Rafael Amer
Polytechnic University of Catalonia
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Mathematical Social Sciences | 2002
Rafael Amer; Francese Carreras; José Miguel Giménez
Abstract Different axiomatic systems for the Shapley and Banzhaf values can be found in the literature. For games with a coalition structure, Owen’s modification of the Shapley value (the Owen coalition value) has also been axiomatized in several ways; in this paper we provide an axiomatic characterization for Owen’s modification of the Banzhaf value.
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research | 2004
Rafael Amer; José Miguel Giménez
Abstract.The introduction of a {0,1}-valued game associated to a connected graph allows us to assign to each vertex a value of weighted connectivity according to the different solutions that for cooperative games are obtained by means of semivalues.The marginal contributions of each vertex to the coalitions differentiate an active connectivity from another reactive connectivity, according to whether the vertex is essential to obtain the connection or is the obstacle for the connection between the vertices in the coalition. We offer general properties of the connectivity, as well as the behaviour of different families of graphs with regard to this concept. We also analyse the effect on different vertices due to the addition of an edge to the initial graph.
Annals of Operations Research | 1998
Rafael Amer; Francesc Carreras; Antonio Magaña
Games with multiple alternatives enlarge the domain of social situations modelled by the classical cooperative game theory. In this paper, we prove that any linear value defined for traditional cooperative games admits a natural extension to games with multiple alternatives. A method to compute the extended values is also provided. As specific examples, we present an application of the Shapley value and the Banzhaf-Coleman index to two voting situations taken from the real world.
European Journal of Operational Research | 2007
Rafael Amer; José Miguel Giménez; Antonio Magaña
The aim of this work consists of allocating a value that allows us to emphasize the importance of each player in a cooperative game when the cooperation possibilities are limited according to the links of an oriented network. The proposed concept of accessibility tries to conjugate the marginal contributions of each node as a game player with the cooperation geometry imposed by the digraph that models the network. We study general properties of this concept and particularly with respect to oriented paths. Concrete applications are proposed.
Mathematics of Operations Research | 1997
Rafael Amer; Francesc Carreras
The weighted Shapley values are extended to situations defined by a cooperative game and a cooperation index. Two main axiomatic characterizations for the modified values are provided. We also develop further axiomatizations of the classical values and discuss two examples.
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research | 2012
Rafael Amer; José Miguel Giménez; Antonio Magaña
The aim of this paper consists of constructing accessibility measures to the nodes of directed graphs using methods of Game Theory. Since digraphs without a predefined game are considered, the main part of the paper is devoted to establish conditions on cooperative games so that they can be used to measure accessibility. Games that satisfy desirable properties are called test games. Each ranking on the nodes is then obtained according to a pair formed by a test game and a solution defined on cooperative games whose utilities are given on ordered coalitions. The solutions proposed here are extensions of the wide family of semivalues to games in generalized characteristic function form.
Mathematical Social Sciences | 2006
Rafael Amer; José Miguel Giménez
Abstract Semivalues form a wide family of solutions for cooperative games. The payoff that a semivalue allocates to each player in a given game is a weighted sum of the marginal contributions of the player in the game, and the weighting coefficients depend only on the coalition size. In this paper we provide an axiomatic characterization for each semivalue the weighting coefficients of which are all positive (regular semivalue).
International Journal of Game Theory | 2003
Rafael Amer; Jean Derks; José Miguel Giménez
Abstract.Semivalues like the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value may assign the same payoff vector to different games. It is even possible that two games attain the same outcome for all semivalues. Due to the linearity of the semivalues, this exactly occurs in case the difference of the two games is an element of the kernel of each semivalue. The intersection of these kernels is called the shared kernel, and its game theoretic importance is that two games can be evaluated differently by semivalues if and only if their difference is not a shared kernel element. The shared kernel is a linear subspace of games. The corresponding linear equality system is provided so that one is able to check membership. The shared kernel is spanned by specific {−1,0,1}-valued games, referred to as shuffle games. We provide a basis with shuffle games, based on an a-priori given ordering of the players.
Mathematical Social Sciences | 2008
Rafael Amer; José Miguel Giménez
Semivalues are solution concepts for cooperative games that assign to each player a weighted sum of his/her marginal contributions to the coalitions, where the weights only depend on the coalition size. The Shapley value and the Banzhaf value are semivalues. Mixed modified semivalues are solutions for cooperative games when we consider a priori coalition blocks in the player set. For all these solutions, a computational procedure is offered in this paper.
Archive | 2010
Rafael Amer; José Miguel Giménez; Antonio Magaña
An oriented structure can model the feasible coalitions according to the sequences of nodes obtained by means of its oriented edges. As an extension of the Shapley value for the classical cooperative games, a solution for games modified by oriented structures is considered in this work. In addition, if a game is symmetric, the allocations only depend on the geometry imposed by the oriented structure. Then, to obtain a measure among the nodes without a predefined game, an exogenous procedure based on a family of symmetric games is proposed.