Ramzi Suleiman

Environmental and social uncertainty in single-trial resource dilemmas

Abstract Considered in this paper is a class of social dilemma situations in which subjects are instructed that there is a certain amount of money, x, that can be made available to them collectively and all they have to do is to request, individually and anonymously, how much money they, as individuals, want. If the total amount requested collectively by the group members does not exceed x, each member gets what he or she requested. Otherwise, no one receives anything. The amount x is a realization of a random variable drawn from a probability distribution whose parameters are common knowledge. The number of members in the group is known. How much money should each group member request? Taking an individual decision-making approach — where beliefs about requests of the other group members are modeled by subjective probabilities — we provide a general solution to the problem, which is experimentally testable, when requests of the other group members (i) are known or (ii) are not.

Simultaneous vs. sequential requests in resource dilemmas with incomplete information

Abstract We consider a class of resource dilemmas of the following form: members of groups of size n are asked to share a common resource pool whose exact size, x , is not known. Rather, x is sampled randomly from a probability distribution which is common knowledge. Each group member j ( j = 1,…, n ) requests r j from the resource pool. Requests are made either simultaneously or sequentially. If ( r 1 + r 2 +…+ r n )⩽ x all members are granted their requests; otherwise, group members get nothing. For each protocol of play we present two alternative models - a game theoretical equilibrium solution and a psychological model incorporating the notion of focal points. We then report the results of two experiments designed to compare the two models under the two protocols of play.

PROVISION OF STEP-LEVEL PUBLIC GOODS UNDER UNCERTAINTY A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

In a typical game examining voluntary contribution to the provision of step-level public goods, each member of a group of size n receives an endowment and then decides privately and anonymously how much of it to contribute for the provision of the good. The good is provided to all group members if and only if their total contribution is equal to, or larger than some threshold. While previous research assumed that group members have complete information about the threshold, the present article relaxes this assumption by treating the threshold as a random variable with a commonly known distribution. Three models, a subjective expected value model, a cooperative model and a strategic model are proposed to account for the individuals contribution decision. General solutions are then derived and their predictions for the case of a uniformly distributed threshold are evaluated.

Equilibrium solutions for resource dilemmas

Considered in this article is a class of resource dilemma games designed to study interactive decision behavior in the face of both strategic and environmental uncertainty. Groups of n members are asked to share a common resource pool whose exact size, x, is not known. Rather, x is sampled randomly from a uniform probability distribution which is common knowledge. Each group member j(j=1,...,n) requests rj units from the random resource pool. Individual decisions are made independently and anonymously. Preplay communication is prohibited. If (r1+r2+...+rn)≤ x, each member j is granted his/her request; otherwise, group members get nothing. We derive the Nash equilibrium solution for this resource dilemma game, and compare it to an expected utility model originally proposed by Suleiman and Rapoport (1988). We then show that the equilibrium solution accounts for the major qualitative features of experimental results reported in two previous studies.

Perception of the Minority's collective identity and voting behavior: The case of the palestinians in Israel

Abstract The author investigated how Palestinian (n = 130) and Jewish (n = 153) Israeli university students perceived the collective identity of the Palestinian minority in Israel. The Palestinian and Jewish respondents perceived the “identity space” of the minority as linear, or bipolar, with 1 pole defined by the national (Palestinian) identity and the other defined by the civic (Israeli) label. The Palestinian respondents defined their collective identity in national (Palestinian, Arab) and integrative (Israeli-Palestinian) terms; the Jewish respondents perceived the minoritys identity as integrative (Israeli-Palestinian). Different political outlooks among Palestinian respondents were related to their identification with the civic (Israeli) identity but not to their identification with the national (Palestinian) identity. In contrast, different political outlooks among Jewish respondents were related to their inclusion, or exclusion, of the national (Palestinian) component in their definition of the minoritys identity. Implications of the results are discussed in terms of a minority acculturation model (J. Berry, J. Trimble, & E. Olmedo, 1986).

FIXED POSITION AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SEQUENTIAL RESOURCE DILEMMAS UNDER UNCERTAINTY

Abstract Considered in this paper is a noncooperative n-person resource dilemma game in which players can share a common and uncertain resource whose probability distribution is common knowledge. Making their requests from the pool privately with no preplay communication, individuals are granted their requests if, and only if, the total group request does not exceed the value of the unknown resource. We investigate this game under the sequential protocol of play and show that if positions in the sequence are fixed for all stage games and commonly known, the threat of retaliation against players requesting disproportionally large shares is sufficient to induce a more egalitarian distribution of requests. Acquisition of property rights, which is hypothesized to induce more skewed request distributions, was ineffective, presumably because of the relatively large group size, or lack of outcome feedback.

Sensitivity to fairness and intentions of others in the ultimatum game in patients with ventromedial prefontal lesions.

This study aimed to examine the relationship between perspective-taking and impaired decision-making in patients with ventromedial prefrontal (VM) lesions, using the Ultimatum Game (UG). In the UG, two players split a sum of money and one player proposes a division while the other can accept or reject this. Eight patients with VM damage and 18 healthy controls participated as responders in a modified version of the UG, in which identical offers can generate different rejection rates depending on the other offers available to the proposer. Participants had to either accept or reject offers of 2:8 NIS (2NIS for them and 8 NIS for the proposer), which were paired with one of four different possible offers (5:5, 4:6, 2:8, 8:2). Results indicate that the controls more often rejected offers of 2:8 when the alternative was 4:6 (a greedy alternative) than when the alternative was 5:5 (fair alternative), whereas the VM patients showed the opposite pattern of decision-making. Additionally, the overall rejection rates were higher in patients as compared to controls. Furthermore, scores on a perspective-taking scale were negatively correlated with rejection rates in the patient group, suggesting that perspective-taking deficits may account for impaired decision-making in VM patients.

The position effect: The role of a player’s serial position in a resource dilemma game

We consider the following single-stage resource dilemma game with both strategic and environmental uncertainty: Members of group N are required to share a common resource whose size x is not known with precision. Rather, x is sampled randomly from a probability distribution which is common knowledge. Individual players make their requests privately; their requests are granted if and only if the total group request does not exceed x.

The one-of-us effect in decision evaluation

Judgment-by-outcomes denotes basing retrospective evaluation of decisions on the valence of their outcomes (success versus failure). Although decisions are typically evaluated in social contexts, so far judgment-by-outcomes has been studied without regard to this context. This study examines the moderating effect of evaluators identification with the decision maker (the one-of-us-effect) on the influence of outcome information on the evaluation of Arab and Jewish subjects were presented with two cases recounting operations by either Arab or Jewish underground directed against the British authorities in Palestine. One case was a success (from the undergrounds point of view) and one ended in failure. Consistent with the one-of-us effect, identification with the decision maker variably canceled the influence of outcome information altogether, accentuated or weakened its influence, or determined which outcome constituted successful and unsuccessful outcomes. The one-of-us effect exercised a differential influence over different facets of decision evaluation, influencing most strongly the assignment of sanctions (in-group decision makers were mostly rewarded, out-group decision-makers were mostly punished regardless of outcomes). Next, in order of potency, the effect influenced the evaluation of decision justification, the evaluation of the decision maker, and the evaluation of the quality of decision process.

On Marginal People: The Case of the Palestinians in Israel

Coping with an imposed and painful marginality is the fate assigned to Palestinians living inside Israel’s border, most of whom (but not all), are nominal Israeli citizens. The question addressed here is that of the meaning of this kind of citizenship, and the place of Palestinians within Israeli citizenry. What psychological consequences could this imposed marginality have, except anger and frustration? Identity is tied to collective memory, and this connection, having been examined in earlier chapters, is now looked at from a fresh perspective. The analysis presented here is both historical and psychological, and is far from detached. Ramzi Suleiman is both a sophisticated social psychologist, at home with prevailing theories and experiments, and a Palestinian who has experienced this imposed marginality all his life. This chapter offers a unique perspective both theoretically and personally.