Raquel A. Adekoye

Conclusion: Controlling Nuclear Weapons in the Global South

This concluding chapter provides policy recommendations and strategies to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons in general and in relation to the Global South. It summarizes the main findings of the study. It also projects a pattern of possible future proliferation trends leaning towards emerging power states and the likes. It also suggests solutions or control measures for the problem of nuclear proliferation.

British–South African Nuclear Politics: A Review

This chapter reviews the literature on the contextualization of British and South African nuclear politics. It defines Britain’s strategy and analyzes works on British interests relevant to understanding the major themes in South African nuclear politics. This chapter also evaluates the body of literature on the triggers of nuclear proliferation. Focusing on the key factors extracted from the literature survey, this chapter provides answers to the question on the extent of study and research in British and South Africa’s nuclear history, politics, and relations.

An Analysis of the Failed Technology Denial Strategy of Britain Towards South Africa

This chapter provides a historical examination of the special relationship between Britain and South Africa. It briefly defines the meaning of technology denial as an instrument for combating nuclear proliferation and describes diplomatic incidents and political environments that suggest that Britain adopted complacent approaches which ultimately negated the effectiveness of “technology denial” in the South African nuclear proliferation case. It traces the development of their unique, historically grounded significance and ties, in the context of interactions around nuclear weapons. If the general assumption is that technological capability is a prerequisite for a state to go nuclear, how is Britain implicated in the provision of such and how did this motivate South Africa to develop its indigenous nuclear weapons? Specifically, this chapter responds to the question: to what extent did British nuclear technology collaboration led to the development of South Africa’s technological capability?

A Comparative Analysis and Evaluation of “Emerging Powers” Nuclear Proliferation in the Global South

This chapter provides a comparative analysis and evaluation of Nuclear Proliferation Cases of “Emerging Powers” of India, Pakistan, Israel, and South Africa. This chapter undertakes a qualitative multistate comparison of nuclear weapons programs among these case study countries. The countries are known to have nuclear weapons in the 1970s and 1980s though without outright declaration of their nuclear capability. Against the premise of a mutual suspicion and hostility in a Cold War international Security and regional tensions, it seems nuclear weapons has found new destinations in the global South and making them emerging powers. The principal question of this chapter seeks to answer is what is the level of technological capability and the motivation behind these states’ decision to develop nuclear weapons? This chapter highlights these dynamics in comparative terms and with particular reference to the role of external agency in the process of nuclearization in these states.

A Methodological Framework for Nuclear Proliferation in the South

This chapter presents a methodological framework for nuclear proliferation and how the South African case may be situated. This chapter provides a unique prism through which nuclear proliferation can be methodologically understood. This is important due to the fact that nuclear-related data are largely undefined and states usually carry out nuclear activities in a clandestine manner. Nuclear politics and levels of advancement are shrouded in secrecy. Therefore, to ensure objectivity and the validity of data, a case study approach is projected as a viable method of analyzing nuclear history and politics. We cross-examined different sources of both primary and secondary information on the five recognized nuclear weapons powers—Britain, USA, Soviet Union, China, and France. This ensures the validity of the claims that we make in the study through the analysis of this material in the context of the cases.

Model Explanations of a Nuclear Powered South Africa

This chapter is devoted to the analysis and constructs of nuclear proliferation in South Africa. The analysis highlights the rationale for nuclear proliferation. It provides model explanations for South Africa’s nuclear weapons development and determines the nature of the political environment that conditioned decisions and outcomes. This chapter seeks to determine whether or not certain patterns of similarity or difference exist among the nations and to identify the significant factors influencing a nation’s nuclear options. Based on this comparison, this chapter also provides an overall evaluation of nuclear weapons programs in the case study countries.

A Conceptual Frame of Nuclear Proliferation in South Africa and the British Nexus

This chapter introduces the study and provides the overall background and identifies the problems of nuclear proliferation with follow-up questions as well as the significance of the research, provides conceptual clarifications, and outlines the theoretical framework and the significance of the study. This chapter provides the background and context for understanding of South Africa’s strategic position in an international system driven by strategic interests leading to the need for strategic weapons of mass destruction. It introduces a conceptualization of armament drive in South Africa in the era of apartheid and the inextricable links of the British government at the time to provide assistance to South Africa due largely to its historical connections, Commonwealth factor, economic arrangements, and the latter’s interest in South Africa’s uranium deposits, a vital resource which Britain could use as bargaining chip to ensure sustainability in a nuclear driven international system. While the British government was keen to improve economic ties with South Africa, diplomatically, it needed to keep the country at arm’s length in order to signal disdain for apartheid and to avoid “guilt by association.” The objective of this chapter is to problematize the South African uranium drives and nuclear proliferation from a global perspective along with other variables.

A Historical Analysis of “Emerging Powers” Nuclear Proliferation: Israel and South Africa

This chapter explores the nuclear proliferation cases of “emerging powers” of Israel and South Africa. This chapter presents case studies of two developing countries noted to have had some form of nuclear collaborations in the past, particularly in the 1970s. The Vela incident is instructive here. The principal question that this chapter seeks to answer is: what is the level of technological capability and the motivation behind these states’ decision to develop nuclear weapons in Israel and South Africa? The argument made here is that many factors impacted upon Israel and South Africa’s nuclear weapons decisions. Overall, the two countries show international dimensions and collaboration with one or more of the established five nuclear states—both in the development of their nuclear complex and in the development of its motivations.

A Historical Analysis of South East Asian “Emerging Powers” Nuclear Proliferation: India and Pakistan

This chapter explores the Nuclear Proliferation Cases of “Emerging Powers” of India and Pakistan. The chapter presents case studies of two developing and neighbor countries known to have nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan, who have never declared its nuclear capability. Against the premise of a mutual suspicion and hostility, nuclear weapons found its way to the South East and aided directly or indirectly by western nuclear powers. The principal question of this chapter seeks to answer is: what is the level of technological capability and the motivation behind these states’ decision to develop nuclear weapons? The argument made here is that many factors impacted upon their nuclear weapons decisions. Overall, the two countries show international dimensions and collaboration with one or more of the established five nuclear states—both in the development of their nuclear complex and in the development of its motivations.

A Historical Analysis of “Super Powers” Nuclear Proliferation Cases

This chapter examines the treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which serves as the basis for the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. The treaty allows only five states—the USA, Soviet Union (now Russia), China, Britain, and France—to have nuclear weapons. A historical analysis is undertaken of these five nuclear powers’ nuclear armament processes. This is achieved by means of both a review of the literature and an analysis of the historical experiences of the nuclear powers. The principal question that this chapter seeks to answer is: what is the level of technological capability and the motivation behind these states’ decision to develop nuclear weapons?