Ralf M. Bader

Side constraints, Lockean individual rights, and the moral basis of libertarianism

The brilliant discussion in Chapter 3 of Robert Nozicks Anarchy, State, and Utopia (ASU) is vitiated by an illicit slide between “some” and “all” or, better, between “to some extent” and “entirely.” In this chapter Nozick discusses the moral theory background to his Locke an libertarian doctrine of individual moral rights. He seeks to show that structural features of the account of moral requirements and permissions that most of us accept turn out to be reasons also to accept the more controversial Lockean libertarianism. The brilliant part of the discussion describes the structure of a non-consequentialist deontological moral theory that denies that each person ought always to do whatever would produce the impartially best outcome, even if the idea of the best outcome is interpreted as the greatest overall fulfillment of individual moral rights ranked by their moral importance. In this connection Nozick introduces the idea of a “side constraint” and of a morality that consists of side constraints, in whole or in part. This discussion advances our understanding of moral theory. We are all in Nozicks debt for this advance even if at the end of the day the case for accepting a consequentialist theory proves compelling.

The Role of Kant’s Refutation of Idealism

This paper assesses the role of the Refutation of Idealism within the Critique of Pure Reason, as well as its relation to the treatment of idealism in the First Edition and to transcendental idealism more generally. It will be argued that the Refutation of Idealism and the Fourth Paralogism of the First Edition are consistent and that their consistence can be explained by reference to the distinction between appearances and phenomena. While the Fourth Paralogism appeals to the fact that space is a form of intuition to establish that the immediate objects of awareness, namely appearances, that are represented as being in space really are in space and classify as spatial objects, the Refutation attempts to show that at least some of these outer appearances are empirically real and have objective correlates, namely phenomena. By appealing to this distinction we can make sense of the idea that the Refutation is an extension of the Transcendental Deduction. While the Deduction, considered on its own, constitutes a ‘regressive argument’, the Refutation allows us to turn the Transcendental Analytic into a ‘progressive argument’ that proceeds by the synthetic method – the method that Kant attributed to the Critique in the Prolegomena. Accordingly, we will see that the Refutation occupies a crucial role in the Analytic. This understanding of the Refutation as attempting to establish the existence of phenomena that correspond to empirically real appearances also explains why Kant placed the Refutation of Idealism after the Second Postulate, rather than leaving it in the Transcendental Dialectic amongst the Paralogisms.

Stochastic Dominance and Opaque Sweetening

ABSTRACT This paper addresses the problem of opaque sweetening and argues that one should use stochastic dominance in comparing lotteries even when dealing with incomplete orderings that allow for non-comparable outcomes.

Kant and the Categories of Freedom

In the second chapter of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason Kant introduces the ‘table of categories of freedom in regard of the concepts of good and evil’. is table has baffled many interpreters and has been described as one of the most obscure parts of Kant’s critical system. Kant does not seem to give any detailed explanation of what the categories of freedom are supposed to do and how they are to be derived. Moreover, he does not appeal to or refer to these categories in the rest of his works despite the fact that the table of the categories of freedom is supposed to allow us to survey ‘the whole plan of what has to be done, even every question of practical philosophy that has to be answered, and also the order that is to be followed.’ (:) It is not even always clear what the individual categories are since he only describes them by means of incomplete sentences. While leaving things unexplained in this way he states that he is not going to provide anything more ‘for the elucidation of the present table, since it is intelligible enough in itself.’ (:) In this paper I will provide an account of the different categories, explaining how they fit together and what role they are supposed to play. I will try to make the table as intelligible as possible by explaining the categories in terms of wellknown Kantian terminology. is analysis will place particular emphasis on the structural features that the table of the categories of freedom shares with the table of judgements and the table of categories laid out by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason. e key to an understanding of the categories lies in the realisation that the categories falling under each heading must form a synthetic unity whereby the