Ramin Jahanbegloo

Iran and the Democratic Struggle in the Middle East

[Many commentators in the West have referred to the uprisings sweeping the Middle East and the Maghreb as the “Arab Spring”. If we take a closer look at the young Middle Easterners who launched these democratic demands, it is clear that the Arab Spring started in Iran back in June 2009. As such, the Arab Uprising had a non-Arab beginning in Irans Green Movement, and in what was known as the “Twitter Revolution” of young Iranians. Furthermore, the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt have reenergized Iranian civil society, helping it become firmer and more outspoken in its demand for democratization in Iran., Many commentators in the West have referred to the uprisings sweeping the Middle East and the Maghreb as the “Arab Spring”. If we take a closer look at the young Middle Easterners who launched these democratic demands, it is clear that the Arab Spring started in Iran back in June 2009. As such, the Arab Uprising had a non-Arab beginning in Iran’s Green Movement, and in what was known as the “Twitter Revolution” of young Iranians. Furthermore, the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt have reenergized Iranian civil society, helping it become fi rmer and more outspoken in its demand for democratization in Iran.]

Conversations with Isaiah Berlin.

Revealing and enlightening, Conversations with Isaiah Berlin gives a close-up view of one of the foremost thinkers of our time. Philosopher and leading proponent of liberal thinking, Isaiah Berlin has changed our sense of history and life. His impact on the intellectual and political views of the last fifty years alone makes it critical to understand his works and analyse his thoughts. The topics of conversation range broadly from Marx and Machiavelli to Berlins extraordinary encounters with Anna Akhmatova and Boris Pasternak in post-war Russia. Conversations is a remarkable record of one of the great intellectual odysseys of the century.

Iranian Encounters with Democracy

Throughout her history, Iran’s experiences with the West have been rather paradoxical. While on one hand these experiences have been troubled by violence and exploitation, Western ideas have also acted as an impetus for democratic reform. The second half of the 19th century saw a number of intellectuals advocate judicial, political and economic reforms based on Enlightenment principles, and particularly republicanism, which laid the groundwork for constitutional demands in 1906. Secularist intellectuals were not the only actors responsible for Iranian constitutional transformation, however. The Ulama were crucial in effectively mobilizing the Iranian population around nonviolent resistance strategies such as bast (sanctuary), which were crucial in gaining democratic concessions from the Qajar government.

Iran: A Century of Undemocratic Violence

The history of 20th century Iran is dominated by reoccurring episodes of civic struggles in the face of three successive authoritarian regimes — Qajar, Pahlavi and the Islamic Republic. This century also saw two defining moments in Iranian history: the Constitutional Revolution 1906 and the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Although these revolutions were preceded by violent and nondemocratic regimes, they created positive and concrete consequences. The first revolution was significant because it ushered in a protracted period of modernization, culminating in the implementation of liberal reforms. And while the Islamic Revolution has seen an unprecedented centralization of the state, it has led to the strengthening of civil society, opening the door for viable democratic movements.

The Two Sovereignties and Islamist Violence in Iran

The crises and decline of liberal institutions left a political vacuum, which provided the opportunity for political Islam to organize and mobilize the population. Once in power, the forces of Islam formulated a new ideology, velayat-e faqih, which claimed that every individual required religious guardianship. Following this ideology, the new regime structured government in such a way that it emphasized the divine clerical-rights of the religious leaders, and the people’s authority and rights (the latter becoming increasingly symbolic). Although the new constitution established a unicameral parliament, presided by an elected president, the overwhelming power was situated in the office of the Supreme Leader. Merely a decade after the revolution, Iran’s political system began experiencing a disintegration of popular sovereignty and ongoing crises of legitimacy.

The Road to Authoritarian Violence: From the Coup of 1953 to the Revolution of 1979

Mossadeq’s sympathies towards liberalism and nonviolence, and his advocacy of civic nationalism, provoked powerful domestic and international enemies, which ultimately led to his demise in 1953. Aside from the United States and Britain, powerful domestic actors such as the CIA’s principle man General Zahedi, Ayatollah Kashani and the violent fundamentalist group Feda’iyan-e Islam were instrumental in inciting violence that resulted in the coup. Following the coup, the Shah and his political allies placed their faith in ruling through an authoritarian dictatorship. On the eve of the 1979 revolution, two dominant opposition groups stood out. Marxism influenced the first group, while the other marched under the banner of Islamic revivalism. Fatally, both intellectual groups put their faith in Ayatollah Khomeini — unknowingly digging their graves.

Struggle for Democracy in Iran

If Iran is to reclaim the public sphere and embrace democracy, then society must organize itself behind nonviolence. Peace and nonviolent values are particularly strong amongst the Iranian youth, and as was witnessed in the pro-democratic Green Movement, wider civil society has also began to embrace these values. Only through nonviolent struggle can the Iranian civil society offer a direct and effective contradiction to the violence of the regime. For nonviolent discourse to be effective, however, a transnational unified front consisting of intellectuals, social activists and women must exist.

Democracy and Lawfulness in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution

At the turn of the 20th century, a multiplicity of strong interests emerged within Iran surrounding the nation’s course of development, some of which continue to surface in one form or another to this day. Around the time of the Constitutional Revolution these interest were represented by: (a) the Qajar elite, which wished to solidify its control over Iran, (b) intellectuals who demanded Western-style reforms, (c) merchants and bazaaris demanding more economic protection against Western expansion, and (d) the Ulama, whose traditional authority was challenged by a growing state. Although the Ulama was instrumental in the revolutionary struggles of 1906 and 1979, it was their different aims and strategies that led to their defeat in 1906 and triumph in 1979.

On Margins, Marginals, and Marginalities: A Conversation with Ramin Jahanbegloo

Costica Bradatan: We would like first of all to thank you for kindly agreeing to take part in this conversation on marginality and its relevance for understanding trends and changes in our contemporary world. What has struck us—what, after all, has set this project in motion—is the elusive nature of this notion when it comes to understanding how humanistic knowledge is produced. I have in mind, for example, why an author who is first considered ‘‘marginal’’ becomes ‘‘mainstream’’ one day, sometimes long after his death (or the other way around). In the social sciences scholars have been working on marginality for quite some time. The topic is popular in sociology, obviously, but also in other fields such as international relations. I am thinking, for example, of Immanuel Wallerstein’s influential work in this area. However, in the humanities (and humanistic social sciences such as political theory), marginality is often perceived as something fuzzy, uncertain, and difficult to conceptualize. How are we to understand this situation? Is marginality here intrinsically mercurial and should we leave it at that? If not, how exactly should, or could, we handle it? Where should we start?

Two Concepts of Secularism

Secularism, for many of us, is not a terra incognita, and yet it is certainly an improperly defined and unexplained concept. For more than 150 years, intellectuals, politicians, and theologians have used secular and secularism in a rather ambiguous way. These terms therefore need to be clarified. The time has come to rethink our whole approach to the question of secularism. Given the inapplicability of the French model of secularism to the Muslim world, it becomes necessary to find a criterion by which state involvement, when it occurs in the domain of religion, can appear to the members of a religious group as both legitimate and fair. The Indian concept of secularism based on the toleration and equal protection of all religious communities without being supportive of any particular religion can supply this criterion. That said, to pursue a secular politics of rejecting sectarianism and demanding toleration requires that strategic priorities be rearranged without making historical shortcuts. In this case, a secular politics of toleration is a twofold struggle, a resistance to uniformization and an invitation to democratization. If such a strategy is to find any role in the regulation of the lives and activities of Islamic societies today, an alternative concept of secularism, rather than simply an alternative to it, needs to be worked out. The challenge is not to abandon secularism but to formulate it as a philosophy with spiritual values, rather than solely a policy of the state. This is the only way of rethinking our whole approach to the future in Muslim societies to the extent that the pluralist model of a shared home can be presented as a third way solution to the crisis of political societies in the Middle East and in opposition to the secular authoritarianism of the state and the rise of religious fundamentalism in civil society.