Randolph B. Pipes

Examining the personal-professional distinction : Ethics codes and the difficulty of drawing a boundary

The Ethics Code of the American Psychological Association (APA) applies to the professional role behaviors of members and not to their personal behavior. This article discusses some of the difficulties inherent in drawing distinctions between the personal and the professional. Consideration is given to the importance of clarifying public statements. Four ethics codes other than the APA Ethics Code are examined for how they treat the personal-professional distinction. A number of questions are posed to assist in determining the tilt a behavior takes. A concluding recommendation suggests that APA Ethical Standards be applied only to professional role behaviors, whereas aspirational principles might be applied to personal behavior.

Remorse and a Previously Punished Offense in Assignment of Punishment and Estimated Likelihood of a Repeated Offense

A total of 149 college students read two vignettes, one about an individual who had been arrested for assault and one about a psychologist who had violated confidentiality. In a 2 × 2 design, variables examined were whether the person had previously been punished for a similar offense and whether the person expressed remorse for the recent act. Participants made two judgments about each story, (1) estimates of the likelihood that the protagonists would do the same thing again and (2) assignment of an appropriate punishment. For the criminal act but not for the improper act of the psychologist the expression of remorse significantly affected estimates of likelihood of a repeated offense and the length of assigned sentence. Detection and punishment of a previous offense affected judgments of the probability of a future offense but not assigned sentence for both the criminal offense and the violation of professional standards.

Confidentiality, ethics, and informed consent.

In Fisher’s (January 2008) excellent and much-needed article, she rightly implied that when discussing ethical dilemmas, psychologists may find themselves saying “consult an attorney” almost as often as they find themselves saying, “consult a fellow psychologist.” Fisher’s article was meant to turn the ship so to speak, by providing psychologists with a foundation for thinking clearly about confidentiality issues—a foundation that does not use legal arguments as primary building blocks. The above being said, we offer comments about four issues that we hope will add to the fine ideas expressed by Fisher (2008). First, we believe that Fisher’s careful analysis of this area has opened a somewhat clearer view of a problem that many psychologists have when they write about client consent. Client consent really means two very different things (as Fisher implied but which we wish to emphasize). Psychologists can obtain client “consent” to disclose information, such as having the client consent to the release of records to another psychologist. Presumably under such circumstances, the client really does consent. In contrast, psychologists can also obtain “consent” when they ask clients to sign a statement acknowledging that confidentiality may be broken under certain circumstances. We believe that using the same word to describe both situations is confusing because in everyday language “consent” denotes voluntary or even proactive agreement. Obviously, Fisher did not create this problem, but her article throws it into relief, especially in Sections II, III, and IV of the model. Thus, when one reads the word “consent” in Fisher’s model (Table 2, p. 7), it is not always clear whether the usage refers to true consent or to acknowledgement of the limits of confidentiality. Perhaps the term “client consent” should be used only to refer to situations in which clients really do endorse a psychologist’s action, and a somewhat different phrase should be chosen to describe the process whereby psychologists are to provide complete information about the limits of confidentiality (e.g., “acknowledgement of guidelines that will be followed in psychotherapy” or “client acknowledgement of exceptions to confidentiality”). A second point is related somewhat to our discussion above. In her narrative, Fisher apparently endorsed Behnke’s (2004) “doors” model, including the door that allows disclosure when legally permitted for a valid purpose. Yet, Fisher’s (2008) choice of wording in Section III (“Obtain Truly Informed Consent to Disclose Voluntarily,” p. 7) of her model seems slightly confusing for two reasons. First, Rule A under Section III says: “Respect the rule: Disclose without client consent only if legally unavoidable” (p. 7). This seems somewhat different from the American Psychological Association (APA) Ethical Standard 4.05(b), which says that one can disclose confidential information without client consent “where permitted by law for a valid purpose” (APA, 2002, p. 1066). It also seems different from Behnke’s and even Fisher’s narrative to some extent. Thus, the question arises as to whether Fisher believes that confidential information can be disclosed for a valid purpose or that it can be disclosed only if legally unavoidable. Second, it seems a little inconsistent for Fisher to criticize using legal arguments as the foundation for thinking about confidentiality yet then to suggest (Section III, Rule A, p. 7) that the only way one should break confidentiality without consent is if the legal system demands it. If psychologists wish to redeem confidentiality from the clutches of the legal system, as we think about a legitimate basis for breaking confidentiality and highlight relevant legal issues, shouldn’t we at least give equal weight to principled arguments about potentially higher ethical commitments (perhaps, for example, saving the lives of many people)? Third, although Fisher (2008) analyzed to some extent the words of the current Ethics Code, reviewed the wording of several older versions of the Ethics Code, and implicitly criticized some of these versions, it is still not completely clear where Fisher stands regarding the current relationship between the Ethics Code and confidentiality. Another way of saying this is that there is little in the article to tell us whether Fisher believes that the current APA Ethics Code is just fine the way it is or should be changed in order to shore up the (presumably) eroding foundation of confidentiality. We do understand that Fisher’s central point here is not to critique the current code but rather primarily to use it as a part of discussing confidentiality. Still, we would have liked to hear her ideas on this matter. Thus, when she says on p. 6, “Underneath all the legally imposed exceptions, the familiar old ethical rule is still there. The rule is simple enough,” one wonders how “simple” it can be given the earlier careful distinctions Fisher drew between various versions of the Ethics Code. Fourth, we believe that Fisher’s (2008) article would have been strengthened by some consideration of multicultural and cross-cultural issues. Although there are many practice settings in which psychologists’ commitment to confidentiality may not be significantly and often altered by cultural influences, it is obvious that there are cultural issues bound up in confidentiality (e.g., Meer & VandeCreek, 2002; Pettifor & Sawchuk, 2006). Thus, Fisher’s model would be strengthened if one or more sections of it were to explicitly remind psychologists that culture plays a role in how we understand the construct of confidentiality and how we carry out our commitments. We appreciate the contribution of this article to the literature on confidentiality;

The effect of noncontingent feedback on attributional style

The relationship between experiences with noncontingency and attributional style was examined in experimental and correlational models. One hundred and twenty-six college student subjects were provided noncontingent, contingent, or no feedback as to the correctness of their responses on a concept discrimination problem. They then completed an attributional style questionnaire, a scale designed to measure life experiences with noncontingency, and a depression inventory. The experimental hypothesis was that exposure to noncontingent outcomes, both in a laboratory and historically, would result in more depressive attributions than would exposure to contingent outcomes or to no outcomes. The manipulation of feedback contingencies produced the predicted effect on attributions for positive and negative events combined into a single composite difference score. A correlation between life experiences with noncontingency and attributions was found only for the positive events measure. However, such life experiences were correlated significantly with depression.

Professional Issues in Counseling Psychology: A Seminar Model

A brief description is provided of how a list of questions about professional issues in counseling psychology is used as an adjunct to a seminar taught at Auburn University. Rationale for a seminar in professional issues is given. Four representative questions for each of several topical areas are listed.

CHANGES IN ATTRIBUTIONS MADE BY INDIVIDUALS CHARGED WITH DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED

Summary An expanding area of study in social psychology [text not clear] processes as they mediate real-world behaviors [text not clear] attributions to failure were investigated in co [text not clear] Under the Influence” school in the southern United [text not clear] posttest design, each of 75 males was asked prior to and follow[text not clear] school to indicate which of four explanations best described the reason for his being apprehended while driving under the influence of alcohol. Results suggested that attributions to luck decreased as a result of the school.

Suspiciousness, Mental Simulation, and Norm Theory

Seven studies were conducted to replicate the work of Miller, Turnbull, and McFarland (1989), who tested predictions from norm theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986). The first three studies with stimulus materials identical to those used by Miller et al. failed to confirm that the ease with which the event might be mentally simulated affected the degree of suspiciousness. In Studies 4, 5, and 6, the improbable events were made objectively more probable, but this did not produce significant results. In the 7th study, the objective probability and attitude toward the target were varied. Although there was a main effect for ease of mental simulation, this effect was produced by only 1 of the 3 vignettes.