Network


Latest external collaboration on country level. Dive into details by clicking on the dots.

Hotspot


Dive into the research topics where Ramon Casadesus-Masanell is active.

Publication


Featured researches published by Ramon Casadesus-Masanell.


Management Science | 2006

Dynamic Mixed Duopoly: A Model Motivated by Linux vs. Windows

Ramon Casadesus-Masanell; Pankaj Ghemawat

This paper analyzes a dynamic mixed duopoly in which a profit-maximizing competitor interacts with a competitor that prices at zero (or marginal cost), with the cumulation of output affecting their relative positions over time. The modeling effort is motivated by interactions between Linux, an open-source operating system, and Microsofts Windows in the computer server segment, and consequently emphasizes demand-side learning effects that generate dynamic scale economies (or network externalities). Analytical characterizations of the equilibrium under such conditions are offered, and some comparative static and welfare effects are examined.


Journal of Economic Theory | 2000

Maxmin Expected Utility over Savage Acts with a Set of Priors

Ramon Casadesus-Masanell; Peter Klibanoff; Emre Ozdenoren

When do dynamic nonconvexities at the disaggregate level translate into dynamic nonconvexities at the aggregate level? We address this question in a framework where the production of differentiated intermediate inputs is subject to dynamic nonconvexities and show that the answer depends on the degree of Hicks-Allen complementarity (substitutability) between differentiated inputs. In our simplest model, a generalization of Judd (1985) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) among many others, there are dynamic nonconvexities at the aggregate level if and only differentiated inputs are Hicks-Allen complements. We also compare dynamic equilibrium and optimal allocations in the presence of aggregate dynamic nonconvexities due to Hicks-Allen complementarities between differentiated inputs.


The Journal of Law and Economics | 2000

The Fable of Fisher Body

Ramon Casadesus-Masanell; Daniel F. Spulber

General Motorss (GMs) acquisition of Fisher Body is the classic example of market failure in the literature on contracts and the theory of the firm. According to the standard account, in 1926 GM merged vertically with Fisher Body, a maker of auto bodies, because of concerns over transaction‐specific investment and contractual holdup. That account exhibits errors of historical fact and interpretation. General Motors acquired a 60 percent interest in Fisher Body in 1919. Moreover, the contractual arrangements and working relationship prior to the 1926 merger exhibited trust rather than opportunism. Fisher Bodys production technology did not exhibit asset specificity. The merger reflected economic considerations specific to that time, not some immutable market failure. We demonstrate that vertical integration was directed at improving coordination of production and inventories, assuring GM of adequate supplies of auto bodies, and providing GM with access to the executive talents of the Fisher brothers.


IESE Research Papers | 2007

Competing Through Business Models

Ramon Casadesus-Masanell; Joan E. Ricart

In this article a business model is defined as the firm choices on policies, assets and governance structure of those policies and assets, together with their consequences, be them flexible or rigid. We also provide a way to represent such business models to highlight the dynamic loops and to facilitate understanding interaction with other business models. Furthermore, we develop some tests to evaluate the goodness of a business model both in isolation as well as in interaction with other business models of different organizations, be those competitors, complements, suppliers, partners, etc.


Management Science | 2010

Strategies to Fight Ad-Sponsored Rivals

Ramon Casadesus-Masanell; Feng Zhu

We analyze the optimal strategy of a high-quality incumbent that faces a low-quality ad-sponsored competitor. In addition to competing through adjustments of tactical variables such as price or the number of ads a product carries, we allow the incumbent to consider changes in its business model. We consider four alternative business models: a subscription-based model; an ad-sponsored model; a mixed model in which the incumbent offers a product that is both subscription based and ad sponsored; and a dual model in which the incumbent offers two products, one based on the ad-sponsored model and the other based on the mixed business model. We show that the optimal response to an ad-sponsored rival often entails business model reconfigurations. We also find that when there is an ad-sponsored entrant, the incumbent is more likely to prefer to compete through the subscription-based or the ad-sponsored model, rather than the mixed or the dual model, because of cannibalization and endogenous vertical differentiation concerns. We discuss how our study helps improve our understanding of notions of strategy, business model, and tactics in the field of strategy.


Management Science | 2011

Mixed Source

Ramon Casadesus-Masanell; Gastón Llanes

We study competitive interaction between a profit-maximizing firm that sells software and complementary services, and a free open-source competitor. We examine the firms choice of business model between the proprietary model (where all software modules are proprietary), the open-source model (where all modules are open source), and the mixed-source model (where some---but not all---modules are open). When a module is opened, users can access and improve the code, which increases quality and value creation. Opened modules, however, are available for others to use free of charge. We derive the set of possibly optimal business models when the modules of the firm and the open-source competitor are compatible (and thus can be combined) and incompatible, and show that (i) when the firms modules are of high (low) quality, the firm is more open under incompatibility (compatibility) than under compatibility (incompatibility); (ii) firms are more likely to open substitute, rather than complementary, modules to existing open-source projects; and (iii) there may be no trade-off between value creation and value capture when comparing business models with different degrees of openness. This paper was accepted by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy.


Management Science | 2015

Competing with Privacy

Ramon Casadesus-Masanell; Andres Hervas-Drane

We analyze the implications of consumer privacy for competition in the marketplace. Firms compete for consumer information and derive revenues both from consumer purchases as well as from disclosing consumer information in a secondary market. Consumers choose which firm to patronize and how much personal information to provide it with. We show that firms maximize profits by focusing on a single revenue source and competing at the extensive rather than the intensive margin, outperforming competitors by attracting a larger customer base. We also show that competition drives the provision of services with a low level of consumer information disclosure high level of privacy, but higher competition intensity in the marketplace need not improve privacy when consumers exhibit low willingness to pay. Our findings are relevant to the business models of Internet firms and contribute to inform the regulatory debate on consumer privacy. This paper was accepted by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy.


Journal of Economics and Management Strategy | 2010

Peer-to-Peer File Sharing and the Market for Digital Information Goods

Ramon Casadesus-Masanell; Andres Hervas-Drane

We study competitive interaction between two alternative models of digital content distribution over the Internet: peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing and centralized client-server distribution. We present microfoundations for a stylized model of p2p file sharing where all peers are endowed with standard preferences and show that the endogenous structure of the network is conducive to sharing by a significant number of peers, even if sharing is costlier than freeriding. We build on this model of p2p to analyze the optimal strategy of a profit-maximizing firm, such as Apple, that offers content available at positive prices. We characterize the size of the p2p network as a function of the firms pricing strategy, and show that the firm may be better off setting high prices, allowing the network to survive, and that the p2p network may work more efficiently in the presence of the firm than in its absence.


Management Research: Journal of the Iberoamerican Academy of Management | 2010

Competitiveness: business model reconfiguration for innovation and internationalization

Ramon Casadesus-Masanell; Joan E. Ricart

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to reflect on competitiveness by using the business model concept and to understand the need to adapt business models to changes in the environment.Design/methodology/approach – Using Catalonia as a context, the paper derives recommendations by presenting and analyzing examples of companies, referred to as “new generation companies,” that have innovated in their business models. The case studies illustrate the contributions of the business model notion to the competitiveness debate.Findings – Reviewing the history and contemporary practice of Catalan firms, examples of “new generation” companies are analyzed to derive recommendations for managers seeking to reconfigure their business models to support innovation and internationalization. Since business models sit at the core of competitiveness, they must be the focus of managers aiming to create efficient firms that foster sustained competitive advantage.Research limitations/implications – The analysis is based on a ...


IESE Research Papers | 2008

Platform Competition, Compatibility, and Social Efficiency

Ramon Casadesus-Masanell; Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda

Katz and Shapiro (1985) study systems compatibility in settings with one-sided platforms and direct network externalities. We consider systems compatibility in settings with two-sided platforms and indirect network externalities to develop an explanation why markets with two-sided platforms are often characterized by incompatibility with one dominant player who may subsidize access to one side of the market. We find that incompatibility gives rise to asymmetric equilibria with a dominant platform that earns more than under compatibility. We also find that incompatibility generates larger total welfare than compatibility when horizontal differences between platforms are small.

Collaboration


Dive into the Ramon Casadesus-Masanell's collaboration.

Top Co-Authors

Avatar
Top Co-Authors

Avatar
Top Co-Authors

Avatar

Jorge Tarziján

Pontifical Catholic University of Chile

View shared research outputs
Top Co-Authors

Avatar
Top Co-Authors

Avatar
Top Co-Authors

Avatar
Top Co-Authors

Avatar
Top Co-Authors

Avatar
Top Co-Authors

Avatar
Top Co-Authors

Avatar
Researchain Logo
Decentralizing Knowledge