Raffaele Conti

Research on Markets for Inventions and Implications for R&D Allocation Strategies

Several streams of literature have examined the phenomenon of “markets for inventions”, that is, the trade of elements of knowledge which are “disembodied” from individuals, organizations, and products. The aims of this paper are to bring together the various streams of research in this area and discuss their major assumptions and limitations, in order to provide a comprehensive framework for understanding the phenomenon, and identify promising paths for future research. We start our review by identifying the object of market exchange—that is, an invention whose knowledge has been codified and disembodied from individuals, organizations, or artifacts. We then identify those factors that enable firms to trade inventions, distinguishing between institutional-, firm-, and industry-level factors. We close our analysis of the extant literature by discussing the implications of markets for inventions for firm behavior and performance. Against this background, we highlight an important avenue for future research. A neglected implication of the development of invention markets is that firms are confronted with a wide variety of technological paths from which to choose, because the opportunity to acquire technologies on the market offers them a greater variety that can their internal R&D departments. However, the streams of research on markets for inventions and on R&D allocation strategies have been surprisingly disconnected so far. Hence, in the final section, we start to establish and explore the link between these literatures, and to identify a research agenda in this domain.

Unpacking Market Emergence and Firm Strategies in Nascent Industries

This symposium assembles four papers that examine market emergence and firm strategies in nascent industries. Specifically, we seek to understand heterogeneous actors, their independent and collabo...

Discrimination and Entrepreneurship: Evidence from LGBT Rights Laws

This study revisits the well-established claim that reducing discrimination spurs entrepreneurial entry. We propose that the effect of antidiscrimination initiatives on entrepreneurship depends crucially on whether discrimination originates on the demand- or the supply-side of the entrepreneurial process. The benefits of antidiscrimination practices in the context of entry are based on the study of the demand-side discrimination, or bias which arises when prospective entrepreneurs face discrimination by key resource providers for a new venture (i.e., investors, banks, prospective employers). We hypothesize the opposite effect on the supply-side, or when prospective entrepreneurs face discrimination in paid employment. Using evidence from the enactment of LGBT antidiscrimination policies, we show that initiatives to reduce employer discrimination deter entry into entrepreneurship because they increase the appeal of paid employment relative to entrepreneurship. Despite the reduction in the rates of entrepre...

Super Partes? Assessing the Effect of Judicial Independence on Entry

Incumbents can enjoy a cost advantage vis-a-vis new entrants and so deter new firm entry by establishing and leveraging connections with the judicial system. Connected firms may in fact avoid fully complying with the costly norms implied by a law, a regulation, or a contract. At the same time, they can also credibly threaten to sue new entrants. Therefore, a change in the institutional environment that diminishes the ability of incumbent firms to establish judicial connections—i.e., an increase in judicial independence—can promote entrepreneurship. Exploiting reforms that change the way in which U.S. state judges are selected, we confirm that this is the case, and we show that this effect is more salient in states and industries where the likelihood of entering into a business dispute is higher. The paper also sheds some light on the mechanisms behind this effect. Data and the online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2794. This paper was accepted by Toby Stuart, entrepreneurship ...

Money Secrets: How Do Trade Secrets Affect Firm Value? Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment

We investigate the impact of trade secret legal protection on firm value in the context of acquisitions. On one hand, market value may increase because trade secret assets become better protected from rivals. On the other hand, market value may decrease because trade secret protection reduces information about the target and its competitors available to potential buyers, increasing uncertainty about the target’s value. Buyers will discount their offers in expectation of being compensated for riskier deals. Using a sample of private equity investments in the United States, we find that trade secret protection has a positive effect in industries with high mobility of knowledge workers, and a negative effect in industries with high uncertainty and a high proportion of “lemons.”