Ralph E. Townsend

Fisheries self-governance: corporate or cooperative structures?

The concept of self-governance of fisheries resources has implicitly assumed that self-governance would be democratic in structure. This concept of self-governance is a patterned on the democratic governance of cooperatives. The present analysis argues for a corporate concept of fisheries self-governance. A corporate governance structure provides a vehicle for effective joint decision-making by producers, but avoids the inefficient longrun incentives created by a cooperative governance structure.

Chaotic dynamics in a multiple species fishery: a model of community predation

Abstract This paper summarizes a dynamic model of a multiple species fishery that incorporates a community level phenomenon — community predation or the tendency of big fish of almost any species to eat little fish of almost any species. The model is used to explore the conditions under which the dynamic behavior of a multiple species complex characterized by community predation qualitatively conforms with the observed dynamic processes of real fisheries systems. The specifications necessary to replicate qualitatively the dynamic behavior of such system lead to the chaotic behavior of individual populations but stability of the entire system. The presence of chaos may explain why the dynamic path of individual populations in real fisheries has been so resistant to prediction, but more important, indicates that predictable order, the basis of management control of these kinds of multiple species systems, may be found at the system rather than at the individual population level.

A critique of models of the American lobster fishery

Abstract A number of studies have used the American lobster fishery to raise theoretical and empirical issues in the economic application of Schaefer yield-effort models. The present research shows that both published variants of the Schaefer yield-effort model are poor predictors of landings in the lobster fishery. The analysis suggests that minimum size rules in the lobster fishery make the Beverton-Holt dynamic pool model more appropriate to the lobster fishery than the Schaefer yield-effort model.

Corporate management of the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands lobster fishery

Limited entry and biological quotas were implemented in the lobster fishery of the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands in 1991, during a period of declining stock abundance. A companion use-it-or-lose-it permit provision has had the perverse effect of increasing fishing effort during times of declining stocks. Despite its unfavorable short-term prospects, the fishery has the potential to be very lucrative for a small number of boats over the long term. This paper introduces a dramatically different management regime that would create ownership rights in a private management corporation for the current limited-entry permit holders. This corporation would function within a renewable operating contract with the government to protect the public interest in the conservation of the lobster population and its associated ecosystem. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd.

Bankable individual transferable quotas

(IT&+), the ITQ holder cannot make long-term decisions about investments in the stock. Consequently, IT& solve the short-run externalities by market incentives, but solve long-run externalities via management quota decisions. Under the ‘bankable ITQs’ proposed here, deferrals of harvests earn a rate of return equal to the estimated rate of growth of the stock. The proposal for bankable ITQs would place more of the economic decisions about the optimal exploitation of fisheries stocks in the hands of ITQ holders.

Transactions Costs as an Obstacle to Fisheries Self-Governance in New Zealand

When faced with opportunities for greater self-governance, the New Zealand fishing industry managed to make only limited progress. Why industry was unable to progress self-management more effectively remains an interesting question. This paper argues that the benefits of greater self-governance were probably less than the significant transactions costs to self-organise. The benefits were probably smaller in New Zealand than elsewhere, because reform had already reduced the costs of fisheries administration. And the transactions costs confronting industry were substantial. First, unanimous agreement was required for self-governance, which created high transactions costs. Second, the tools for private enforcement were limited. Third, policy failed to specify clearly the expectations of self-governance, so the investments in self-governance are unusually risky. The government had unrealistic expectations that self-governance would solve third-party environmental externalities as well as fishing externalities. This implied high transactions costs to negotiate with third parties, such as environmental groups. Fourth, the standards for accountability were difficult to specify. This experience identifies four key policies if devolved fisheries governance is to be promoted: non-unanimous decision-making; private enforcement; clarity on areas for self-governance; and clarity on accountability standards.

Potential Impact of Seasonal Closures in the U.S. Lobster Fishery

Open access in the U.S. fishery for American lobsters has created seasonally concentrated landings. This analysis examines the impact of seasonality upon the market and also analyzes the possible use of seasonal closures to counteract this seasonality. Monthly price response functions are estimated using principal components regression. A linear programming model, which uses the monthly price response equations , finds that the gross revenue maximizing pattern of U.S. landings would increase U.S. revenues by 18 percent. Furthermore, the increased concentration of U.S. landings that has occurred between the 1960s and 1980s has decreased revenues to U.S. fishermen by an estimated 6 percent. We find that one or two month closures will not increase gross revenues. Closures for extended periods (such as August to November) might increase gross revenues modestly, but such extended closures face serious political obstacles. Because this is an open access fishery, resource rents will not be generated from any increase in revenues. Higher revenues would seem to be consistent with other political objectives, such as increasing economic activity in fishing communities.

Managing unpredictable resources: Traditional policies applied to chaotic populations

Abstract Conventional theory for the management of living ocean resources assumes a predictable link between current management actions and the future state of managed populations. As a practical matter, however, it is very hard to establish this kind of predictable relationship. It is possible that the dynamics of these populations exhibit chaotic variation. This paper addresses the question of appropriate management policies in a regime characterized by chaotic population dynamics. The problem is approached through a bioeconomic simulator that has chaotic properties. With light fishing, policies that alter the conditions of fishing perform better than policies dependent upon population predictions.

An Economic Evaluation of Restricted Entry in Maine's Soft-Shell Clam Industry

Abstract Approximately one-half of the coastal towns in Maine manage their soft-shell clam (Mya arenaria) fisheries by local ordinance. A key feature of these local ordinances is restricted entry for nonresidents. Two tests of the economic success of restricted entry to this fishery were developed. In the first test, results indicated that yield per unit of effort was higher in managed fisheries by 15%. Results of the second test indicated that yield per unit of effort increased as entry was more tightly restricted. Both results support the theory that limited entry improves the economic welfare of fishermen.

Evidence on Producer Bargaining in the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands Lobster Fishery

Conjectures have been made in fisheries economics that private bargaining to reduce fishing effort might arise among permit holders in regulated fisheries. A case of such spontaneous cooperation in the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands lobster fishery is analyzed.