Ray Donnelly

Board Structure, Ownership, and Voluntary Disclosure in Ireland

This is a cross-sectional study of the relation between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure in Ireland. We report clear evidence that voluntary disclosure increases with the number of nonexecutive directors on the board. Firms that have a nonexecutive chairman make greater voluntary disclosures than other firms. This finding is not robust to the inclusion of other explanatory variables. We find no evidence that ownership structure is related to voluntary disclosure. The results regarding nonexecutive directors are interpreted as independent boards facilitating a reduction in information asymmetry between owners and managers. While this supports the predictions of agency theory, the absence of evidence that ownership structure influences voluntary disclosure does not. It is posited that sociological and organizational factors (e.g., informal networking) that pervade the Irish market mitigate against our disclosure measure capturing all aspects of voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, indirect evidence is provided that there are other costs and benefits to disclosure that vary across firms and may outweigh agency costs in many situations. We conclude that while agency theory has some explanatory power for voluntary disclosure, it cannot explain all the cross-sectional differences in voluntary disclosure by Irish public limited companies. The results support the attention paid by regulators to the proportion of nonexecutive directors on the board. However, the costs and benefits to disclosure vary across firms. Regardless of agency considerations and regulatory guidelines, firms will ultimately formulate their disclosure policy with reference to overall marginal costs and marginal benefits.

The ownership structure of UK firms and the informativeness of accounting earnings

Abstract This paper provides evidence that in the UK, a firms ownership structure is related to the informativeness of its accounting earnings for price. Evidence is reported that concentrated outside ownership is negatively related to the contemporaneous price-earnings association. This is interpreted as indicative of more non-accounting information being collected and disseminated for firms whose ownership includes large outside (non-managerial) blocks and a consequential loss of informativeness of contemporaneous accounting earnings. Having controlled for the information environment, we provide evidence that the overall relation between return and earnings is attenuated for firms with diffuse outside ownership. This is interpreted as evidence of the market anticipating opportunistic managerial manipulation of earnings when outside ownership is diffuse.

Earnings Persistence, Losses and the Estimation of Earnings Response Coefficients

One of the major themes of capital markets accounting research concerns mapping the relation between accounting earnings and security returns. There is still not agreement on the functional form of this relation. The models analysed here are those where: the level of earnings alone, the change in earnings alone, or both, scaled by price, are used as explanatory variables for returns. This article demonstrates that if earnings are either completely permanent or entirely transitory, the earnings response coefficients (ERCs) estimated by levels and changes models should coincide. However, if earnings comprise a mixed process of permanent and transitory components, the ERC estimated by the levels will differ from that estimated by the changes model. Using losses to identify transitory components in earnings, empirical evidence consistent with these predictions is provided. A combined model using both the level of, and change in, earnings is justified as a weighted average of an earnings and a book value valuation model (e.g., Ohlson, 1989). An alternative rationalization concerns the mitigation of an errors-in-variables problem associated with the estimation of unexpected earnings (Ali and Zarowin, 1992). The results for the combined model are more consistent with the latter. In this context, some previous empirical studies perceive the levels variable as a useful addition to the changes variable when there are transitory components in earnings. However, the evidence reported here suggests that the level of earnings, scaled by price, appears to be the fundamental earnings explanatory variable for returns (Ohlson, 1991, p. 1). The changes variable can, when the errors-in-variables problem is not mitigated by other methods, be a useful addition to the levels variable.

Non-Audit Services Provided to Audit Clients, Independence of Mind and Independence in Appearance: Latest Evidence from Large UK Listed Companies

This paper investigates whether the provision of non-audit services (NAS) to audit clients impairs auditor independence of mind and independence in appearance. The main contributions of this paper are in terms of its timeliness with respect to regulatory changes, the simultaneous examination of both forms of auditor independence and the methodological innovation whereby it uses a variable derived from the level of abnormal audit fees as a moderating variable in order to capture the direct impact of the NAS fee level on auditor independence as well as how its influence is moderated by the level of unexpected audit fees. Our results indicate that auditor independence of mind is compromised by the size of NAS fees, particularly for clients who pay below the level of expected audit fee. The stock market perceives that auditor independence is compromised by NAS fees but, at the same time, additional tests indicate that there are benefits that accrue from NAS and, in particular, the relation between return and non-discretionary net income is increasing in NAS fees. The balance of evidence suggests that the European Union is correct in undertaking some reform of the auditing market.

An Assessment of Corporate Governance Reforms in Italy Based on a Comparative Analysis of Earnings Management

– The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the impact of corporate governance reforms in Italy. , – The authors argue that the effectiveness of corporate governance can best be assessed with reference to the choices made by management or controlling shareholders. They use the curtailment of earnings management as a desirable and measureable outcome of good corporate governance to assess Italy’s progress since the 1990s. The UK is used as a reference point because it is a European Union (EU) economy of comparable size and there is evidence that its firms managed earnings to a much lesser extent than their counterparts in Italy in the 1990s. A matched sample of UK and Italian firms was used for the empirical analysis. , – It was found that in contrast to the situation in the 1990s, firms in Italy do not manage earnings to a greater extent than their UK counterparts after the corporate governance reforms. In addition, firm-level governance has a greater effect on earnings management in Italy than in the UK. The authors attribute this to firm-level governance compensating for deficiencies in national institutions. , – The restriction of earnings management is just one positive consequence of good governance. Other positive outcomes require to be studied to form a complete picture of the impact of governance reforms in Italy. , – This paper is the first to use an outcome-driven approach to evaluate the impact of governance reforms.

The acquisition puzzle and mispricing: evidence of over-optimism

Purpose - – Researchers suspect that the overvaluation of equity issuing acquirers is a major cause of their subsequent post-event underperformance. Definitive conclusions regarding this overpricing hypothesis have not been possible since indicators of overpricing such as the book-to-market ratio and subsequent underperformance are open to alternative interpretations. The purpose of this paper is to corroborate or refute overvaluation as a driver of equity issuing acquirers’ subsequent underperformance. Design/methodology/approach - – The literature has linked overvaluation of acquirers to over-optimistic expectations. The authors use analysts’ earnings forecasts to reflect the markets expectations. Over-optimism is indicated by subsequent earnings disappointments. The authors examine the relation between acquirers’ choice of payment method and their tendency to report disappointing earnings. The authors also examine the effect of including a more direct measure of over-optimism in a model to explain the long-run post-event buy-and-hold-abnormal returns of acquirers. Findings - – The post-acquisition earnings of equity issuing acquirers disappoint more often than those of acquirers employing alternative financing methods. This relationship is confined to glamour acquirers. The ability of financing method to predict long-run post-acquisition performance is subsumed when direct measures of optimism are included in a model explaining long-run post-acquisition performance. This result is robust to controls for overpayment and other potential explanations of post-acquisition underperformance. Research limitations/implications - – Acquirers’ management exploit their information advantage to exchange overvalued equity for the assets of the target company in accordance with Loughran and Ritters (2000) behavioural timing hypothesis. Originality/value - – The study provides new and unambiguous evidence that equity-issuing acquirers are optimistically priced at the time of acquisition.

The valuation of abnormal accruals and corporate governance

For the most part the extant literature considers abnormal accruals to be opportunistic and discounted by the market. However, an alternative view is that abnormal accruals signal manager’s private information of firm value and profitability so are valued positively by the market. In addition, there is evidence that effective corporate governance mitigates opportunistic earnings manipulation. While prior studies have tested for the impact of corporate governance on the value relevance of earnings this study is different in that it focuses on the impact of governance on the value relevance of that part of earnings that are likely to be manipulated: abnormal accruals. Using a sample that is comprised exclusively of accounting data reported under IFRS evidence is provided that the market views abnormal accruals as being on average opportunistic. However, it also perceives this opportunism to be mitigated by effective corporate governance. These findings are robust to alternative ways of measuring abnormal ac...

Cross-sectional Variation in Price Anticipation of Earnings

Estimates of the earnings response coefficient (ERC) can be improved by including leading returns in return-earnings models. This improvement in estimated ERC can be used to measure price anticipation of earnings. It is posited that this price anticipation is related to the information environment of a firm. Theories and prior empirical research pertaining to the information environment (e.g. Bhushan, 1989; Frankel et al., 1994) are used to identify three variables, breadth of trading, capital issues and volatility of returns, which potentially determine the extent of price anticipation of earnings. The empirical tests suggest that the tendency of prices to lead earnings is negatively related to thin trading and is positively related to the propensity for external financing and return volatility in the year immediately prior to that to which the anticipated earnings pertain. Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998.

Active institutional investors and the board of directors

The present research examines the role of activist institutional investors in the formation of the board of directors. Activist institutional investors, such as pension funds, have a long term investment perspective and are independent of the firms in which they hold significant stakes. This study finds that pension fund ownership is associated with boards that are more independent of management and have more balanced compositions. The strongest results pertain to an overall board quality index reflecting board efficiency, board leadership, board independence and balance. The finding that activist institutional investors influence the board vindicates the efforts of regulators to encourage institutional investors to be active in terms of corporate governance.

Impairment reversals: unbiased reporting or earnings management

Purpose This paper aims to provide evidence that will inform the convergence debate regarding accounting standards. The authors assess the ability of impairment reversals allowed under International Accounting Standard 36 but disallowed by the Financial Accounting Standards Board to provide useful information about a company. Design/methodology/approach The authors use a sample of 182 Malaysian firms that reversed impairment charges and a matched sample of firms which chose not to reverse their impairments. Further analysis examines if reversing an impairment charge is associated with motivations for and evidence of earnings management. Findings The authors find no evidence that the reversal of an impairment charge marks a company out as managing contemporaneous earnings. However, they document evidence that firms with high levels of abnormal accruals and weak corporate governance avoid earnings decline by reversing previously recognized impairments. In addition, companies that have engaged in big baths as evidenced by high accumulated impairment balances and prior changes in top management, use impairment reversals to avoid earnings declines. Research limitations/implications The results of this study support both the informative and opportunistic hypotheses of impairment reversal reporting using Financial Reporting Standard 136. Practical implications The results also demonstrate how companies that use impairment reversals opportunistically can be identified. Originality/value The results support IASB’s approach to the reversal of impairments. They also provide novel evidence as to how companies exploit a cookie-jar reserve created by a prior big bath opportunistically.