Ralph de Haas

Internal capital markets and lending by multinational bank subsidiaries

We use new panel data on the intra-group ownership structure and the balance sheets of 45 of the largest multinational bank holdings to analyze what determines the credit growth of their subsidiaries. We find evidence for the existence of internal capital markets through which multinational banks manage the credit growth of their subsidiaries. Multinational bank subsidiaries with financially strong parent banks are able to expand their lending faster. As a result of parental support, foreign bank subsidiaries also do not need to rein in their credit supply during a financial crisis, while domestic banks need to do so.

Running for the Exit? International Bank Lending During a Financial Crisis

The global financial crisis and the related sharp reduction in cross-border credit have reignited the debate about the risks of financial globalization. We use loan-level data on lending by the largest international banks to their various countries of operation to examine how banks reduced cross-border credit after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Country-, firm-, and bank-fixed effects allow us to disentangle credit supply and demand and to simultaneously control for the unobserved traits of banks as well as the countries and firms they lend to. We document substantial heterogeneity in the extent to which different banks retrenched from the same country: there was no blanket ‘run for the exit’. Instead, banks reduced credit less to markets that were geographically close; where they had more lending experience; where they operated a subsidiary; and where they were integrated into a network of domestic co-lenders. Deeper financial integration is associated with more stable cross-border credit during times of crisis.

The Dynamic Adjustment towards Target Capital Structures of Firms in Transition Economies

We examine the capital structure dynamics of Central and Eastern European firms to get a better understanding of the quantitative and qualitative development of the financial systems in this region. The dynamic model used endogenizes the target leverage as well as the adjustment speed. It is applied to microeconomic data for ten countries. We find that during the transition process, firms generally increased their leverage, lowering the gap between the actual and the target leverage. Profitability and age are the most robust determinants of capital structure targets. Although banking system development has in general enabled firms to get closer to their leverage targets, information asymmetries between firms and banks are still relatively large. As a result, firms prefer internal finance above bank debt and adjust leverage only slowly.

What Determines the Composition of Banks' Loan Portfolios? Evidence from Transition Countries

This paper explores how bank characteristics and the institutional environment influence the composition of banks’ loan portfolios. We use a new and unique data set based on the EBRD Banking Environment and Performance Survey (BEPS), which was conducted for 220 banks in 20 transition countries. We show that bank ownership, bank size, and legal creditor protection are important determinants of the composition of banks’ loan portfolios. In particular, we find that foreign banks play an active role in mortgage lending. Moreover, banks that perceive pledge and mortgage laws to be of high quality choose to focus more on mortgage lending.

Running for the Exit: International Banks and Crisis Transmission

The global financial crisis has reignited the debate about the risks of financial globalization, in particular the international transmission of financial shocks. We use data on individual loans by the largest international banks to their various countries of operation to examine whether banks’ access to borrower information affected the transmission of the financial shock across borders. The simultaneous use of country- and bank-fixed effects allows us to disentangle credit supply and demand and to control for general bank characteristics. We find that during the crisis banks continued to lend more to countries that are geographically close, where they are integrated into a network of domestic co-lenders, and where they had gained experience by building relationships with (repeat) borrowers.

How Important are Foreign Banks in the Financial Development of European Transition Countries

This article analyses the development of the banking sector in European transition countries. We find that, although bank assets increased during the 1990s, credit to the private sector remained relatively low. Foreign-owned banks have become major players in the financial system of these countries. However, foreign bank presence and financial development in general vary considerably among the transition economies. Foreign-owned banks have, in general, higher profitability levels than domestic banks. Furthermore, it appears that foreign and domestic bank performance tend to converge.

When arm's length is too far. Relationship banking over the business cycle

Using a novel way to identify relationship and transaction banks, we study how banks’ lending techniques affect funding to SMEs over the business cycle. For 21 countries we link the lending techniques that banks use in the direct vicinity of firms to these firms’ credit constraints at two contrasting points of the business cycle. We show that relationship lending alleviates credit constraints during a cyclical downturn but not during a boom period. The positive impact of relationship lending in an economic downturn is strongest for smaller and more opaque firms and in regions where the downturn is more severe.

Foreign Banks and the Vienna Initiative; Turning Sinners Into Saints?

We use data on 1,294 banks in Central and Eastern Europe to analyze how bank ownership and creditor coordination in the form of the Vienna Initiative affected credit growth during the 2008–09 crisis. As part of the Vienna Initiative western European banks signed country-specific commitment letters in which they pledged to maintain exposures and to support their subsidiaries in Central and Eastern Europe. We show that both domestic and foreign banks sharply curtailed credit during the crisis, but that foreign banks that participated in the Vienna Initiative were relatively stable lenders. We find no evidence of negative spillovers from countries where banks signed commitment letters to countries where they did not.

Microfinance at the Margin: Experimental Evidence from Bosnia and Herzegovina

We use a randomised controlled trial (RCT) to analyse the impact of microcredit on poverty reduction in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The study population are loan appli-cants that would normally have just been rejected based on regular screening. We find that access to credit allowed borrowers to start and expand small-scale busi-nesses. Households that already had a business and where the borrower had more education, ran down their savings, presumably to complement the loan and to achieve the minimum amount necessary to expand their business. In less-educated households, however, consumption went down. A key new result is that there was a substantial increase in the labour supply of young adults (16-19 year olds). This was accompanied by a reduction in school attendance.

The Crisis as a Wake-Up Call- Do Banks Tighten Screening and Monitoring During a Financial Crisis?

To what extent was the credit contraction during the global financial crisis due to more intense screening and monitoring by banks? We address this question by analyzing changes in the structure of a large number of syndicated loans to private, non-financial corporations. We find an increase in retention rates among syndicate arrangers during the crisis that we cannot explain by borrower risk or interbank liquidity alone. This increased ‘skin in the game’ is especially pronounced when information asymmetries between the borrower and the lending syndicate – or within the syndicate – are high. This indicates that the reduction in bank lending during the crisis was at least partly caused by stricter bank screening and monitoring: a wake-up call.