risk settings. Guidance for risk reduction measures for workers in high-risk areas is limited, and no studies confirm the efficacy of treatment regimens for latent TB infection due to MDR TB. Bacille Calmette-Guérin (BCG) vaccination decreases the risk of active TB and possibly latent infection. IFN-γ release assays differentiate TB infection from BCG vaccination effect. A series of risk reduction measures are provided as a potential strategy. These measures include risk reductions before travel, including risk assessment, TB screening, education, respirator fit testing, and BCG vaccination. Measures during travel include use of respirators in settings where this may not be common practice, transmission control practices, triaging of patients with consistent symptoms, providing education for good cough etiquette, and provision of care in well-ventilated areas, including open air areas. Risk reduction measures after return include TB screening 8 to 10 weeks later and recommendations for management of latent TB infection in areas where the likelihood of MDR TB exposure is high.