Rafael De Clercq

Two Conceptions of Response-dependence

The traditional conception of response-dependence isinadequate because it cannot account for all intuitivecases of response-dependence. In particular, it is unableto account for the response-dependence of (aesthetic, moral, epistemic ...) values. I therefore propose tosupplement the traditional conception with an alternativeone. My claim is that only a combination of the twoconceptions is able to account for all intuitivecases of response-dependence.The traditional conception of response-dependence isinadequate because it cannot account for all intuitivecases of response-dependence. In particular, it is unableto account for the response-dependence of (aesthetic, moral, epistemic ...) values. I therefore propose tosupplement the traditional conception with an alternativeone. My claim is that only a combination of the twoconceptions is able to account for all intuitivecases of response-dependence.

On some putative graph-theoretic counterexamples to the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles

Recently, several authors have claimed to have found graph-theoretic counterexamples to the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII). In this paper, I argue that their counterexamples presuppose a certain view of what unlabeled graphs are, and that this view is optional at best.Recently, several authors have claimed to have found graph-theoretic counterexamples to the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII). In this paper, I argue that their counterexamples presuppose a certain view of what unlabeled graphs are, and that this view is optional at best.

A peculiarity in pearl's logic of interventionist counterfactuals

We examine a formal semantics for counterfactual conditionals due to Judea Pearl, which formalizes the interventionist interpretation of counterfactuals central to the interventionist accounts of causation and explanation. We show that a characteristic principle validated by Pearl’s semantics, known as the principle of reversibility, states a kind of irreversibility: counterfactual dependence (in David Lewis’s sense) between two distinct events is irreversible. Moreover, we show that Pearl’s semantics rules out only mutual counterfactual dependence, not cyclic dependence in general. This, we argue, suggests that Pearl’s logic is either too weak or too strong.

Huemer on Immigration and the Preservation of Culture

Libertarian philosopher Michael Huemer has argued recently that there is a prima facie right to immigrate, and, moreover, that concerns people have about the effects of immigration are not strong enough to neutralize or override this prima facie right. In this paper, I focus on one particular concern that Huemer deems insufficiently strong to neutralize or override the prima facie right to immigrate, namely, the concern that unrestricted immigration poses a threat to one’s culture. I argue that Huemer fails to show that the concern is insufficiently strong.

The lazy person’s approach to depiction

It has been argued (for example, by Nelson Goodman and John Hyman) that ‘depicts’ and similar terms such as ‘is a picture of’ and ‘represents’ are semantically ambiguous: sometimes they are two-place predicates expressing a relation, and sometimes they are not. This article takes issue with this claim and develops an alternative theory according to which the ambiguity in question is pragmatic rather than semantic.

A Simple Solution to the Paradox of Negative Emotion

Philosophers have long been perplexed by the way in which works of art move us when they elicit so-called negative emotions such as pity fear, sorrow, and anger. What is perplexing is that these emotions are generally considered to be unpleasant to experience, yet people seem to enjoy and value the works of art that arouse them. Depending on the context, this fact is referred to as ‘the paradox of tragedy’, ‘the paradox of horror’, or simply ‘the paradox of negative emotion’.

Book review : The critical imagination, by James Grant

irrational if (as Hume might have put it) the desires that appear to prompt it excite a general sentiment of incomprehension. (It is at least minimally rational, if it is not irrational.) Something constitutes a harm if we are collectively averse to it for ourselves and for those we care about. This explains what is ridiculous about those earnest attempts to give a rational explanation of why death is a harm. It’s a harm because we are averse to it, and since this constitutes normative bedrock there is, in a sense, no answer to the question of why death is bad, though there is presumably an evolutionary explanation of why we think it is. With harms, Gert may be on to a winner but, when it comes to irrationality, I don’t think that there is the kind of consensus of incomprehension that his theory requires. Though there are a few desires that seem weird to almost everybody, there is not enough agreement in our reactions to give us a sense of irrationality, any more than there is enough agreement in our reactions to underwrite a moral sense. Nice try, though.

The Critical Imagination, by James Grant

irrational if (as Hume might have put it) the desires that appear to prompt it excite a general sentiment of incomprehension. (It is at least minimally rational, if it is not irrational.) Something constitutes a harm if we are collectively averse to it for ourselves and for those we care about. This explains what is ridiculous about those earnest attempts to give a rational explanation of why death is a harm. It’s a harm because we are averse to it, and since this constitutes normative bedrock there is, in a sense, no answer to the question of why death is bad, though there is presumably an evolutionary explanation of why we think it is. With harms, Gert may be on to a winner but, when it comes to irrationality, I don’t think that there is the kind of consensus of incomprehension that his theory requires. Though there are a few desires that seem weird to almost everybody, there is not enough agreement in our reactions to give us a sense of irrationality, any more than there is enough agreement in our reactions to underwrite a moral sense. Nice try, though.